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This work offers the major hypothesis that political
stability is directly related to economic stability in
Greece and then investigates whether Greece's accession
to the European Economic Community will provide the economic
prerequisites necessary for equilibrium. The study traces
Greek economic development through three eras: the pre-
junta period of Karamanlis influence, the seven years of
dictatorship by the Colonels and the New Democracy period
from July 1974 on. It investigates the existing relation-
ships between Greece and the EEC by discussing their
historical ties and the advantages, disadvantages and
political implications of accession. Finally, it analyzes
several factors crucial to Greece's economic welfare by
determining each factor's movement, by weighting each factor
with respect to economic development and EEC accession
and by comparing the weighted results . The work suggests
from the results of this comparison that accession to the
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The international environment in the Eastern Medi-
terranean today vibrates with tension. The two primary
actors, Greece and Turkey, face major domestic difficulties,
particularly in their economic sectors. The governing regimes
hang in the balance waiting for economic improvement while
seeking remedies for inflation, unemployment and trade
deficits, realizing that their political stability directly
depends upon economic outcomes . The other nations of the
world, particularly Europe whose "soft underbelly" these
two countries protect, watch intently as circumstances
develop. Their opportunities to influence the situation are
infrequent and must be exploited quickly,. This study evalu-
ates one such opportunity: Greece's accession to full
membership in the European Economic Community (EEC)
.
The work offers a major hypothesis that political stability
is directly related to economic stability in Greece and
then investigates whether Greece's accession to the EEC
provides the economic prerequisites necessary for equilib-
rium. The study addresses the problem by analyzing several
factors crucial to Greece's economic welfare. The
methodology determines trends for the selected factors,
weights the factors with respect to economic development and
EEC accession, and then compares the resulting weighted





To ensure the selection of the most critical and rele-
vant elements for evaluation, the study first traces Greek
economic development through three eras: the pre-junta
period of Karamanlis influence, the seven years of dicta-
torship by the Colonels and the New Democracy period from
July 1974 to the present. This portion of the analysis
includes a discussion of Greek economic plans and outlooks
for the future.
Since the major concern of the work is the ramifications
of Greek accession to full EEC membership, it also addresses
the existing relationships between Greece and the European
Community. It discusses the historical ties of Greek asso-
ciate membership since 1962, outlines for Greece and the
EEC the advantages and disadvantages of accession, and
points out the political implications of the proposed union.
The study draws conclusions by evaluating the selected
factors in light of Greek economic developments and previous
association with the EEC. The work provides a description
of each factor, a discussion of its significance to both
Greek economic development and EEC accession and a tabulation
of available numerical indicators showing factor movement.
The economic elements are selected, weighted and evaluated
subjectively, based upon the author's determination of
their relevance and salience today.
To determine if Greece's accession to the EEC will
enhance her economic stability and subsequently her political
13

vitality is essential. Her importance in the Eastern
Mediterranean has increased exponentially with the inter-
national shift in emphasis from strategic to regional con-
cerns. She is a next door neighbor to the volatile Middle
East and lies just across the Mediterranean from Africa and
the ever increasing tensions on that continent. She occupies
a vital position in the southern flank of the NATO alliance
and retains the capability to blunt the impact of Warsaw
Pact forces in the Balkans. Her modernizing naval fleet
effectively patrols the Aegean and with the strategic use
of her hundreds of islands in that sea can significantly
curtail Soviet warship movement to and from Black Sea bases.
Her proximity to the Eastern bloc countries provides an
ideal location for intelligence surveillence sites and the
monitoring of Communist activities. Finally, her Western
ties, but geographically central location, provde her a
unique opportunity to bridge the economic, political and
social gulf between North and South, and East and West.
This work does not suggest that Greece should or should
not accede to the EEC. The vital question is whether or not
the accession will improve Greece's economic stability. If
it does, her political stability will follow and the potential
of her unique position in the Eastern Mediterranean will be
realized. If the accession proves unsettling economically,
political chaos may well follow and prevent Greece from
making any positive contributions toward the solution of
14

international problems. This thesis will suggest probabili-






At the conclusion of the Italian/German occupation in
1945, and the communist civil war which ended in 1949,
Greece faced near-total economic dislocation. What infra-
structure the occupying forces left intact the communist
and partisan forces destroyed leaving the country without a
viable economic system. More than 2000 individual villages
were destroyed leaving 650,000 refugees completely dependent
on the state and over one-third of the population in need of
some public aid. Industry and exports stopped, while imports
slowed to a 10 percent trickle of their pre-war level and
uncontrolled inflation destroyed the monetary system. Only
with the help of vast amounts of Western financial aid and
groups of advisors was the government finally able to reestab-
lish the political channels and economic networks necessary
for Greece's national survival.
The trauma of the war years lingered, however, and the
Greeks turned to the social structure which in the past
provided them individually with security and reasonable
advancement opportunities. This structure employed the con-
cept of the extended family and utilized extensive patronage.
Although reassuring, and capable of meeting the country's
basic economic needs, this inefficient and cumbersome system
appeared to provide little capability to meet the postwar
16

challenge of an international economic revolution, and
Greece immediately fell behind her Western allies in
reconstruction efforts.
In 1955 however, following the death of the then Prime
Minister, Marshal Papagos , King Paul appointed Konstantine
Karamanlis premier and started a period of startling growth
which lasted for more than eight years. The following
figures illustrate a favorable comparison with other
2
economically advancing European countries
.
TABLE 1-1
AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE IN GREEK






Source: Economic Development Issues , pp. 10-11.
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Source: Economic Development Issues, pp. 10-11
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France 5 . 4
mean 6 . 2
Source: Economic Development Issues , pp. 10-11.
These figures demonstrate another interesting considera-
tion in light of additional structural problems facing
Greece. As with most developing countries, primary produc-
tion (agriculture, livestock, fishing, hunting and forestry)
18

played the most important role in the economy throughout
the Karamanlis period, accounting for 3 2 percent of the GDP
in 1953 and 25 percent in 1963. Primary production's
dominance during this period compared to the production of
the second highest contributor, manufacturing which totaled
14 percent and 18 percent of GDP in those two years, was
significant.
Even so, the agricultural sector had several distinct
geographic disadvantages. Only about 2 8 percent of the
land (9.15 million acres) could be cultivated and only about
11 percent of that irrigated. Because of the return to
the extended family structure, the size of individual land
holdings decreased, approaching an average of eight acres
4in 1961. In most cases, the owners acquired their land
piecemeal and consequently owned several small plots (one
to two acres), widely separated by plots of other owners.
This prohibited the use of farm machines and large scale
cultivation techniques and thus drastically reduced efficiency
and yield.
In the manufacturing sector, the clan syndrome again
prohibited economies of scale. Most firms (95 percent in
1958) employed less than ten workers, preferring to keep
their businesses small and staffed with relatives or trusted
friends. Scarcity of resources, unavailability of domestic
markets
,
poor lines of communication and a dearth of
organizing and technical talent contributed to holding back
real modernization and growth in this sector.
19

Despite these negative conditions, the economy in
Greece did expand compared to other European countries from
1955 to 1963. One indicator, the quantity of public savings,
predicted Greece's growth by standing out as unusually high
for a developing nation. In most similar cases, because
of a lack of consumer confidence, savings rates and thus
capital accumulation are generally low, hindering economic
expansion. In 1955, the Greek domestic savings to GDP
ratio was 15.5 percent and climbed to 20.5 percent in
19 61. These ratios compared favorably with other countries.
TABLE 1-5
DOMESTIC SAVINGS TO GDP










Source: Ellis, Industrial Capital in Greek
Development, p. 106.
Significantly, the public savings to GDP ratio averaged
only 2 percent over these years while private investment
equaled 14 percent. Psilos suggests that the large private
20

portion resulted from growth in per capita income ($180 in
1955 to $240 in 1964), price stability, tax incentives on
income earned from deposits and high rates of return on
deposits (maximum: 9.57 percent in 1956, minimum: 4 percent
in 19 63) . Consequently, the relatively high amount of
capital accumulation from 1955 to 1963 in the form of private
savings gave Greece the edge in combating strong negative
growth pressure.
The Karamanlis premiership lasted nearly eight years,
the longest continuous tenure of a prime minister since
Greece gained independence. The son of a Macedonian school
teacher and later a tobacco merchant, this man did not
typify Greece's usual political elite. He spent many years
before starting his political service working to support
his family and solve the problems of provincial living. His
understanding in these areas provided much of his appeal
to the Greek voter and helped to provide his insight into
the severe structural difficulties of the 1950' s and early
1960 's. As leader of the National Radical Union (ERE),
Karamanlis based his political goals on continued monetary
stability and the expansion of the market economy concept.
To realize these goals, he had to ensure the competitiveness
of Greek domestic products, and in 1955 and 1958 the govern-
ment imposed certain restrictions on imports. These measures
effectively prevented the consumption of excessive amounts
of luxury and non-essential commodity items and turned
the Greek consumers toward their own products.
21

Karamanlis' critics accused him of overworking wage
controls to achieve expansion without inflation and of
holding the free enterprise system up as a panacea for all
Greek economic ills. Nevertheless, those in opposition could
not deny his accomplishments which included the beginning
of several new light industries, the introduction of modern
agricultural techniques and the construction of numerous
g
modern roads, hotels and other tourist-oriented facilities.
By 1963, Karamanlis' efforts had laid a broad and firm
foundation for Greece's economic future. However, since
his political position lay right of center and his tactics
originated in a rigid, conservative base, strong opposition
arose in the moderate left-tending Center Union Party (EK)
,
headed by George Papandreou, a man nearly as well liked as
Karamanlis. A bitter struggle ensued resulting in Karamanlis'
self imposed exile to Paris and the election of Papandreou
as Prime Minister in 1964.
The EK's economic goals differed little from those of
the ERE, with increased industrialization and agricultural
productivity heading the list. As Karamanlis had, Papandreou
faced a need for sound planning in the acquisition of
investment capital to expand these two sectors . This meant
maintaining an encouraging atmosphere to attract a combina-
tion of private domestic resources and foreign funds. To
do this he had to keep the balance of trade deficit as low
as possible (it increased from $514 million in 1963 to
22

$576 million in 1964) and carefully orchestrate the fl ow
of invisible income which traditionally offset the higher
9import values.
TABLE 1-6
PERCENTAGE OF GREEK TRADE DEFICIT
COVERED BY INVISIBLES





Exchange Receipts 42 43
Total 90 75
Source: Economic Development Issues
, p. 30.
The Karamanlis administration had previously established
the Research Committee for the Organization of Economic
Planning which presented the country's first five year plan
in 1959. It specified targets for growth rates, increases
in agricultural and industrial income, regional development,
and market competition capabilities. From I960 to 1964
however, the Greek economy far exceeded these specified
goals, which demonstrated the need for a much more scientific
method of forecasting. The Papandreou regime, realizing
this and noting the increasing complexity of world economic
conditions, established the Center of Planning and Economic
23

Research in late 1964. The following year, the Center
submitted a scientifically generated economic plan with
growth objectives for the 1966 to 1970 period. The target
figures included specific increases for GDP (7 to 8 percent)
,
per capita income ($570-800) , sector productivity, and
employment. The proposals also spelled out income redis-
tribution plans to equalize regional and sector differences,
and estimated the amount of foreign investment required to
offset balance of payment deficits while projecting an
increase in import and export trade figures.
The research revealed two basic requirements: the
structure of the economy needed drastic revision and the
political leadership of the country had to remain stable
and forceful. Ironically, events in the last months of
1965 touched off political turmoil of critical consequence
for the nation and the recommended plan for economic restruc-
turing was never implemented. In April 1967, the country
began to reevaluate its entire social structure under the
leadership of a military oligarchy, and economic planning
lay dormant for some time.
THE MILITARY OLIGARCHY
An analysis of the circumstances surrounding the military
coup in the spring of 1967 lies beyond the scope of this
study. It must be noted however, that worsening economic
conditions in late 1965 and 1966 contributed to the usurpa-




CHANGE IN GREEK GROSS
NATIONAL PRODUCT
'63 *64 '65 '66 '67
Year
Source : OECD Economic Survey 1977
Prior to the last two years of democratic rule, the civilian
governments of Karamanlis and Papandreou established a
sound base for economic growth. Paul Samuelson writing for
Newsweek two months after the coup stated that Greek output
grew faster than in any other European country, that per
capita living standards climbed rapidly relative to Western
Europe, that Greece belonged with the miracle nations Japan
and Israel in growth accomplishments and that the accom-
plishments were not a "flash in the pan," but real growth
represented by price stability.
Three very important conditions existed in 19 6 7 which
12further favored economic success by the Junta. First, the
monetary stability of the nation during the previous twelve
years had inspired the confidence of the Greek people and,
as pointed out, encouraged their propensity to invest in
25

bank savings. This habit continued even through the 1965
to 1966 period of uncertainty and on into the Junta years,
providing the banking system with considerable financing
capital for expansion projects.
TABLE 1-7
GREEK PRIVATE SAVINGS DEPOSITS
Deposits Percent








Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1976 .
Second, the economic growth up to 196 7 had
created excess productive capacity which the military
government exploited over the next several years. Third,
positive world economic conditions favored expansion in
other nations and enhanced Greece's growth through inter-
action with these markets
.
It must also be pointed out however, that the European
Economic Community, of which Greece had been an associate
member since 1962, suspended all development funds to Greece
(over $200 million) immediately after the Junta assumed
26

power. This appreciably hindered the financing of long
range development projects which otherwise could have been
instituted. The military leaders stepped into an economic
environment conducive to growth and expansion. Many critics
later contended that the oligarchy could have accomplished
much more under these conditions if they had relied more on
long-range planning efforts and less on publicizing showy,
short-term projects. The results of their years in power
revealed many flaws but also produced growth figures which
cannot be ignored.
After the political environment stabilized in 1967, the
military leaders resurrected the Economic Research Center's
plan shelved in 1966, and with certain alterations, presented
14their own version for 1968 to 1972. The plan focused on
modernizing the total structure of the economy, but did not
specifically detail the methods to be used for the individual
changes. It did specify "giving private enterprise its
head" by increasing competition, utilizing free-market
mechanisms, and more efficiently allocating resources.
Government incentives provided the guidance for market
direction. Secondly, it suggested rapid industrialization
by encouraging a maximum amount of foreign investment and
the actual establishment of foreign businesses in Greece.
Major incentive plans also provided the draw in these cases.
Thirdly, the plan focused on agricultural reforms, including
an increase in farm incomes to establish parity with urban
living standards. This restructuring required the
27

consolidation of the fragmented farm plots and the estab-
lishment of government support prices and subsidies.
"Intervention prices" provided encouragement to shift from
surplus goods to more profitable, exportable ones. The
plan also included: adjustment of income taxes, new shipping
policies, insurance of exports, simplification of the mone-
tary and credit systems, liberalization of closed professions
16
and expansion of health, welfare and social security services.
Since the plan called for a basic restructuring of the
economy, it faced several obstacles and much resistance.
Increasing free-market competition required overcoming limited
natural resource availability, a small domestic market
already dominated by inefficient, tariff protected monopolies,
and non-availability of financing even though the banks
swelled with private savings deposits. The credit institutions
judged new business risk to be too high and collateral too
low.
Facing an ever increasing balance of trade deficit,
the government's industrial development emphasis lay with
increasing the number of domestic firms producing goods for
export by offering low interest rates and substantial tax
incentives. To foreign investors they offered even more
generous terms. These included: prohibition of expropria-
tion, irrevocable agreement terms, repatriation of profits
and non-taxable foreign employee wages.
28

In certain cases, the agreed upon conditions bordered
on the absurd, as a result of the government's eagerness
for foreign investment, Steyr-Daimler-Puch, a tractor and
truck manufacturing company, agreed to establish a plant in
Greece if Athens placed a ban on importing all second hand
tractors and trucks and only allowed loans from the Agricul-
17tural Bank to farmers buying the Steyr product. The
Colonels went along with the stipulations.
In the agricultural sector, and again to aid in improving
the balance of trade, the government encouraged domestic
production of consumer food items traditionally imported,
as well as those profitably exported. This endeavor faced
particular difficulty because of the existing subsidizing
practice which paid a high price to farmers for goods not
demanded by market conditions. For instance, wheat produc-
tion far exceeded domestic demand, and could not compete
with world prices as an export, yet remained heavily subsidized.
To tally the economic balance sheet for the years of the
Junta is a difficult task. Several positive aspects must
be noted. The average growth rate in GNP ranged between 7
19
and 8 percent from 1968 to 1972, acceptable by any standards.
Consumer wages increased an average of 8 percent each year
while consumer prices averaged a rise of only 1.5 percent
20for the period. Consumer goods improved substantially in
quality, style and availability. New roads, telephone lines
and public constructions including sports stadiums, schools
and town squares increased in number. Receipts from merchant
29

shipping increased by 47 percent from 1966 to 1970 after a
concerted effort to entice Greek ship owners to reestablish
21home offices in Greece. Similar efforts to increase home
registry of Hellenic owned ships moved Greece from the
seventh to the fifth largest fleet in the world (an increase
from 7.4 to 19.3 million gross registered tons from 1963
22to 1972).
In the industrial sector, total industrial- output increased
by 13.4 percent from 1968 to 1972, exceeding the government's
target of 11.4 percent and obtaining the largest increase
of any sector. Manufacturing output matched the total of
23industry at 13.0 percent. Manufacturing exports increased
over 200 percent for the same period and accounted for 34
percent of total exports in 1972, compared with 19 percent
24in 1968.
In agriculture, the military regime's weakest growth
area, officials managed to discontinue certain backward
patterns of operation, remove bureaucratic pressures holding
back long-range plans and successfully reallocate some
resources. They accomplished much of this by establishing
a Regional Services branch in the Ministry of Coordination
which made the real needs of the rural community better known
25to the government." Although the farmers initially balked
at a less favorable price support policy instituted to redirect
the type of crops produced, extensive irrigation, flood
control and land reclaimation projects changed their feelings.
30

The government also initiated a non-participating welfare
plan which provided free medical care and pensions for all
actively producing farmers.
In the area of foreign investment, the Colonels realized
immediately that the coup of April 1967 might ruin investor
confidence and frighten away foreign money. Consequently,
they established extremely liberal standards for investment.
The enticements worked, and within a few short months,
foreign capital again began to flow into Greece.
The statistics on the Junta's performance present a
fairly impressive picture of economic growth, expansion and
goal attainment. However, many critics contend that the
statistics are misleading and that an investigation into
the factors behind the Junta's accomplishments reveal decay
and structural weakness. Andreous Papandreou in his 1970
account of the military regime's activities asserts that a
real, competitive market economy could not expand as out-
lined by the Colonels because of their continuously changing
2 6
laws and decisions. He accuses them of merely shifting
the center of privilege from traditional monopolies to foreign
investors, rather than equalizing the business environment
for all. He cites their use of deficit spending (anathema
to "sound monetary management") as a cause for later infla-
27tionary tendencies. Papandreou summarizes his condemnation
of the regime by concluding that the large increases in
balance of payments and volume of available money in the
31

economy combined with strict price controls, destroyed the
economic infrastructure. The analysis is understandably
colored by his antagonistic relationship with the government
as the son of George Papandreou, and by the fact that he
only evaluated 196 7 and 1968, two of the worst years for
the regime.
The Junta did lack confidence in their economic manage-
ment capability and hired a division of Litton Industries
as management consultants and to secure investment capital
for development projects on Crete and in the western
Peloponnesus. The terms of the contract were more than
generous for Litton (11 percent above all costs plus 2
percent of all capital raised) , once again demonstrating the
over-solicitous attitude of the government toward most foreign
2 8firms. In this case Litton could not find the required
investments and the Junta canceled the contract at little
economic cost. They had widely publicized the expected
benefits of the agreement, however, and the situation resulted
in embarrassing publicity.
Several other highly acclaimed major economy building
29projects ended in the same manner. In 1969, the regime
reached a $600 million agreement with Aristotle Onassis to
build Greece's third oil refinery, a second aluminum smelter,
a large power station and a petrochemical complex. Shortly
after the initial signing, Mr. Onassis determined that he
needed more money to offset higher costs. Negotiations
32

ensued but the matter eventually reverted to an international
board of arbitration which tied up all progress on the criti-
cal projects for two years. Another example: In late 1970
an Italian consortium agreed to construct a car manufacturing
and assembly plant in northern Greece. After the initial
announcement of agreement nothing more happened. Critics
contested that the Junta's search for the big deals, as
demonstrated here, prevented the accomplishment of vital
smaller projects and further cited that the regime failed
to bring any major industrial projects to fruition during
the seven year period.
The foreign investment problem also drove the Junta to
provide incentives to domestic firms which sought and obtained
credit abroad. These companies were usually awarded public
works contracts which invariably cost the state more because
of the high cost of financing the foreign credit.
At a Stanford Research Institute meeting in 1974, Achilles
Cominos , former Governor of the National Bank of Greece
demonstrated the extent of foreign money involvement in
the Greek economy. He stated that in a 19 71 sample of 50
industrial firms, foreign interests wholly owned only
twenty-six which accounted for 8 percent of the fixed assets
of the sample. However, another fifty-seven firms showed
"important foreign equity participation" and accounted for
23 percent of the fixed assets. Additionally, in another
sample of the 200 largest manufacturing exporters in Greece,
33

Mr. Cominos showed that 45 percent of their total exports
were made by firms with "substantial foreign participation."
Evaluating the agricultural sector, even the Junta
admitted that the desired expansion did not occur. From
196 8 to 1972 , agricultural production increased only 1.8
percent vice a target of 5.2 percent and composed only 17.1
percent of production vice a target of 21 percent. This
resulted not only from the fragmentation of land holdings
,
poor distribution of crops grown, and government price
subsidies which contributed to inefficiency, but because
the rural Greek traditionally looked to the government as
the promoter of agricultural development and did not consider
it his responsibility. At the same time he distrusted
official efforts and "sought ways and means to circumvent
the law, obtain special consideration and evade his responsi-
32bilities as a citizen." To meet the seasonal labor
demands, the government attempted to keep the rural popula-
tion on the farms by promising to bring them urban conve-
niences. When the bureaucracy could not produce them, it
further alienated the farm communities . Legg contends that
ordering the Ministry of the Interior to provide all villages
with electricity, telephones and water only offered expec-
33
tations that could not be realized.
The regime attempted to consolidate the fragmented land
holdings by purchasing the smallest plots and reselling
them to the larger adjacent landowners. This totally ignored
the basic Greek cultural precept of land equating to status
34

and self worth and thus met strong resistance. What
consolidation measures the regime did implement, did not
contain provisions against refragmentation and did not
pursue the holdings of rural landowners who left the villages
and migrated to the city.
Other than the agricultural shortfalls, the burgeoning
trade deficit throughout the Junta years was the most
criticized characteristic. The deficit rose from $926
million in 1968 to $2032 million in 1973, an increase of
34119 percent m five years.
Admittedly, a case can be made for both points of view,
that from 19 6 7 to 19 73, the Junta in some ways improved the
Greek economy and in some ways prevented its expansion.
However, the most critical question which faced the replace-
ment government in July 19 74 centered on the state of the
economy at that time, i.e., the legacy of the Junta.
Once again as has happened so often in Greek history,
political turmoil and unrest overtook events in the last
months of 1973 and the summer of 1974. As the political
environment worsened, economic conditions began to deterior-
ate and soon became critical to the survival of the nation.
Between 1972 and 1973, the consumer price index rose nearly
35 percent, the highest in Europe, and the balance of trade defi-
cit shot up by 75 percent . The Gross National Product, for
3 6
the first time since WW II, declined by 2 percent in 1974.
An even more serious downward tend developed in the receipt
of invisible earnings, the traditional means of offsetting
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the trade deficit. Foreign exchange monies sent home by
Greek seamen increased at a rate comparable with previous
years, but income from foreign travel (tourism) dropped by
15 percent and receipts from emigrant workers fell by 12
4-
37percent.
Although partly due to worsening world economic condi-
tions in 19 73 and 19 74, the civilian government recalled in
July 1974 faced a recession, devastating inflation and a
balance of payments total which had lost much of its invisi-
ble compensating capital. These conditions coupled with near
total internal political instability and the threat of war
with Turkey over Cyprus confronted Mr. Karamanlis and his
New Democracy Party with a monumental task. The critical




The Karamanlis Government defined several specific and
immediate actions required upon taking office: 1) return
to normal economic processes and abolish emergency proce-
dures established during the Cyprus crisis, 2) stop further
increases in the balance of payments, 3) restock the domestic
market and arrest price increases, 4) restore monetary
stability by readjusting the supply and availability of
money, 5) provide specific help to the farmers and lower
income workers hardest hit by the inflation, 6) rebuild
citizen confidence in the economy at a time of increased
36

unemployment and decreased job security for emigrant
workers, 7) acquire funds for the nation's defense against
38
a hostile Turkey. To accomplish this program required a
precise juggling act by the new administration because of
the delicate equilibrium existing in the balance of payments
and inflation areas. One pressure applied in the wrong
direction could start the entire negative trend all over
again and this placed considerable restraint on the policies
the new government could adopt.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1975, the Greek economy
made a near miraculous recovery and the immediate crisis
passed. The Gross Domestic Produce rose 3.7 percent compared
with a 2 percent drop in 1974. The inflation rate decreased
from a Consumer Price Index (CPI) rise of 26.9 percent in
1974 to 15.2 percent in 1975. The balance of payments
actually decreased with a reduction in the current accounts
deficit from $1218 million in 1974 to $1009 million in
391975.
Several factors qualified these results, however.
Although actual GDP rose in 1975, agricultural production
slowed from 9.2 percent in 1974 to 2.9 percent in 1975,
primarily because of only small gains in livestock and
animal feed production. Even though a decrease in real
terms, the output did reflect the beginning of structural
changes, shifting the sector to the production of high
income exportables and domestic required items.
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The large reduction in inflation figures reflected a
considerably lower rate of imported goods, the flooding of
the market with items hoarded during the crisis months, and
a decrease in demand on production capacity. All these
factors worked in the absence of price controls and began
to drive market price trends downward. Purchasing power
expanded as the average monthly wage increased by 20 percent
in 19 75, even though employment decreased by .4 percent.
The latter trend resulted primarily from Greek emigrant
workers returning home, layoffs in the building industry
overheated by the Junta, and new workers seeking employment
for the first time.
A major concern of the Karamanlis government related to
inflation and dealt with the money supply in the economy.
Too much currency in circulation or on demand in sight
deposits increased the possibility of an inflationary spiral.
The growth rate in the money supply slowed down by 4.1
percent from 1974 to 1975, primarily because private confi-
dence in the economy returned and savings deposits increased
41by 32 percent compared to 18.5 percent in 197 4.
Finally, the 19 7 5 reduction in the balance of payments
resulted from an exchange rate policy which increased the
competitiveness of Greek exports and exerted downward
pressure on private demands for imports. Additionally, an
increase in invisible earnings helped to reduce the deficit.
Foreign travelers regained their trust in the stability of
the Greek environment and increased their spending by 2 8
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percent over 1974. Remittances from emigrant workers
increased 2.5 percent while returns from shipping moved up
only 0.7 percent due to the world downturn in that market.
The government easily financed the current account deficit
with a substantial increase in foreign capital inflow which
also expanded because of increased confidence in the new
government's control over the political situation.
After stabilizing the economic environment in the first
eighteen months of its administration, the New Democracy
Party turned to adjusting the structure to meeting longer
range objectives. Officials outlined their goals in a Five-
Year-Plan for 1976 to 1980 developed by the Institute for
Planning and Research. The proposal provided for growth
in national income, but specified this as a means rather than
an end, stating that "reforms aiming at an improvement in
structure and organization, leading to better education and
social services as a means of creating conditions wherein
a comfortable and intimately close family life can be
43
enjoyed" were the ultimate goals. It specifically cited
certain benchmarks
:
1) Increase production and incomes,
2) Develop industrial units,
3) Contain price increases compatible
with principal trading partners,
4) Reduce the current accounts deficit 50 percent
by 1980,
5) Equalize income distribution between social
classes and regions,
6) Expand social services,
which it suggested could be accomplished by an annual GNP
increase of 6 to 7 percent (2 percent higher than the average
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forecasted for Western European countries) and a yearly
inflation rate no higher than 10 percent.
The Karamanlis administration quickly began several
programs designed to realize the objectives in the Five
Year Plan. Price control measures started in early 1976
when authorities established a list of essential commodities
which required importers to give advance notice and justi-
fication for price increases. Officials expanded the list
from time to time and postponed certain proposed increases
when necessary. Other measures reduced wholesalers' profit
margins, obliged producers to recommend retail prices,
enacted fines against speculators, and established laws
.
- , . , . 45
curtailing monopolies.
To improve the government's capability to administer
public programs , monetary officials tackled the particularly
resistant problem of taxation distribution. They implemented
new measures which 1) increased the tax on dividend income,
2) levied a capital gains tax on land and buildings of
commerical, industrial and financial enterprises and 3) rein-
forced regulations to combat tax evasion. Analysts expected
these processes to yield over 4 billion drachmae in 1977,
46
nearly 9 percent of budgeted direct tax revenues. In
the past, the majority of estimated total tax revenues came
from indirect taxes (1976: 65 percent) which have low
elasticity and can not increase in direct proportion to
growth. Thus the revenues essential to administer the
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expanding economy did not keep up with needs , requiring
more and more stop-gap, indirect taxation of such things
as cars, luxury goods, entertainment and fuels. The new
measures began to reallocate taxation to more direct
sources which could expand directly with increased produc-
tivity and income. The administration also began plans
for implementation in January 19 7 8 of a value-added-tax
(VAT) , essential for future EEC compatability
.
To enhance the development of industrial units, the
government in 1975, formed a consortium of state-owned
banks (ELEVME) comprising the National Bank of Greece, the
National Investment Bank for Industrial Development and
The Hellenic Industrial Development Bank. The newly formed
public organization pooled its resources to "carry out large
scale investment projects which privately-owned companies
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are unable or unwilling to undertake at this time."
Since its formation, ELEVME acted as a holding institution
to provide major investment funds for companies developing
Greek mineral resources. In concert with the goals of
ELEVME, the administration also formed the Public Petroleum
Corporation (PPC) in October 1975, and charged it with the
responsibility to prospect, drill, extract, process, store
and distribute all oil and natural gas deposits in Greece.
In October, officials established the National Council on
Energy to implement the government's long term plan for
exploiting all indigenous energy forms , and in the Spring
of 1976, the Parliament revised existing mining laws to
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allow the formation of the Institute for Mineral and
Geological Research (IGME) . This public entity allowed the
State to prospect for minerals and develop an internationally
competitive mineral industry.
The government also addressed industrial expansion
efforts toward the powerful and lucrative shipping industry,
specifically by encouraging "the investment of shipping
capital in shore-based businesses." Mr. Papadongonas , the
Minister of Merchant Marine, stated:
It is a well known fact, however, that
besides being an inexaustable source of
foreign exchange revenues , and an
employer of a large number of men, Greek
Merchant Shipping has extended its
operation to other sectors of the
economy. 4 8
Officials accomplished the increased shipping industry
involvement by strengthening two basic incentive laws
:
No. 2687/53 and No. 4171/61. These were the same measures
used by the Colonels in their attempt to encourage foreign
investment. Modifying laws such as No. 159/7 5, clarified
and redefined the allowable benefits by eliminating loopholes
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costly to the state. These ammendments ultrmtely increased
the returns on the investments to Greece but did not appre-
ciably reduce the draw for foreign money.
The incomes and social services equalization and expan-
sion disparities came under scrutiny by the regime shortly
after the economy stabilized. In 1976, minimum wage and
salary rates increased by 17 percent for men and 20.5 percent
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for women while measures voted for 1977 specified additional
increases of 15 percent (19 percent for women) . This
schedule equalizes minimum wages and salaries between men
and women in 1978.
Equalization between high and low pay groups did not
occur as easily however. The government attempted to secure
a wage freeze commitment from high salaried employees when
nationally negotiating the 1977 minimum wage increases with
employers and employees. The higher paid groups would only
agree to a small curb in their pay increase scales, completely
rejecting the freeze philosophy. Mr. Papaligouras , Minister
of Coordination, indicated that the government would not
impose a wage halt but appealed to the high salaried Greeks
to "understand where their duty lies toward their fellow
countrymen, the farmers and the low paid workers." He
insisted that what the government desired was not to require
excessive sacrifices of any one group, but to close the gap
between the poor and the well off.
To return some of the initiative in social improvements
to the workers themselves, the administration reformed
and modernized labor legislation. The new measures pro-
vided freedom of action for labor unions, brought Greek
legislation in line with international labor practices,
provided greater protection for workers through the signing
of a new labor contract, restored the right of the Institu-
tion of National Collective Labor Contracts to draft labor
43

agreements and arbitration rulings without government
interference.
Finally, to reduce government spending and relieve
some of the burden from the lower income citizens, Mr.
Karamanlis instituted plans to reduce bureaucratic ineffi-
ciency and improve general economic effectiveness. He
attempted these measures first, by demanding that government
officials cease the practice of rousfeti — political
patronage and favoritism — which often required more time
of public employees than the accomplishment of their
assigned tasks. He reemphasized this at his first
cabinet meeting of 1977:
Strictness in the enforcement of
the just and correct methods in
every direction and not a mis-
interpreted leniency is the ele-
ment which truly serves the
interests of the people as a
whole and of every class of
citizen. 54
Second, in March 1977, the government began a three
month experiment centered on a continuous 9:00 A.M. to
5:30 P.M. work day. Traditionally Greeks have split working
hours with a three hour mid-day siesta from 2:30 P.M. to
5:30 P.M., reopening their shops from 5:30 P.M. to 8:30
P.M. The split time system causes problems with businesses
dealing in international markets and generally contributes
to a less efficient economic environment. In May the country
returned to the mid-day rest policy for the hot summer months,
55
and the results of the test are under analysis.
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Third, to combat inequality in fares and general
inefficiency pressures, the government purchased control
of all public transportation companies. These included
the Athens electric trolley buses, the Piraeus-Kifissia
railway, Olympic Airways and the EKTEL urban bus pool.
Since then services have expanded, modern equipment has been
purchased and availability increased providing more bene-
56fits to the low paid workers
.
In a broad perspective then, the Karamanlis government
has attempted to focus on long range economic improvement
goals by implementing specific plans and programs. In
many cases they have succeeded in substantially enhancing
57the economic environment. In 19 7 6 Gross National Income
grew 5.6 percent (1975: 4.1 percent) including an 8.8
percent rise in industrial output. Manufacturing employment
rose 6.1 percent, minimum wages and salaries increased an
average of 2.2 percent, the consumer price index climbed
only 11.7 percent compared to 15.7 percent in 197 5. The
balance of payments picture stabilized with a current account
deficit of $1,092 million (1975: $1,088 million) as an
increase in invisible receipts offset a higher trade deficit.
Foreign exchange from tourism increased 28 percent, from
Merchant Shipping 8.2 percent, and from emigrants' remittances
2.6 percent.
In the critical area of foreign investment projects,
the government attained its goal of reinstilling
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investor confidence, and contracts mounted. Those
negotiated included: a $550 million shipyard, a cement
steel complex in Pylos , a $250 million nickel industry
expansion project by Bodossakis Industries, a $200 million
alumina project by Parnassus Bauxite, a $7 million cement
factory in Volos by General Cement, numerous shipbuilding
and repair yards and the $100 million Hellenic Aerospace
Industries complex by Lockheed at Tanagra. This complex
promises to bring in $25 million per year in currencies from
around the world. The site will ultimately provide depot
level maintenance for the state-owned Olympic Airways , the
Hellenic Air Force (this work is currently performed by
other NATO countries at a loss of foreign exchange) and
maintenance and manufacturing capabilities for airlines of
world nations including the Middle Eastern countries.
In 1976, because of their uneconomic and monopolistic
conditions, officials reviewed nineteen of 600-odd contracts
negotiated by the Junta. These included agreements with
companies involved in major projects, such as the three firms
which acquired th Onassis oil refining concession, the
Oceanic Offshore Exploration Company doing the major under-
sea drilling near Thasos, the Pappas Coca-Cola franchise and
the Hellenic Steel Corporation. Most were renegotiated on
terms more realistic for Greece while others were canceled.
These accomplishments and the positive trends apparent
in the Greek economy do not suggest that the major problems
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have been solved. Mr. Laz Arseniou in a lengthy article
in the Greek press cited what he felt to be a need for
more drastic structural modification. He demonstrated
the problem, which he labeled "parasitism," by discussing
dichotomies of waste and thrift. For example, he states
that Athens has water supply problems severe enough to
require diverting a river into the city, but still supports
all major soft drink manufacturing plants in Greece. The
wheat mills, once dependent on imported grain remain located
near ports even though the country is now self-sufficient in
wheat. The grain must be transported from the central farm
belts to the coast to be ground and then retransported to
be sold, all at high cost. This raises the cost of bread
to almost twice that of flour even though 100 kg of flour
yields 130 kg of bread.
In another example, Arsenious suggests that a large
number of pensioneers are reappointed to bureaucratic posts
at generous salaries but perform only marginally, decreasing
government effectiveness. Finally, he lists five basic
economic problems: 1) A strike-it-rich-quick syndrome in
the Greek market, 2) Ineffective and incomplete exploitation
of the agricultural sector, 3) Foreign dominance of mineral
industries, 4) Lack of industrial infrastructure, and
5) Too much state intervention in economic processes.
Although his argument is perhaps over-stated, Mr. Arseniou




The OECD Survey of Greece for 1977 suggests that immediate
problems have been solved efficiently, but that long term
plans, particularly for restructuring the economy have not
yet been detailed. This applies specifically to increasing
manufacturing output and employment, reducing the weight of
the self-employed portion in non-agricultural income, and
improving the composition of the tax structure.
A U.S. Government source suggests that major changes are
required in two structures: agriculture and fiscal policy.
In the first, the report indicates that the extensive use
of price supports and subsidies cause supply problems par-
ticularly in the beef, veal and milk sectors. It points out
that fragmentation of land holdings remains a problem, reducing
productivity and efficiency, and that marketing practices
employ small-scale independent wholesalers who don't have
adequate storage, transportation, preservation or quality
control capabilities. In the fiscal area, the report shows
that Greece currently derives two-thirds of its revenue from
indirect taxes such as customs receipts, consumption taxes
and transaction taxes. It suggests that a shift to direct
taxation is essential.
Mr. Zolotas, the Governor of the Bank of Greece, cites
in his 1977 report to shareholders that stagnation of indus-
trial investment is a major problem facing Greece today.
He shows that large increases in industrial output have
diminished excess productive capacity to zero and that new
plants, factories and facilities must be brought on line or
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productive capacity will begin to decline. He contends
that world conditions will of course have much to do with
demand levels, but that bureaucratic procedures governing
investment must be simplified to allow maximum input of
capital for development projects affecting the supply of
Greek goods. He further indicates that foreign investment
and technology must be attracted and suggests that a
favorable environment for this can be established by:
1) Simplifying development incentives,
2) Adopting a lasting tax system supporting
long range development,
3) Simplifying and clarifying policies toward
foreign venture capital,
4) Strengthen competition in production and
distribution of goods by eliminating
government controls and introducing
strict anti-monopolistic legislation.
Collectively, the sources referenced and many others
indicate that long range planning is essential for the
ultimate improvement of the Greek economy to a level desired
by herself and Western Europe. Some of these plans have
already been compiled, while others await development.
ECONOMIC PLANNING
Mr. Karamanlis is vitally concerned with the extent of
Greece's defenses against Turkish forces in the event of war.
In 1977, the government allocated $1.7 billion or 25 percent
of its $6.2 billion total budget for defensive purposes;
a 35 percent increase over 1976, making her the third largest







1974 1975 1976 1977
602 810 1,049 1,700
Source: Intelligence Report Greece
, p. 10.
A Defense Marketing Services Report, completed in
February 1977, indicates that Greece plans to spend an
average of $335 million annually over the next five years on
defense articles. Purchases will include US F16A fighter
aircraft, French Mirage F1CG fighter aircraft, French La
Combattante III fast attack missile boats, German Type 209
Glavkos Class submarines, French AMX 30 Tanks, various
missiles including the Exocet surface to surface and TOW
anti-tank weapons, and a myriad of electronic surveillance
A 4- 64and warning equipment.
To offset such extensive defense expenditures, Greek
plans include the receipt of aid and assistance from several
countries. US Military Assistance Program (MAP) aid
funds allocated $33 million in FY77, $33 million FY73 and
are projected to go higher in future years. On July 28,
1977, the United States administration and Greek Parliament
agreed to a $700 million four year assistance package which
allows the US to retain installations at Hellenikon Airbase
in Athens; Nea Makri (communications); Souda Bay, Crete
(USN facilities); and Heraklion Airstrip, Crete. West
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Germany supplied about $25 million in military aid in 1976,
and along with Belgium, France, and Italy has agreed to
long-term credit sales contracts for arms procurement.
Until the hostility with Turkey begins to lessen, plans for
increased defense spending will remain a significant factor
in Greece's long range economic projections.
Michael Wall suggests in his September 1975 Survey of
Greece that in addition to defense spending needs, the
Karamanlis government must address at least seven major
areas in its long range planning process. First, he
cites the exploitation of indigenous raw materials. The
administration has made strong efforts in this area with
the development of the banking consortium (ELEVME) , the
Public Petroleum Corporation (PPC) and the Institute for
Mineral and Geological Research (IGME)... Much remains to be
done however, particularly in the improvement of extraction
processes.
Second, and closely associated with mineral development,
he contends that Greece needs to be much more self-sufficient
in energy. Improvement here will not only provide indepen-
dence from world oil pressures but will eliminate a substan-
tial portion of the balance of trade deficit. Government
planning to this point has concentrated on oil exploration
and solar, hydroelectric, lignite and wind power projects.
Third, Wall mentions the perennial agricultural nemesis,
suggesting that increases in productivity, irrigation capa-
bility, the quantity and diversity of exportables, processing

capacity, and self-sufficiency in meat production are
essential for improvement in this sector. In November 1976,
the Ministry of Agriculture outlined an agricultural
development program which included:
1) Increasing the average size of land holdings by
making available 10,000 hectares (1 hectare =2.47
acres) of state owned land (from abandoned plots
and drained lake beds) to landless farmers for
group farming,
2) Similar endeavors to develop 500,000 to 600,000
hectares of community and privately owned land,
3) Tax incentives and credits to encourage land
consolidation,
4) Assistance to producers in organizing local markets
for better distribution of fruits and vegetables,
5) The restructuring of producer prices along world
market lines to encourage the cultivation of crops
with more international demand, i.e., cotton and
durum wheat. °'
Associated projects include a $30 million endeavor by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
to investigate processing and marketing practices, and two
irrigation projects financed by World Bank loans with which
the government plans to increase irrigated land by 24,000
to 90,000 hectares a year.
Fourth, Hr. Wall cites the continued narrowness of the
Greek manufacturing base despite efforts by the Karamanlis
regime to broaden it with projects like the Tanagra Aero-
space Complex. He links this problem to the traditional
"closed shop" of Greek entrepreneurs which he asserts must
be opened to those who have gained talents and experience
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as migrant workers and wish to enter the business world at
home. He suggests that Greek financial institutions must
become involved in the two areas and take the initiative
to meet the needs of the industrial community.
Monetary officials in 19 76 were able to improve the
financing capability of the banking system by the issuance
of a bank bond plan. This action reduced the dependence
of commercial banks on the central bank (Bank of Greece)
,
provided more financing to the public, and created an
appropriate climate for reactivation of the general bond
6 Q
market. In October of that year, the Committee on the
Capital Market reported: "The time now is propitious for
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a recovery of the Greek stock market." Also, the National
Monetary Plan, established to maintain monetary equilibrium,
acquired increased credibility in 1976 when the Bank of
Greece established two new committees to monitor credit
trends and analyze the month-by-month targets of the plan.
Finally, Mr. Wall addresses regionalism, pointing out
that the ever-expanding Athens-Piraeus and Thessaloniki
complexes are the only two urban centers developed enough
to continuously attract economic activity. The government
is well aware of the restraining effect this polarization
has on the economy and has enacted a plan (Law No. 289/1976)
which provides special incentives for productive business
enterprises (agricultural, tourist, workshop-industrial,
etc.) to locate away from major industrial centers. The
plan divides the country into five sectors A to E (A - major
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industrial, E - most remote) and provides progressively
70greater benefits in more remote locations.
Officials in mid-1977 also negotiated a World Bank loan
of $35 million towards an $81 million plan for the develop-
ment of north-eastern Greece. This regional development
project includes investments in agricultural development,
agro-industry, roads and community education facilities
and calls for raising incomes and improving the quality of
life in the rural areas concerned.
Mr. Constantine Doxiadis in an article for the London
Times , asserts that the government is finally beginning
to realize that long range planning for Athens is absolutely
essential if the city is to survive and not degenerate into
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an urban ghetto. He points out that officials are care-
fully considering the Third Environmental Plan for Athens
developed in 1974 which contains programs for transporta-
tion, the movement of the international airport to the
island of Makronisos and the establishment of a LANWAR
.73(land, water, air) system joining Athens and Piraeus.
To relieve regional imbalances in citizen inequities,
the government announced in early 19 77 a new long-range
74 ...health care program. The plan strives for a significant
improvement of health care services and includes:
1) Five new hospitals situated around the country
with a total of 3500 beds,





3) An "agrarian doctors" corp to serve the farm
population,
4) Expanded availability of drugs and medicines in
the countryside,
5) Establishing a National Health Council to improve
the structure of the medical profession.
Thus it is apparent that the Karamanlis government has
evaluated at least the major areas of immediate economic
weakness and in most cases provided plans for rectification
or improvement. As previously cited, the OECD Survey for
19 77 on Greece suggests that the focus of Greek economic
planning should now shift to longer range goals with atten-
tion to specific implementing techniques. The basic struc-
tural problems that Mr. Karamanlis faced during his first
tenure as Prime Minister (.1955-1963) still exist and must
be removed if Greece is to pass into an association with
Western Europe as a modernized and industrialized partner.
One note of caution must be interjected. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in its 1977 annual report contends that
a "general unsatisfactory" economic situation exists in the
world today and warns governing politicians that "excessive
stimulation of business activity can give rebirth to inflation
and another recession. The quick fix leaves the nation in
worse shape than before. Because of constraints imposed by
inflation or balance of payments difficulties, fiscal and
monetary policies must be kept under restraint." Mr.
Karamanlis then, is faced with a dilemma. He must make all
haste to prepare his country for EEC accession but he must
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go slowly enough to prevent a disastrous collapse of the
structure he has built so meticulously over the last
three and one-half years. How he solves this dichotomy
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Under the leadership of Konstantine Karamanlis, the
Greek government decided as early as 1959 that a strong
formal relationship with the countries of the European
Community could substantially enhance Greece's economic
development goals. As a result, the original six members
of the European Economic Community concluded an Agreement
of Association with Athens on July 9, 1961 which became
effective on November 1, 1962 after ratification. This was
the first association agreement to be formalized and con-
stituted an arrangement signifying more than just a customs
union between the parties by providing the opportunity for
Greece to attain full membership in the Community at some
future time
.
To establish the Athen ' s Treaty, the EEC acted under
Article 238 of the original Treaty of Rome which provides
that the Community can enter into formal agreements of
association with other international entities character-
ized by reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions
and special procedures. The new relationship required the
establishment of several special institutions for adminis-
trative purposes including an Association Council composed
of Ministers of the Six, members of the Greek government
and a representative of the European Commission. The council
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in turn designated an Association Committee to assist in
preparing material for meetings and investigating major
problems as they became apparent.
In April 196 3, the Council further expanded the adminis-
trative function by creating the Joint Greek-EEC Parlia-
mentary Committee currently consisting of fifteen represen-
tatives from both the Greek Parliament and the European
Parliament. This thirty man body provided the major forum
for discussion and analysis of association concerns and
provided a checking mechanism for the rulings of the Associa-
tion Council. Since Greece applied for full EEC membership
in June 1975, this body has supplied the major forum for
the resolution of differing opinions and the development
of accession plans.
Article Two of the Association Agreement specified three
major objectives:
1) The establishment of a customs union,
2) The promotion of joint measures by the parties
and harmonization of their policies in a number of
fields (chiefly agriculture, movement of persons and
services, competition rules, taxation, legislation
on administrative provisions relevant to the func-
tioning of the association, other areas of economic
policy, notably exchange rate policy)
,
3) The making available to the Greek economy of resources
which will assist it to develop at a higher rate.
The Community established these tenets to assist Greece in
developing sufficiently to eventually acceed to full
membership.
Because of the expanding nature of the Hellenic economy,
the initial drafters of the agreement specified that no time
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limit be placed on the period of association. However, to
facilitate an orderly and progressive movement towards the
goal of Greek accession, the authors included certain schedules
in the articles of the treaty. For Greek exports to the
EEC, all tariffs on manufactured and agricultural goods not
specified in special protocols (No. 10 and Nos . 14-17),
immediately dropped to the intra-EEC level on November 1,
1962. By July 1968, subsequent reductions eliminated the
tariff on all Greek manufactured goods exported to the
Community (about one third of total exports to the EEC)
.
4
Protocols No. 10 and Nos. 14-17 cited special provisions
for the export of tobacco, currants, sultanas, wines and
olives to the Community. For unprocessed tobacco and raisins
(currants and sultanas), major Greek export items, the EEC
customs duty dropped to 50 percent of the existing third
country level in 1962 and ended completely in 1968. Olives
immediately enjoyed a no tariff status and olive oil faced
only minimal quantitative restrictions. The original agree-
ment provided for unlimited export of Greek wines to the
Benelux countries, but faced a total bottle restriction to
Germany, Italy and France.
Because of the duplication of the production of citrus
fruit, grapes and peaches in the EEC countries, the agreement
specified limits on the quantity of these goods imported
from Greece under reduced tariff conditions. The Association
Council reserved the right to specify the allowable quantities
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based on current conditions. The following table summarizes
the approximate tariff restrictions applying to Greek exports
to the Community. It indicates that favorable conditions
existed very shortly after the inception of the Association
Agreement.
TABLE 2-1


















Source: Yannopoulos, Greece and the EEC
,
p. 7.
To preserve market stability, Articles 41, 42 and 43 estab-
lished agricultural safeguard clauses which provided for
minimum price systems and countervailing charges. These
two methods of protection can be used by either Greece or
the EEC to maintain base import prices on certain products.
The agreement outlines more specific schedules for
aligning Greek import tariffs with those of the SEC. For
goods from third countries (non-EEC) , Greece agreed to apply
the Community's Common Customs Tariff (CCT) to all indus-




CUMULATIVE REDUCTION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
GREEK AND CCT RATES
Dates Percent
May 1, 1970 20
Nov 1, 1975 50
Nov 1, 1979 80
Nov 1, 1984 100
Source: Bulletin of the European Communities
,
Supplement 2/76, p. IT.
The Association Council retained the capability to grant
exceptions for countries with which Greece has bilateral
agreements and allow tariff rates lower than the CCT. The
total value of these special allowances however, can not
exceed 10 percent of the value of Greek imports from third
countries. Tariff harmonization on agricultural imports
from non-EEC countries still depends on the evolution of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) . Greece has not yet
implemented this sytem and still determines its own tariff
schedule on these products.
For goods imported from the EEC, the agreement defined
tariff harmonization schedules by category. Levies on
manufactured goods not produced in Greece at the time of
the agreement required progressive reduction over twelve-
years reaching zero in 1974. The agreement provided cer-
tain exceptions to this plan for products of new industries
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started after 1962. For manufactured goods already produced
in Greece, the tariff reduction schedule extended for
twenty-two years. The ten year extension allowed addi-
tional time for growth and stability in the particular
industries.
TABLE 2-3
TARIFF REDUCTION SCHEDULE FOR EEC
IMPORT ITEMS ALSO MANUFACTURED IN
GREECE
Date Percent
May 1, 1977 52
Nov 1, 1978 60
May 1, 19 80 6 8
Nov 1, 1981 76
Nov 1, 1982 84
Nov 1, 1983 92
Nov 1, 1984 100
Source: Yannopoulos, Greece and the EEC, p. 9
Greece also agreed to abolish all quantitative restrictions
on manufactured articles in both categories by 1984.
Tariff reductions for agricultural imports from the
EEC followed similar lines. For goods specified in Annex
III of the Association Agreement and generally classified
as exported or exportable by Greece (with the exception of
wine) , the twelve year reduction schedule applied. For
goods listed in protocol No. 13 and generally classified
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as exported or exportable to Greece by the EEC countries,
the 22 year schedule applied. This category included dairy
products, meat and rice and required more rapid reductions
for certain items such as ham - 40 percent, cheese - 35
percent and butter - 30 percent by 1972. 7 The tariff con-
ditions established by the Association Agreement provided
an equitable atmosphere for the development of Greek trade
during the long transitional period.
The agreement also specified that by 1977, workers would
be free to move between Greece and the EEC in accordance
with two provisions of the Treaty of Rome. Article 7
prohibits discrimination of grounds of nationality and
Article 4 8 ensures the free movement of workers within the
Community. Greece traditionally has relied on remittances
from migrant workers to offset a large portion of the balance
of payments deficit and implementation of these articles
greatly enhanced the opportunities of the Greek workers.
A third important tenet, Protocol No. 19, granted finan-
cial aid from the Community for the development of the
Greek economy and its expansion to complementary status with
the EEC. The Protocol designated long term (twenty-five
year) loans from the European Investment Bank to be used for
financing investment in the industrial infrastructure and
for expenditure on imports to cover the trade gap the aboli-
tion of tariffs might create. A restriction limited the
amount of investment to a maximum of $125 million for the
68

first five year period. Assuming renewability , total funds
could have amounted to over one-half billion dolars for the
twenty-two year period specified in tariff schedules.
Servicing of the debt at 6 percent interest would not have
started until after Greece became a full member of the
9Common Market. By the end of the first five year period
however, Greece had absorbed only $69 million of the $125
million maximum and when the Army colonels took control of
the government in April, the Community suspended the proto-
col and froze the remaining $56 million. The five year
period subsequently expired on November 1, 1967.
With the restoration of democracy in Greece and the
reactivation of the full Association Agreement, the Karaman-
lis government requested and received the balance of the
investment funds in December 1974. Monetary officials fully
allocated these by the end of 1975 and urged that a second
financial protocol be concluded as soon as possible to
meet the rapidly growing investment needs. Bureaucratic
inertia delayed resolution of a new protocol until February
1977 at which time Greek and EEC officials signed a $336
million agreement making funds available until October 31,
19 81. Of the total, $66 million in grants were approved
and $270 million in loans from the European Investment Bank
were earmarked.
Based upon growth trends during the first five years cf
the Association, it can be conjectured that Greece would be
a full member of the EEC today if not for the seven year
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intervention of Papadopoulos and the military oligarchy.
Yannopoulos discusses the effects of the limitations the
EEC placed on Greece during this period and emphasizes that
although aid funds and policy harmonization efforts were
suspended, tariff reductions continued as scheduled. He
points out that EEC action limited the Athens Agreement to
its "current administration" ( gestion courante ) which
involved the suspensions mentioned but did not really
freeze evolution of the agreement as desired by the Community.
In fact, because of the complicated process necessary to
keep the tariff arrangements functioning between Greece and
the EEC, several portions of the original treaty had to be
modified.
Yannopoulos cites as an example the conditions surrounding
the movement of Greek wines. Since Greece had not accepted
the CAP prior to the April 1967 coup and the activation of
the "common market for wines" became effective in December
19 70, the arrangement for importing Greek wine (different for
each country) became unwieldy. The Association Council did
not want to suspend the Athens Treaty totally, and therefore
had no choice but to harmonize Greek wine agreements with
the Community. This circumstance and other similar cases
yielded a "piecemeal harmonization" which eventually ren-
dered the limitation of gestion courante an empty threat to
the Junta.
When democracy returned to Greece in July 1974 and Mr.
Karamanlis led his New Democracy Party to victory in the
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November election, a major tenet of his winning platform
vigorously supported immediate accession to the EEC. The
Association Council restored the Association Agreement in
September 1974' and on April 28, 1975, the three new Community
members, Britain, Ireland and Denmark signed an Additional
12Protocol with Greece which became effective in July.
The supplementary agreement immediately cut tariff rates
on Greek agricultural and industrial exports to the three
by 60 percent, further reduced them by a total of 80 percent
in 1976 and completely abolished them by the end of 1977.
For imports into Greece, the protocol applied the same
classifications of goods used for the original twelve and
twenty-two year reduction schedules. For those items
falling into the shorter category, the agreement cut the
duties charged by 60 percent on July 1, 1975, increased the
reduction to 80 percent in January 1976 and applied no
tariff after mid-1977. The duty on products in the longer
term schedule dropped progressively over the two years
following the signing, to align them with the 52 percent
rate effective in May 1977. Quota restrictions, with the
exception of a few items, were eliminated.
Mr. Stephane Stathatos, Greece's ambassador to the
Community, delivered the Greek application for full member-
ship on June 12, 1975. The EEC Council of Ministers accepted
the application and, in accordance with Article 237 of the
Rome Treaty, requested an official opinion by the European
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Commission. The opinion, rendered in January 1976, recom-
mended "that a clear affirmative reply be given to the
Greek request and that negotiations for Greek accession be
13
opened." The Commission included a suggestion, however,
that a transitional, pre-membership period would be in the
best interest of Greece as well as the Community.
The Greek government reacted violently to the proposed
delay. Mr. Karamanlis recalled his EEC ambassadors and
summoned the ambassadors of EEC countries to explain in
emphastic terms that Greece wanted "immediate full integra-
14tion, not second-class membership." The Greek press head-
lined the Commissions recommendation as "EC Blackmails Greece"
and John Pesamazoglu, the leader of the Greek delegation to
the Joint Parliamentary Committee, addressed the problems of
pre-membership in a lengthy article published simultaneously
1
6
in The World Today and the German Europa-Archiv . Ke asserted
that the problems cited by the European Commission were
ongoing ones which could be addressed as well during the
period of preparation for full membership as in some vague
transitional time span. Signor Altiero Spinelli, the Italian
industry member of the Commission, in a dissenting opinion
supported the Greek point of view and stated that any two-
tiered integration system such as the one suggested, could
undermine the Community by driving a wedge between the
17
weaker southern states and the stronger northern ones.
The Council of Ministers heeded the backlash of comments,
overroad the Commissions opinion, and in February gave the
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go-ahead for full scale negotiations without mentioning
any pre-accession period. Mr. Karamanlis hailed the decision
in a public statement on February 10, 1976:
I am convinced that Greece will justify
the trust placed in her by the other
countries of the European Community and
that she will become a positive and creative
element within Europe.
He also perceptively observed:
The road leading to our full integration
in Europe will be neither short nor
easy. For in the negotiations which
follow, important economic and technical
problems will have to be solved. 18
In response to this need, Mr. Karamanlis ordered the forma-
tion of six special committees to examine areas of the
economy and make recommendations for their adaptation to the
Community. The areas included: primary and secondary
<
production, employment, trade, international relations,
and population.
With regard to the speed of accession proceedings,
optimistic opinions projected an eighteen month period for
negotiations followed by a year for ratification, setting
the actual accession date at Jan 1, 1979. However, Mr.
Papaligouras , then Minister of Coordination, indicated in
July 1977 that negotiations had just moved into the second
of three mandatory phases. He stated that both sides had
expressed their original positions and that new negotia-
tion would move to "the more technical, more difficult and
19
more specialized" second stage beginning on October 17th.
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He would not make a prediction about the duration of the
second and third rounds, but indicated that negotiators were
making good progress toward a final agreement. The 1979
date does not allow much time for completing negotiation
and ratification proceedings in ten countries.
The Joint Greek-EEC Parliamentary Committee has con-
vened three times between December 1975 and January 1977
to discuss matters pertinent to the association agreement,
the progress of the accession proceedings and the political
problems of both sides. In a report covering these three
sessions, the Committee on External Relations recommended
that the European Parliament adopt a resolution, in part
stating that:
Solutions to the problems arising from
the transition to (Greece's) full mem-
bership must be sought through the
adoption of transitional measures and
not by means of adjustments to Community
rules
.
Since Greece's accession to the EEC must
promote the interests of both sides,
appropriate and mutually advantageous
solutions will have to be found during
the accession negotiations to all the
problems inevitably posed by the transi-
tion to membership status. ^
In light of these statements and the speed of subsequent
progress made by the negotiators at the technical and
ministerial levels, a more realistic projection for an
actual accession date would now be January 1981.
Greece has taken a broad but consistent position
during the various accession negotiations. Some of the more
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important stands concerned: 1) Regional policy, in which
Greece asked for no special concessions except that the
country be considered a "single developing region" for aid
purposes; 2) Agricultural policy, in which Greece agreed
to immediate adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy
with three exceptions. First, for tobacco and eating
grapes, Community regulations will have to be revised to
include Greek varieties, and for peaches, eating grapes,
citrus fruit and wines, additional transportation cost off-
sets will have to be worked out. Second, transitional
arrangements will be necessary to implement Community machinery
and common prices: for beef, pork, milk and dairy products,
five years; eggs, three years; flowers, plants and seeds,
two years. Third, new market organizations do not exist
and will have to be developed for bulk cotton, dried grapes,
^
figs, alcohol, pine resin and sheep and mutton; 3) Third
country relations, in which alignment of Greek duties with
Common Custom Tariffs will be gradual over a five year
transitional period at the end of which Greece will adopt
21
EEC preferential concessions to appropriate countries.
Negotiators for the Community have not accepted these
positions but as Mr. Papaligouras stated, the original
desires are out in the open and the remaining negotiation
periods will make the necessary modifications to reach a
mutual agreement for accession.
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Xenophon Zolotas in his analysis of the Greek-EEC
relationship emphasizes that the fifteen years of associa-
tion with the EEC have significantly aided the Greek
22
economy. He also presents statistics to show that the
record of Greek growth since 1962 compares more than
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Primary Production Industrial Production
1962 to 1974 1962 to 1975
Greece 4.7 9.4
EEC Six 2.0 4.2
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exports to EEC Six 4.8 52.1
TABLE 2-9
GREEK INCOME AS A
PERCENTAGE OF GDP




* Projected percentage of GNP, Greek Press and
Information Service, Occasional Paper No. 5, 1977
Source: Tables 4-9: Zolotas, Greece in the
European Community
In a similar study, Yannopoulos concluded from mathematical
analysis that:
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25.3 31.0 32.8 35.9
15.8 21.0 21.8 25.0
23.7 18.7 not available

The preferential treatment accorded to
Greek products in the EEC markets by
the Association Agreement has indeed
exerted a strong beneficial effect on
Greek exports to the EEC and that the
extent of disadvantages through trade
diversion have been practically
negligible. 23
In fact, the share of total Greek exports sent to the
Community increased from 35.3 percent to the Six in 1962
to 50.1 percent to the Nine in 1976. 24
These studies verify that the fifteen year formal assoc-
iation of Greece with the EEC has been beneficial to both
the EEC and the Hellenic nation. The question remains
whether accession to full membership will benefit the two
parties equally as well.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES CF ACCESSION
The benefits of Greece's accession to the EEC are not
as obvious for the members of the Community as they are
for Greece, but appear to offer much. First, Greece's geo-
graphic location provides a stepping off point for European
markets to expand into the Middle East, Africa, and even the
Balkan states as world tensions shift away from bi-polar
orientations. Greece has already made inroads into Middle
East and African industrial markets particularly for cement
and civil engineering consultation. Second, the destruction
of Beruit, at one time the financial center of the eastern
Mediterranean, forced large numbers of major institutions to
relocate and many have selected Athens. The shift focuses
European financial interests on Greece and provides the

arena for major monetary negotiations. Finally, the tra-
ditionally sound relationship between Greece and the Arab
nations provides a two-way gate for Arab/European contact
in a stable environment, a critically important factor when
considering the oil question.
A quantifiable benefit for the Community is the addition
of Greece's merchant fleet of twenty-five million gross
registered tons (grt) to the Community's seventy-five million
grt existing capability. This will raise the Community's
share of world tonnage from one-fifth to over one-third.
Considering that the Community's external trade is mostly
seaborn and that it accounted for nearly 40 percent of total
world trade in 1975, a 33 percent increase in the fleet is
significant.
Mr. Ortoli, Vice-President of the European Commission
cited another advantage for the Community in May 197 7 during
a Brussels symposium dealing with Greece's entry. He indi-
cated that he viewed the enlargment as a stimulus for the
Community to "take itself in hand, ... strengthen its capacity
and reinforce its dynamism. " This view is supported by
other officials who have indicated that the demands placed
on the Community by a new member in a developing phase of
growth will aid the EEC in a fundamental reassessment of
its purpose and direction. The decision to directly elect
the European Parliament in 1978-79 and provide it with a
real mandate may be the first step in this process.
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The composition of Greece's agricultural production has
caused many reservations about the nation's accession by
Community members producing competitive goods. Greek offi-
cials point out, however, that if Greece has access to EEC
funds as a full member, it can assure that its agricultural
exports become more complementary by switching to early or
late season varieties, by processing more produce and by
broadening the types of vegetables produced. Full member-
ship, taken in this light, will benefit the farming sectors
of the Community by relieving competition for such items
as citrus fruit and tomatoes.
Mr. Zolotas cites one other advantage for the Community
which is often overlooked. He points out that Greece has a
large variety of unexploited minerals including bauxite,
nickel, iron, copper, magnesium, chromite , asbestos, lead
and zinc. Recently, geologists have found significant oil
reserves in the Ionian Sea with producible estimates
ranging from 40,000 to 30,000 barrels per day. These
resources offer the energy and mineral-hungry community
nations an additional store of required materials and provide
investment opportunities for exploitation and development.
These benefits, available to the Community with Greece's
accession to full membership, offer significant advantages
not otherwise available. Of course, there are many drawbacks,




The budgetary expenditure required for Greece's accession
to the Community is most often mentioned as the major disad-
vantage of the union. The Commission Opinion submitted to
the Council in January 1976, indicated that to take Greece
into the Community would cost approximately 453 million
units of account ($544 million at 1 u.a. = $1.20) in terms
of the 1976 budget.
TABLE 2-10
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Guarantee 220
Guidance 60








Source: Bulletin of the European Communities
,
Supplement 2/76.
The EAGGF Guarantee section finances support buying of
farm produce and pays export rebates when Community prices
rise above world prices. The Commission based their esti-
mate for this section on the application of market rules
to 1975 Greek agricultural production and determined the

need for approximately 22 m.u.a. primarily in production
support buying. EAGGF guidance section funds are earmarked
for modernization projects, and the Commission calculated
60 m.u.a. for structural reforms in farm modernization and
produce distribution plans. Rules of matching for guidance
funds imply an application of three times this amount by
the Greek government for the same period.
The Community's social fund supports the relocation and
training of workers within the member states. Based once
again upon restructuring needs and the shifting of a sub-
stantial number of Greek workers from agriculture to indus-
trial jobs, the Commission roughly estimated the 40 m.u.a.
figure
.
The Regional Development Fund finances investments in
areas receiving national aid which have per capita incomes
below the Community average. Lack of specific information
about conditions in the different regions in Greece handi-
capped the Commission's capability to objectively estimate
the needs for a regional policy. They finally suggested
100 m.u.a. based upon a population pro-rated share of
Ireland's 84 m.u.a. and southern Italy's 520 m.u.a. set
aside for 19 75 to 1977. The estimate included consideration
for Greece's large regional disparities.
The validity of the Commission's figures can be questioned
because of the subjective methods used to obtain them, but
the numbers do serve to put a concrete value on the cost of
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Greek accession. It is interesting to note that the 453
m.u.a. is only 6 percent of the total 1976 EEC budget.
Greece probably could have contributed about 150 m.u.a. to
the Community, dropping the net cost to the Nine to about
300 m.u.a. or 4 percent of the budget. This figure was
less than half the compensatory amounts paid out to Britain
27
alone in 1976. The Greek government also points out that
a large portion of the cost will be used for funding invest-
ment projects which will reduce the aid required in the
future as Greece's economic infrastructure becomes modified.
In the agricultural sector, a second disadvantage to
the Community is cited by those who feel that Greece may
provide an overly competitive amount of the same southern
Mediterranean goods already produced by Italy and France.
The statistics actually refute this contention. Farming now
accounts for only 16 percent of GDP in Greece and total
agricultural output would be a mere 5 percent of Community
output. Exports by Greece to the EEC are 7 percent indus-
trial and 30 percent agricultural while Greek wine, a critically
2 8
contested item, is only 1.5 percent of total EEC wine imports.
Greece has also stated in accession negotiations that she
will be able to apply CAP mechanisms immediately upon attain-
ing full membership in the Community to all markets including
fruit and vegetables, oil and fat (olive oil) and wine. This
means that Greece will have to accept the official yearly
product prices set down by the Council of Ministers and
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abide by the same rules controlling the sale of similar
products by other Mediterranean member countries. Addi-
tionally, as has already been pointed out, utilization of
EAGGF guidance section funds may well allow Greek agricul-
ture to restructure toward products which are more comple-
mentary to the EEC markets; something she can not presently
afford to do.
The remarks by the Commission in the January 197 6
Opinion summarize the effects of Greek entry on Community
agricultural conditions.
Greek entry should not give rise either
to major changes in the level of the
Community's self-sufficiency for
agricultural products nor confront the
different kinds of market organizations
within the Community with a substan-
tially different situation. With the
exception of certain products, such
as oriental tobacco, some fresh and
processed fruit and vegetables, and
olive oil, such changes as will result
are smaller than the normal annual no2 9
variations in Community production.
Yet another reservation, and perhaps the one at the
heart of the resistance to Greece joining the Community is
the perceived delaying effect accession will have on further
European union. The Community recently has taken a major
step toward further integration by modifying its rules and
scheduling direct elections to the European parliament for
1978-79. In the past the Parliament, with its appointed
representatives from member countries, has served essentially
as a rubber stamp for Commission initiatives, with little
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real legislative power of its own. Advocates of further
political integration feel that the introduction of another
country's policies, orientations and opinions can only
undermine what progress has been made. They wish to delay
any further expansion of the Community until the existing
members establish mechanisms for developing such things as
common foreign policy and monetary reforms, hopefully moving
the union from intergovernmental to supranational status.
In rebuttal to this philosophy that more members will
slow down integration, Mr. Zolotas suggests that Greece is
merely going to become the tenth member of the Community by
taking the place of Norway which decided by referendum not
30to join after being accepted. Obviously there are vast
differences in the problems the two countries posed for the
EEC, but with respect to further integration prospects,
perhaps the analogy is not that far fetched.
Mr. Pesmazoglu proposes that the attempts to delay
Greece's entry on grounds of restricting integration are
more deeply rooted in a desire to limit full membership
status to the industrially advanced European countries.
He suggests that this bias implies a tiered union with the
poorer Mediterranean countries relegated to second class
status. This philosophy, he asserts, is in violation of
the original Treaty of Rome which is founded on the princi-
ple that all peoples of Europe are invited to join the
Community on an equal institutional basis.
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Closely linked to the integration problem is the fear
that Greece's accession will set the precedent for admitting
Spain and Portugal, both of whom have officially applied
for membership. The economic dislocation and structural
problems in these two countries are in many cases more severe
than those in Greece and would certainly place more pressure
on the Community's support funds. If all three countries
were admitted at the same time, the burden would most likely
be unbearable. However, neither Spain nor Portugal has
requested immediate membership, and both countries realize
that they must make progress in many areas before pressing
for accession. Greek proponents also point out that the
terms of Greece's entry currently under negotiation are
similar in most respects to those granted to Britain, Ireland
and Denmark, and that the final agreement will contain no
new concessions on which to base a precedent not already
established.
Finally, critics of Greek accession imply that the Athens
bureaucracy is one of the most inefficient and ponderous in
Europe, claiming that it "cannot produce reliable statistics
32
or translate relevant documents . " Greek officials will
be the first to admit that major structural problems do
exist in their civil service, but also say that the demands
of Community membership will force the administrative echelons
to modernize their operations.
Greek membership will of course place additional demands
on the EEC bureaucracy including more paperwork and the
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translation of all documents into the Hellenic language -
a major chore. Already, 38 percent of the Commission's
staff is solely responsible for rendering documents from
33
one of the six official languages to another. Since most
Greek diplomats are usually fluent in both English and
French, they might be persuaded to waive translation into
Greek except for official regulations. However, as they
are quick to point out, the Community was ready to admit
Norway and its extra language in 1973. Greek admittance
will also require additional jobs for Greek officials, the
appointment of a Greek commissioner, and extra seats on
the European Parliament, all complicated, but necessary
modifications
.
Several plausible objections can be raised against
Greece's accession to the European Community. However,
each can also be countered by equally reasonable arguments
showing that the problems which will be caused by this new
member are not insurmountable. In the long run, full mem-
bership in the Community can only serve to strengthen Greece
which in turn will strengthen the whole union.
The most significant advantage of accession for Greece
is the cementing of political ties with the Western democra-
cies. The possibility of a right-wing conservative reaction
spawned in the regimented environment of the Greek armed
forces still exists. Mr. Karamanlis feels that a formal
relationship with the countries of the West will dampen
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any actual attempts at a repeat of April 1967. Strong
traditional ties with the United States have been considerably
muted since 1974 and although still viable, do not offer
the guarantees they once did. A full scale union with the
major Western European nations can replace this loss.
The major problems associated with Greek economics are
rooted in the need for structural reforms; be they agricul-
tural, industrial or investment oriented. The financial
assistance available through the various Community funds
can significantly contribute to this restructuring process
vital to Greece's economic modernization.
In the agricultural arena, Greece has already agreed to
immediate implementation of most aspects of the CAP which
will help to increase productivity, stabilize the agricul-
tural market, facilitate the marketing mechanism, maintain
prices at reasonable levels and ensure a high standard of
34living for Greek farmers. The technical assistance pro-
vided with funds from the guidance section of the EAGGF
,
for instance, will allow farm officials to attack the
"fragmentation of holdings" problem and consolidate the
plots into larger more efficient ones. This projection is
based upon successful experiences of EEC member nations

















Greece 3 . 5ha
* lha - hectare = 2.4 7 acres
Source: Zolotas, Greece in the EEC
A similar substantial increase in plot size for Greece will
proportionately increase productivity and allow crop diver-
sification, thus improving export capability. Hitiris
asserts that the expansion of the market and the internal
and external economies of scale (the restructuring mentioned
above provides the opportunity for this) should give rise
35to substantial benefits in any kind of customs union.
In contrast to the agricultural sector which has remained
a problem throughout the period of association, Greek indus-
try has expanded and improved dramatically: industrial
exports to the Community increased from $1.6 million in 1962
to $287.6 million in 1974; the values of industrial and /
handicraft products in total exports to the Community increased
from 2 percent in 1962 to 48 percent in 1974 and thus financed
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25 percent of the Greek-EEC trade deficit that year versus
less than 1 percent in 1962. Zolotas suggests that full
membership in the EEC will further benefit Greece industrially
by providing the capability to:
1) Finance a larger volume of industrial investment
with European funds,
2) Apply the latest technology and organizational
procedures
,
3) More easily establish joint enterprises with
Greek and European capital,
4) Optimize industrial firm size by providing
expanded markets
,
5) Absorb the migrant workers who are now unemployed
in other EEC countries particularly Germany,
6) More systematically process minerals, ores and
other raw materials before export,
7) Protect the home market against monopolies,
8) Utilize the problem solving services of the
European investment Bank and the Regional and
Social Funds. 36
Closely linked to both industrial and agricultural
expansion is the attraction for foreign investment. Greece's
union with the European Community will provide the one feature
lacking in past years, the virtual assurance of political
stability. As apparent in Mr. Zolotas' enumeration of the
advantages for Greek industry, expansion requires capital
and capital is available in large quantities from European
and American investors secure in the knowledge that they
will not lose their money. This increased inflow of foreign
funds will provide the smaller business with sufficient
capital to take advantage of opportunities. Hitiris states:
"National gain from foreign investment is achieved as long

as the value added to output by the investment exceeds the
37
amount appropriated by the investor." Even considering
the cost of Greece's generous incentives for attracting
foreign capital, the increased guidance and control gained
from union with the Community will substantially increase
value added gain.
The main factor restricting Greece's economic growth
is the balance of payments deficit which stabilized at
approximately $1 billion in 1975 and 1976. A major advan-
tage of Greece's accession to full membership in the European
Community will be the opportunity to increase exports, thus
reducing the deficit.
The majority of the negative balance is currently offset
by invisible earnings from tourism, migrant worker wages
<
and shipping. With the increasingly stable environment
created by EEC membership, tourism traffic and thus proceeds
can be expected to increase substantially even over current
favorable conditions. Mr. Tzannetakis, secretary general
of the National Tourist Organization, stated that 4.7 million
tourists are expected to visit Greece in 1977 compared to
3 82.2 million in 1974. He indicated that the goals of the
organization are to increase the number of tourists arriving
during the vacation off-season and to improve the quality
of services offered; both of which require significant
capital investments. Accession to the Community will pro-
vide the opportunity to acquire these funds, correspondingly
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increase the tourist traffic and finally cancel a larger
portion of the payments deficit.
By joining the Community, Greece will be able to expand
her markets, utilize improved technology to become more
productive and attract greater amounts of investment
capital to restructure her economy. In light of these
tempting possibilities disadvantages have a tendency to be
ignored but nevertheless must be considered.
The largest single disadvantage Greece will face upon
acceeding to full membership will be the application of EEC
preferential access arrangements with third countries.
These include the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
,
(Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Portugal
and Iceland), the Lome Convention (46 African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) nations) , the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) (112 developing countries) , and the eleven
39
other Mediterranean countries. In 1976, Greek imports
include only 6.6 percent from EFTA, less that 10 percent
from the eleven Mediterranean countries and 2.5 percent
from ACP, but these could go higher when tariff barriers
are lifted.
Currently for these countries, Greece has: 1) adopted
the Common Customs Tariff on products which enter from the
Community duty free, 2) in accordance with Article 2 of
the Association Agreement adjusted the tariff rate to 50
percent of the difference between the CCT and Greek rates
on most other products, 3) suspended the CCT completely

until 1984 on some special products. Greek officials have
not taken any steps to implement the Community's preferen-
tial agreements or the autonomous GSP reductions. These
requirements will become mandatory when Greece acquires
membership, subjecting the country to considerably lower
import prices, and providing strong competition for home
produced goods
.
In the same vein accession presents certain disadvan-
tages to Greek industry. Even though nearly two- thirds of
all EEC industrial goods are imported to Greece tariff
free in accordance with association reduction schedules, a
complex system of state aid still protects this sector.
Government interest rebates subsidize industrial exports at
about 6 percent of the export value and additional "tax
«
perks" push the total benefits to nearly 17 percent of
value. This direct support is unacceptable to EEC policy
and would have to be abolished, subjecting certain indus-
tries to heavy competition, particularly electrical appliance
manufacturers, metal working corporations, foundries, machine
41tool manufacturers and makers of capital goods. Many
other industries however, have become strong since 1974
and should be able to adjust to the new unsubsidized struc-
ture with relatively minor modifications. Certain transi-
tional measures will be necessary for the less independent
firms
.
Associated with the industrial outlook is the question
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) . To become
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a full member of the European Community, Greece will have
to join the ECSC, the products of which are not controlled
under the Association Agreement. Upon accession Greece
will have to dismantle the entire tariff structure on these
goods which currently rests at third country levels and is
substantially higher than the Community rate. The Greek
steel industry appears to be strengthening rapidly but
remains small (60 percent of its output produced by one
mill in Athens) and significantly subsidized by the state.
To remain competitive it will require a transitional period
for adjustment.
Another disadvantage of full membership for Greece is
the cash cost of that membership. Greece will be required
to make direct contributions to the European Development
«
Fund, the capital of the. European Investment Bank and the
ECSC fund. To help finance the Community budget, Athens
must also send a portion of agricultural and CCT levies and
a percentage of the Value Added Tax (VAT) base determined
42by the council to union treasuries.
TABLE 2-12
GREECE ' s HYPOTHETICAL BUDGET





.52% of the VAT base 7_3
Total 151
Source: Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/7 6
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With regard to the VAT, Greece currently relies on a
taxation system primarily utilizing indirect methods which
are not of the value added type. Transition to a VAT to
meet Community requirements will require significant
restructuring.
Joining the Community will have its price tag for both
Greece and the member nations, but the long range benefits
reaped by all should far outweigh these "initiation fees."
As indicated, one of the most important far reaching impli-
cations is the political effect of Greece's accession. The
final portion of this chapter evaluates that consequence.
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
Greece made the original decision to cast her lot with
the European Community in 1959 when she began negotiations
for association with the EEC rather than EFTA. She made
the choice consciously and centered it politically on the
belief that the member nations would strive to develop the
Europe described in the Treaty of Rome. Thirteen years
later, Greece's official request for full membership con-
tinued this theme.
Europe is now engaged in a process of
integration; and Greece desires to be
present in this and to makes its
contribution to the efforts which will
assuredly lead to the outstanding event
of the present century. 3
Mr. Karamanlis
,
prime minister during the consolidation
of the EEC Association Agreement, reasserted since his
return to leadership in July of 1974 that Greece's political
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ties lie with the West and that his major goal in office
is to cement this relationship, initially by full membership
in the Common Market. He has also reiterated this stand
over and over again since that time.
June 12, 1976 - To the Greek Parliament:
Greece, politically, strategically,
economically and culturally belongs
to the West ... Greece's membership
in the Common Market will constitute
a safeguard for her democratic system,
a strengthening of her security and
an acceleration of her economic and
social development . 44
July 27, 1976 — At the opening of the official accession
proceeedings in Brussels:
Our entry into the EEC marks the vindi-
cation of a major policy formulated 15
years ago, aimed at making Greece a
full member of the families of peoples
of western Europe. It is a great
policy which will shape the future of
Greece for many generations to come. 5
April 2, 1977 — To the New Democracy Party Congress:
New Democracy believes that Greece's place
is with the democratic West, with which it
has long standing ties in politics,
economics and defense ... Within Europe,
Greece can hasten its economic and
social development and strengthen its
defense . . . Entry into the EEC (will
make our) economic political and
defense destiny- identical with that of a
United Europe. ^^
When Mr. Karamanlis advanced the general parliamentary elec-
tions to November 20, 1977, a full year ahead of schedule,
he cited the "critical negotiation period for Greece's
accession to full EEC membership" as one of three major
reasons for the earlier date. At his first campaign speech
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in Thessalonike, November 2, 1977 he stated:
Greece belongs to the West, and full
membership in the EC will decisively
influence the country's course for
many a generation.4
7
Former cabinet minister Yeoryios Dhrosos described the
extent of Greek political dependency on Europe when he
asserted that Greeks have no real "blood relatives," i.e.,
Anglo-Saxons, Latins, Slavs or Moslems, and that "relatives
are indispensable" in the world today and therefore Greece
must "manufacture in-laws." These in-laws are the nations
of the European Community, soon to be politically united
and with full membership providing Greece an equal say in
the destiny of the world. To be heard, Greece must join "the
* 1 „ 4 8family.
"
Despite detailed discussions reguarding the disadvantages
to the Community caused by Greece's accession, member coun-
tries and EC officials have strongly supported Greece's
application. Particularly gratifying has been the unreserved
assurances offered by Italy, the nation which agriculturally
Greece's accession could hurt most. Italian Prime Minister
Guilio Andreotti, during an official visit in May 1977
stated:
For Italy, the warm support accorded
to the request for Greece's entry into
the European Community has become an act
of conscience and consistency. 49
He assured the Greek people as he departed:
97

I reaffirmed to (Mr. Karamanlis) the
Italian government's support of Greece's
admission to the EEC. I repeat that
this support is absolute and sincere. 50
Germany has also demonstrated considerable support for
Greece's entry into the Community. In June of 1976, the
Bonn government honored Greece at the Dortmund Week Festi-
val, a yearly event which singles out for praise one particu-
lar country Germany associates with through the Common
Market. Germany's Minister of Culture, speaking for
Chancellor Schmidt, stated during the festivities:
The Federal Republic agrees in princi-
ple with all the Greek views on the
EEC. Greek admission (will) be costly
to the Community . . . but compared with
the political targets to be achieved,
the financial considerations (are)
secondary. 51
West German Vice Chancellor Genscher officially visited
Athens in August 1977 and further solidified Germany's
support by reiterating that his government would contribute
"with all its strength" to make Greece a full member of
the Community as quickly as possible.
In February 1976, Mr. Papaligouras , the ranking Greek
official on negotiation proceedings, conducted a successful
visit to the Benelux countries where he met with Common
Market ministers and Commission officials. He stated on
his return that the "road to Europe lies open" and that





In May 19 77, Mr. Karamnalis met with Mr. James Callaghan
and received the Prime Minister's assurance that Britain
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would "work to overcome any difficulties" concerning Greek
membership and provide full support for the Greek applica-
53tion. At the same time Mr. Karamanlis had successful
meetings with the Prime Ministers of Denmark and Luxembourg
and President d'Estaing of France. In March, Le Monde
had published an article describing an alleged "new French
Doctrine" urging caution on the timing of Greek entry into
the Community, but this did not seem to dampen the Greek-
54French exchange in Paris.
Ireland's Foreign Minister Michael 0' Kennedy visited
Athens on September 9, 1977 and at the completion of talks
with Greek officials signed a joint communique reiterating
his country's wish to "warmly support the accession negotia-
55tions until they terminate in the shortest possible time."
Since filing the formal application for accession in
June 1975, Greece has received at least tacit support from
all members of the EEC and in most cases strong assurances
that the negotiations will be urged along as quickly as
possible because of the political importance attached to
Greek membership. During the remaining negotiation period
certain key issues will surface.
First is the question of Greece's effect on Turkey's
later entry into the Community. Turkey initially reacted
to Greece's application for full membership without objec-
tion. Some months later however, when it appeared that
Greece would succeed in its bid fairly quickly, Ankara began
opposing the accession. Officials felt the negative reaction
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occurred because of the unanimity vote required by all
EEC members on any admission. Greece's vote could thus
block Turkey's entry at a later time (19S5 projected).
Greek officials replied to this concern by stating that
Greece would never veto Turkey's admission when the condi-
tions for her acceptance were met (Mr. Karamanlis has reaffirmed
this twice publically)
. They further assured Commission
President Ortoli in July 1975:
The presence of the two countries in
the Community would ease their relations
with one another and give them the -
fi
opportunity of overcoming their problems.
Supporters of Turkish efforts to keep Greece out of the
Community argued that such attitudes would not necessarily
be binding on future Greek governments, and that Greek
politicians would be under considerable pressure to deny
future EEC aid to Turkey and further concessions under the
Turkish Association Agreement.
Greek officials admit that they do not see the Community
as a mediating body designed to spell out terms of Greek-
Turkish settlement. Mr. Pesmazaglu, recent leader of the
representatives to the Joint Greek-EEC Parliamentary
Committee stated:
The view that the European Community
' should urge upon Greece and Turkey
the need for them to reach just and
lasting solutions to the differences
which separate them 1 is deemed
unacceptable by Greece. ^"7
Thus the problem remains a thorny one relative to both
current negotiations and future considerations.
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Second, many European officials, notably Germany's
Helmut Schmidt, hope that bringing Greece into the Community
will help to speed her return to the NATO fold. This
reconciliation would greatly shore up the sagging southern
flank, a major concern with increasing tensions in the
Middle East, Africa and more recently Yugoslavia over Tito's
succession. Others, including many Greeks, consider the
European Community and NATO two non-associated entities.
In fact one newspaper described the current accession pro-
ceedings as balancing "divorce proceedings in NATO with
5 8
marriage negotiations in the Commission." Mr. Karamanlis
attended the NATO summit meeting in May 1977 but reasserted
his position that Greece would only return to the military
structure of the alliance when the "conditions which com-
pelled her to withdraw" (anti-American feeling and the
Cyprus dispute with Turkey) ceased to exist. In actuality,
Greece cooperates in much of the day-to-day work of NATO,
has recently taken part in naval maneuvers in the Aegean
and in October 1977 suggested a new special status arrange-
ment which immediately commits Greek forces to NATO commanders
in times of international crisis. Also in October, Athens
signed a new four-year $700 million bilateral aid and base
rights agreement with the United States. These conditions
indicate that Greece's attitude toward NATO remains posi-




Third, domestic politics (i.e., the conflict between
parties for and against EEC entry) has always played a
significant role in the accession question. A major tremor
shook the accession bargaining structure in January 1977
when the two top negotiators resigned. Mr. Nicos Kyriazides,
the delegation leader, apparently did not disagree with the
strong official position that political considerations must
take priority, but did contend that basic economic inter-
ests should not be sacrificed in the process; in other words,
the question of how willing should the Greek negotiators be
to back down from stands on economic problems (particularly
agricultural) for the sake of speeding up the negotiation
process and quick entry. This challenge did not sit well
with Mr. Papaligouras who replaced Mr. Kyriazidis with Mr.
3yron Theodoropoulos , a delegate more oriented toward the
relative priorities of the Minister of Coordination and
Mr. Karamaniis.
The dismissals brought a furor of criticism from the
opposition parties, particularly PASOK, the far left Pan-
60
hellenic Socialist Movement led by Andreas Papandreou.
Mr. Papandreou withdrew his party's representative from the
Joint Greece-EEC Parliamentary Committee in protest and
stated that the problem of admission to the EEC had been
purposefully simplified by the administration. He asserted
that three major areas were being overlooked and that:
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1) Greece is being forced to accept the intervention
of the EEC directorate on a solution to the
Turkish problem,
2) The economic terms of admission developed in
negotiations will "lead to the extermination of
our economy",
3) The EEC is a union of "multinational monsters"
which will absorb and weaken Greece as an under-
developed border country. 61
The PASOK expanded on these views in May 1977 at a
Brussels symposium organized by the Universite Libre de
Bruxelles . In a paper presented by Professor Simitis, the
party contended that the negotiating policy of the Karamanlis
government "relies on statements of good intention by the
Nine, while in fact neglecting to guarantee vital Greek
economic and political interests." The paper goes on to
offer a neutralist position in lieu of accession:
The Greek Socialists Party believes that
Greece would do better to readjust its
relations with Western Europe and seek
wider collaboration with the Balkan and
Mediterranean countries with the goal
of external economic policy which does
not only turn towards the USA and
West Europe. ^^
In a September interview with Le Nouvel Observateur ,
Mr. Papandreou stated:
The Common Market problem will be Mr.
Karamanlis 1 Waterloo. He has made Greece's
EC entry the number one theme of his
national policy. He has thus stripped
our delegation of all its negotiating
arguments
.
When asked why the Karamanlis government was organizing
new elections a year early he replied:
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Today Karamanlis can still convince the
people that Greece's entry into the
Common Market is going to take place.
In reality, it has been postponed
indefinitely and next year it will no
longer be possible to deceive anyone.
In contrast to the PASOK position and similar views
held by the pro-Moscow Communist Party of the Exterior,
Karamanlis 1 New Democracy Party, the EDIK or Center Union-
New Forces, and the Communist Party of the Interior (Euro-
communist) all support accession. The following table
summarizes the relative strength of these parties following









New Democracy 54 216 42 173
Center Union 21 58 12 15
PASOK 14 12 25 92
United Left* 10 8 12 13
Other 1 6 9 7
Total 100 300 100 300
* includes the Communist parties of the Interior and
Exterior plus splinter groups
Sources: Time , December 5, 1977; 1975 Yearbook on
International Communist Affairs
The Greek government has no plans to hold a referendum
on the EEC question. In an opinion poll conducted in
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April 1976 by the Institute of Communications Research
however, those who answered the question: "Would Greece
be helped or harmed by entry into the EEC?", 50 percent
said membership would help Greece and 18 percent thought it
64
would be harmful. The survey showed that education and
income of the respondents made little difference in their
replies but that older Greeks (ages 45-64) felt accession
would help.
The international and domestic political implications
for Greece's accession to the European Commnity are signi-
ficant and although the member states have assured Greece
that they are behind quick accession for the Hellenic
nation, the thorny problems of Turkish association and
NATO realignment loom large over the negotiating table.
The effect of EEC association on Greece, must be counted
as a positive factor in her development over the last
sixteen years and although when evaluating accession, the
advantages for Greece and disadvantages for the Community
seem to predominate, the overall balance of the benefits
for both is not drastically skewed. What remains then is
to examine more fully the more critical factors that have
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MAJOR FACTORS IN THE GREEK ECONOMY
This section of the study will evaluate nine factors
which, in the opinion of the author, are central to an
analysis of Greek economic stability. It will provide a
brief description of the significance of each factor to
future Greek economic development, a determination of the
effects of EEC accession on the factor and a tabulation of
the available numerical indicators showing factor movement.
ENERGY
Greece faces a rapidly expanding demand for energy.
Primary needs increased over 12 percent annually from 1963
to 1973 and electric power consumption increased 17 percent
per year over the same period. Foreign supplies of energy
still account for 50 to 75 percent of this requirement and
in 1976, mineral fuels and lubricants totaled 20 percent of
the value of all imports. Crude petroleum imports (84
percent of fuel imports) trebled in volume from 1970 (4.3
2
million tons) to 1974 (13.1 million tons) and in dollar
3
value terms increased 800 percent. Considering Greece's
balance of trade deficit (about $3.5 billion in 1976) the
fuels problem is critical.
The Greek government developed a long term plan in
October 1975 to exploit all possible indigenous energy
resources. The National Council of Energy (NCE) , established
at that time, works closely with the Public Petroleum
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Corporation (PPC) and comprises the senior advisory board
for all energy matters. Shortly after its formation the
NCE presented recommendations to Athens.
1) Fuel savings - strictly evaluate new industries
requiring large amounts of energy, reorient
with technology and incentives toward alternate
production modes,
2) Petroleum use — reorganize the petroleum use
cycle to better meet world oil conditions,
3) Emphasize source changes — revise pricing of
energy supplies, favor the use of indigenous
sources
,
4) New sources — accelerate the prospecting for
all forms of indigenous energy (lignite, oil,
natural gas, solar, and geothermal)
.
The Karamanlis government acknowledged the importance
of the recommendations of the council, particularly those
dealing with oil. Petroleum has become more and more important
to Greece since 1960 when Mr. Karamanlis' old regime began
shifting away from indigenous solid fuels to the cheap,
easily importable liquid products. Greece's industrial
expansion soon came to depend upon the new type of energy
not only for manufacturing exportables (including high value
aluminum) but because oil refineries formed the center of
major industrial complexes: Esso/Papas — refinery
,
petro-
chemicals and steel; Onassis — proposed refinery, aluminum
smelter, petro-chemicals
,
power stations; Niarchos — refinery,
chemicals. These refineries produce petroleum products for
domestic use but also for export (10 percent of total
exports in 19 75)
.
In light of demand, the Athens administration intensi-
fied the search for Greek oil begun by the Junta in 1973-1974.
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The primary exploration company, Oceanic Exploration, an
American firm, reported tapping an efficiently exploitable
field (Prinos) off the Aegean island of Thassos late in
1974. Reserve estimates have varied since then from 25,000
barrels per day (BPD) to 180,000 BPD. Most estimates cluster
at 50,000 barrels of crude and ten million cubic feet of
natural gas per day for the next fifteen years, with
reserves totaling 177 million barrels of petroleum and 46.1
million barrels of liquid natural gasoline. If these
figures are accurate, the Prinos fields alone could cover
one-fourth to one-third of Greece's current oil requirements
by the end of 1980. 6
The government also processed more than fifty applica-
tions in 1976 for oil drilling rights in other parts of
Greece, including the continental shelf of the Ionian Sea,
the Nestos River delta in south-eastern Macedonia, and the
Peloponnesus. As yet, these sites are unproven but some
have displayed promising preliminary results. French,
German, American and Romanian companies have joined these
exploration efforts. Even if these sites do yield substan-
tial domestic oil reserves, electricity produced by oil-
burning generating plants will remain expensive. For this
reason, the Karamanlis government specifically heeded the
recommendations of the National Council of Energy and
accelerated the development of other indigenous energy
sources, the most abundant of which are lignite and peat.
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Proven lignite (brown coal) reserves are set at 1 .
5
to 2 billion tons from sites at Ptolemais, Megalopolis and
Crete with the possibility of two to three times this amount
in other exploitable areas. Electricity produced by lignite-
fired generators costs about one-third that of oil burners
and can be provided entirely from domestic sources. The
government projects completion of a minimum of six new 300
megawatt lignite burning units by 1983 to 1986; three are
p
already in operation.
Extensive peat deposits exist in the plains of Phillippi
in northeastern Greece which the Soviet Union contracted to
develop in 1973. The agreement specified the construction
of a 375 megawatt peat burning power station at a cost of
$89 million. Since the quantity of peat is enormous (about
four billion metric tons) and its heat generating capacity
(caloric value) is three times that of lignite, the possi-
bilities for future use as a substitute energy source are
many.
Nuclear energy also plays a role in the government's long
range plan. In March of 1977, teams from the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the Institute of Geological
Studies discovered uranium in Thrace. Preliminary analysis
indicates that exploitable quantities of the ore exist in
9
the area and geological mapping has begun. Greek officials,
including Professor E. Gyftopoulos, Counsellor of Energy,
determined that the country should acquire its first nuclear
reactor power station by 1986-1987. They tentatively
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decided to locate the 600 megawatt facility at Lavrion on
the tip of the Athens-Piraeus peninsula. It will help to
supply the demands of the metropolis which uses 35 to 40
percent of the country's total electrical output.
Greek energy researchers also recommend expansion of
hydroelectric capability which currently stands at about
900 megawatts, less than one-eighth of feasible capacity.
Key facilities exist in central Thessaly and on the Peloponne-
sus with a major new plant nearing completion at Sfikia in
southern Macedonia.
To complete the list of future possibilities, the National
Council of Energy recommended investigating geothermal
resources on the islands of Micos, Nisyros, Methana, Kamena,
Vouria and Ikaria, and encouraged membership in the National
Committee on Solar and Wind Energy. In conjunction with the
latter suggestion, the Greek government established a solar-
technical section of oceanological research on the island
of Coroussa, and several nations elected to found the Inter-
national Center for Solar and Wind Technology there as well.
In January 19 77 the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank
began a research project aimed at devising a plan to heat
12
water in apartment blocks with solar techniques.
The majority of all these exploitable energy sources
develop electric power. The Public Power Corporation is
solely responsible for the generation, transmission and
distribution of all electricity in Greece. It has doubled
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installed capacity every five years since 1960. Trans-
mission systems are connected to the national systems in
Yugoslavia and Albania and service over 3.5 million Greek
13
customers representing about 9 8 percent of the population.
Realizing the critical limitations on external liquid
energy sources, the Greek government modified its require-
ments and diversified its energy base in the direction of
domestic sufficiency. Michael Wall projects that if
Greece continues its present efforts, by 1992 indigenous
. . . 14
sources should totally supply electricity requirements.
TABLE 3-1
SOURCES OF ELECTRIC ENERGY
PRODUCTION IN GREECE
(percent)
1974 a 1975b 1980b 1992
a
Oil 45 41.3 26 7
Nuclear - - - 9
Hydroelectric 18 13.7 18 18
Lignite-Peat 37 45 56 66
Sources: a) Wall, "A Survey of Greece," Economist ,
Sep 20, 1975, p. 27.
b) Overseas Business Reports, No. 76-17.
Effect of Accession
The EC Commission's opinion on Greek application for
membership states that "Greek membership is not likely to
affect the overall energy balance" in the Community since
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Greece's indigenous production will not "outstrip domestic
demand in the foreseeable future." However, improved
technology aids from the Community, such as modern data
analyzing methods, will help Greece to develop its own
resources more quickly and reduce the quantity of energy
imports
.
Once accession has occurred, increased availability of
financing may allow Greece to construct new industry which
will place greater demands on energy but hasten the follow-
through on energy development programs. Accession should
not hinder Greece's plans for domestic energy production
but rather enhance growth and encourage self-sufficiency.
TABLE 3-2
GREEK ELECTRIC ENERGY PRODUCTION
AND GENERATING CAPACITY
Production (million KWH) Installed Capacity (megawatts
(1959=100) ,
Year Total Indexa Total
1970 3991 458.2 2495
1971 10611 540.8 2695
1972 12034 613.4 2857
1973 13546 690.4 3443
1974 13724 699.4 3988 c
1975 14613 745.1 4736 c
1979 d 21300 1085.6 5700
1984d 27307 1391.7 7100
Sources: a) Statistical Yearbook of Greece , p. 258.
b) Statistical Yearbook of Greece , p. 464.
c) Statistical Yearbook of Greece , p. 261.
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1976.
TABLE 3-4




Year Value Increase Imports
1970 76.73 01 03
1971 85.30 11 04
1972 142.84 67 06
1973 328.75 130 09
1974 845.54 157 19
1975 1028.01 21 19
1976 1034.80 0. 66 17
Source
:
OECD Survey Greece - 1977, p. 48.
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DOMESTIC AND MIGRANT LABOR
Domestic Labor
The Ministry of Employment and the National Labor Exchange
closely supervise conditions of employment in Greece. These
agencies have set the minimum employment age at fourteen
years, restricted females from underground work, barred
males under sixteen and females under eighteen from hazardous
or unhealthy jobs and prevented minors under eighteen from
16
working at night. In certain cases, regulations require
males under nineteen and females under seventeen to serve
apprenticeship periods at reduced pay, and many jobs require
specific qualifications for which applicants must present
appropriate certificates of training before hiring.
One of Greece's major labor problems remains a lack of
skilled workers. The Labor Exchange is attempting to combat
this by encouraging expansion of vocational training facili-
ties and programs, but progress is slow.
Until recently, high level professionals in industrial
management, agricultural science, research science, tehcni-
cal engineering, and advanced education tended to leave
Greece in search of more lucrative positions abroad. Con-
versely, a general excess of professionals existed in law,
literature, architecture and administration. Improved pay
scales, increased industrialization and greater foreign
corporation involvement have turned this pattern around within
the last twenty- four to thirty-six months.
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In the lower level job market, the problem of seasonal
employment, particularly in the agricultural and services
sectors, continues to make coordination a problem between
those seeking employment and the National Labor Exchange
which is responsible for filling jobs. Since all persons
looking for work must now register with the Exchange, its
informational and job/employee matching capabilities are
improving.
The normal workweek in Greece consists of forty-five
hours (six days at 7.5 hours each). The Employment iMinistry
must approve all overtime and regulations require employers
to compensate workers for annual leaves ranging from eight
to twenty-six days or more depending on job type and length
18
of service. In cases of illness, employees must pay the
difference between Government Social Insurance compensations
and the individual's salary or wage for at least the first
month
.
Industrial trade unions base their organization on area,
occupation or industry groups which in turn form labor
centers and then national federations. The Greek General
Confederation of Labor (GSEE) heads all the national organi-
zations, receives recognition from the Greek government and
affiliates with the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions. The labor organizations have the right to
strike and to bargain officially over wages and benefits.
The GSEE, the Federation of Greek Industrialists (SEV)
,
which is an employers' union, and the government Ministry
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of Labor usually determine national collective labor
agreements by joint negotiations. In December 1975, GSEE
denounced the agreement placed into effect the first of the
year and demanded a 32 percent minimum wage hike across the
board to combat inflationary trends. They also called for
automatic individual wage and salary adjustments for every
three years with the same firm and uniformity of annual
20leave entitlements for all classes of workers. The SEV
initially rejected the demands, but after adopting several
intermediate measures, it finally consented to an agreement
which satisfied GSEE wants and actually increased the minimum
wage 34 percent for men and 43 percent for women from the
21beginning of 1976 to the middle of 1977.
Migrant Labor
A special word is necessary about the impact of migrant
labor on the Greek economy. In the early 1960's, when popu-
lation began to outpace job availability, more and more




















The exodus accomplished two things for the government: it
absorbed a large percentage of the unemployed workers, and
it provided a valuable source of foreign exchange inflow
which significantly helped to offset the balance of trade
deficit.
TABLE 3-6














Source: Herrick, Area Handbook for Greece
, p. 263.
Officials hoped that the workers ' experiences in the
more advanced Western European countries would provide them
with training in skills that they could later apply in an
industrially expanding Greece. In some cases this occurred,
but in most, the receiving states relegated emigrants to
lesser jobs and menial tasks which provided little experi-
ence of value. A 1975 OECD Observer article states:
The fragmentation of the work generally
assigned to the foreign worker tends to
make him a performer of repetitive tasks,
his only training a familiarization with
industrial discipline. This may be
valuable but would hardly equip him to
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perform the functions of a skilled
worker on his return home ... 22
Since the downturn of the economic environment in
Europe, many Greek immigrants found conditions worsening for
them in the host countries. UPI correspondent Bjorn Edlund
discusses the example of Sweden and cites Swedish Bureau
of Statistics figures which show that immigrants work in
lower paid jobs, live in poorer housing, suffer from more
crowded conditions , have twice as many late-night shifts and
high-risk jobs and generally experience a lower standard of
23living than native Swedes. In Germany, the most popular
country for Greek immigrants, conditions appear worse where
most live crowded in urban slums. In West Berlin, many
Germans consider the Greek Gastarbeiter (guest workers)
24
"simpletons, primitives and Drecksshweine (filthy pigs)."
France has so many unemployed immigrants (100,00 out of 1.2
million are jobless) that Prime Minister Raymond Barre
presented a plan in April 1977 offering all non-resident
workers who would return home a $2000 bonus and a second
class plane ticket.
The European Community has evaluated the migrant worker
question in great detail and has attempted to improve the
conditions facing laborers from non-Community member coun-
tries. Mr. Patrick Hillery, European Commissioner for
Social Affairs, indicated in a recent report that the fun-
damental aim of the migrant workers ' action program should
be "the progressive elimination of all discrimination as
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regards living and working conditions from the moment when,
in the case of migrants from third countries, they have
been authorized to work in the Community."" Toward this
end, the Commission supported the principle that the
language and culture of origin should be taught to the
children of migrant workers . It granted aid from the
European Social Fund to help the member countries pay for
this training. As the Nine implement this program in vari-
ous ways and at various speeds, migrants who remain in EC
countries ultimately should see more equitable treatment.
Notwithstanding the EC efforts to improve conditions,
many emigrant Greek workers have considered returning home.
'If they do not all return at once, the Greek economy should
absorb them without much difficulty; however, certain draw-
backs will result. The migrants bring back both culture
and ideas from their experience. They have seen modern
societies and the benefits of highly industrialized econo-
mies. Thus they become impatient and easily frustrated when
confronted with Greek bureaucratic inertia. Politically,
they have witnessed progressive ideas in action and can com-
pare these to the generally conservative programs at home.
These factors could move many to support the more radical
advocates of change and significantly increase the power of
left parties like the radical PASOK. Financially, their
remittances have traditionally offset significant portions
of the balance of trade deficit (24 percent in 1976) , a
2 6




Full membership in the EEC and the application of all
rules and regulations will open Greece to increased com-
petition from many sectors. As pointed out, certain indus-
trial firms employing a substantial number of people may be
unable to stand the competition and go out of business,
increasing the unemployment rate until those displaced can
find new jobs. The free access conditions for all workers
(including professionals), to all member countries, will
provide the opportunity for linguistically qualified
engineers, though critically needed in Greece, to move
to more lucrative jobs in the Community. However, the
free movement rules also will encourage overages of lawyers
and architects to seek employment elsewhere.
Greek union leaders strongly support accession because
of better labor and union protection provided by EC member
27
countries, improved working conditions and better pay.
Mr. Papaligouras ,- Minister of Coordination, stressed in a
March 19 77 statement on the new collective labor agreement
that the effect of full membership competition on Greek
business will help eliminate the super profits of large,
wealthy, monopolistic firms and equalize some of the vast
28income differentials between sectors of Greek society.
With regard to migrant labor, critics of Greek accession
to full membership assert that the guarantee of free labor
movement under the Treaty of Rome will rapidly increase the
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number of Greek workers in other member states. Statistical
indications over the last two to three years, however, show
that migration from Greece is slowing and that the number
of workers returning to Greece is steadily rising. With the
increase in industrialization, the development of more jobs
and the improvement of working conditions and pay scales
accompanying Greece's accession, this homeward trend should
continue, and new migrations should decrease markedly.
Weaver indicates from her research that many Greek
migrants will return from Western Europe because they have
29fulfilled their "short-term financial objectives." Nearly
100,000 have arrived home in the last three years already,
most returning to the towns or regions of their birth. Hope-
fully, employment opportunities stimulated by regional
development funds, available with accession, will encourage
them to stay in the rural areas.
Zolotas suggests that although the gains and losses for
a sending country change with environmental conditions, there
are certain general characteristics which remain applicable.
TABLE 3-7
EFFECT OF EMIGRATION ON SENDING COUNTRIES
Gains Losses
1) Remittances 1) Lost production
2) Decline in consumption 2) Decline in investment
3) Training 3) Outflow of human capital
4) Equilibrium factor pricing 4) Danger of forced massive
repatriation
5) "Balanced growth" 5) Demographic consequences




Without elaborating on these, it appears that with Greece's
current situation and impending EC accession, losses will
overshadow gains, excepting remittances. Thus the reduction






1965 a 1970b 1974° I975 C





Sources: a) Herrick, Area Handbook for Greece
b) Economist , Jan 31, 1976, p. 55





























Average Daily Wages 3 Minimum Daily Wages
1973 1976 Percent
Increase
1973b 1977 a Percent
Increase
Men 187 326 74 165 294 78
Women 128 237 85 144 285 97
note
:
Inflationary increasses totaled 54.3 percent
from 1973-1976. (See Appendix Table A-5)
Sources: a) Greece Economic Activity and Development
,
p. 12.
b) Greece: Business in Greece, p. 19.
RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES
As with so many European nations when the energy ques-
tions arose in 1973, Greece's attention turned toward her
Arab neighbors. The relationship began with oil shipments
to Greece, then highly dependent upon that resource to fuel
the rapidly expanding economy. However, as Arab buying power
increased and significant markets opened in the Arab lands,
Greek officials realized the great potential for reciprocal
trade agreements.
In the 1960's Greece oriented its trade almost exclusively
toward Western Europe and the Americas. West Germany headed
the list of trading partners followed by the United Kingdom,
the United States, Italy, France and finally Japan by the
end of the decade. However, by 1975, the pattern changed.

































o o o O
rH o o in O
^
o o KO o
kO o o C\
e
<0 a> H ^p
CN CN CM CN







iH CO O O







































rrj i cd rH
s VT3 rH
r» rH en
•. OO <u 3







M C -C «.
rrj +J U




c CO -U CO
rrj •H J3































Saudi Arabis second after West Germany. In 1964, all the Arab
nations accounted for only 5 percent of Greek exports, but
by 1975 they absorbed almost 17 percent. 30
Greek officials realized the need to offset the terrific
balance of payments deficit created by the value of oil imports
and made concerted efforts to counter the flow. This forced
a shift in trading areas and provided several collateral
benefits for Greece. Arab oil revenues more than quadrupled
by the end of 1973 and supplied these nations with consider-
able wealth and corresponding financial capability. They
quickly realized the temporary nature of the source of their
income and began reducing dependence on petroleum exports by
developing other industries. This new emphasis allowed nations
with foreign exchange as well as to exploit a broad spectrum
of business opportunities.
Immediate Arab needs surfaced for housing, schools, hospi-
tals, roads, sewage and water systems, recreational and tourist
facilities, new harbors and airports. Greek engineering and
industrial firms, experienced in meeting these developing needs
in their own expanding economy, established strong footholds
with large engineering and construction contracts. These
totaled over $4 billion and involved more than thirty Greek
31
companies in early 1978. The Arab desire to develop a major
merchant marine fleet also provided opportunities for Greece in
ship building, marine managerial and technical planning and





In the financial sector, Greece provided two major attrac-
tions for the growing surplus of Arab funds. To encourage
economic expansion, Greek banks pay large returns on monies
deposited for development purposes. Investment packages are
usually offered on shorter terms than in other Western nations,
and new secrecy laws allow the use of numbered accounts which
provide the anonymity Middle Eastern investors desire.
Politically, Greece has traditionally supported the Arab
position on international issues including the Arab/Israeli
dispute. In February 1977, Mr. Karamanlis reiterated that
Greece advocates a speedy and equitable settlement of the
Middle East issue based on:
The evacuation of the Arab territories
occupied after 1967, the reinstatement
of the rights of the Palestinians and
the guarantee of the frontiers and safe-
guarding of the right of all peoples of--
the region to live in peace and safety.
During the same speech, presented at a dinner given by the
Ambassadors to Greece from Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, Mr. Karamanlis stressed that
Greece had had a pro-Arab foreign policy for twenty years and
would continue to maintain it. He pointed out that commercial
exchange with the ambassadors' countries tripled in the last three
years (from $116 to $440 million) in a "spectacular" renewal
of friendly relations. He expressed the wish that the coop-
34
eration would continue to broaden in all sectors
.
Recent developments indicate ties are strengthening. A
1977 trade protocol signed with Egypt on November 8, 1976 estab-
lishes a $35 million export market for Greek goods including
pharmaceuticals, wines, olives and other produce. Greek

purchases from Egypt are comprised of cotton, rice, other
agricultural goods and 400,000 tons of crude oil. 35 Professor
Angelos Angelopoulos
, Governor of the National Bank of Greece,
returned from Cairo in February 1977 after talks with Prime
Minister Mamdouh Salem announcing an agreement to establish
a branch of the National Bank of Greece in Cairo.
In May 1976, Mr. D. Bitsios, then Greek Foreign Minister,
met with his Jordanian counterpart, Mr. Hassan Ibrahim, in
Athens and signed a framework agreement dealing with economic,
commercial, scientific and cultural cooperation. Mr. Bitsios'
follow-up trip to Amman in February 1977 resulted in the
signing of a new trade agreement, and the reaffirmation of
37Greek support for Arab stands in Palestine.
During the same trip, Mr. Bitsios visited Damascus, con-
ferred with Syrian President Assad and concluded agreements
on cultural relations and telecommunications including plans
for a cable link between the two countries. The Syrian
government encouraged Mr. Karamanlis to visit Damascus at
his earliest convenience to conduct talks and further strengthen
Greek/Syrian ties. On July 25, 1977 ferryboats carrying trans-
port trucks began traveling a route from the Greek port of
Volos to Latakia, Syria once every four days. At the same
time, a Syrian delegation met in Volos to finalize the
implementing of another agreement already signed, to utilize




Professor I. Georgakis , Greece's roving Ambassador to
the Arab countries, concluded a basic cooperation agreement
with Libya in May of 1976, which paved the way for the estab-
lishment of a Greek/Arab bank later in 1977. Arab interests
will control 60 percent of the new bank's shares (20 percent
each for Libya, Kuwait and Bahrein) while the Greek National
Bank will hold the remaining 40 percent. The Greek press stated
in February 19 77 that the bank will provide general banking
3 9services and investment initiatives in all Arab countries."
These will include use of funds for large state and private
industrial projects in the Middle East and North Africa and
research efforts to help attract Arab money into Greece.
Greece also concluded an economic and technical agreement with
Iraq in June 1976 which provided for the formation of joint
enterprises, a framework for future trade and tourist coop-
eration, consultation on Iraqi housing and road construction
40
and a supply of oil to Greece on a special basis. Agree-
ments were signed to expand commercial exchange with Kuwait
in March 1977 and with Iran in May 1977 to advance relations
in such areas as trade, industry, merchant marine and tourism
while providing the opportunity for Greece to purchase $1
41billion of Iranian crude oil.
Effect of Accession
Mr. Zolotas , in his analysis of the Greek/EEC question
suggests that upon accession, Greece will act as the bridge
between the European community and the countries of the
Middle East and North Africa. Since Greece already has
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working agreements with most of these nations, projecting the
interests of the EC countries into them should follow naturally
Thus Greece stands to become the gateway for European Com-
munity ventures into the Arab world, providing guidance
along routes well traveled by Hellenic industry, commerce
and politics. To this end, Mr. Karamanlis implemented plans
in January 1977 to open a transportation Europort in Thessa-
lonike which "will become an international center for transit
trade and . .
.
the southeastern gate linking the EEC with
the vital commercial centers of the Middle East and North
42Africa." With Greece as a full member of the Community
these predictions should prove accurate.
In the other direction, investment funds from the Arab
countries will funnel into Greece through established
channels, such as the joint Arab/Greek bank, and then dis-
burse among EC nations using conventional Community finan-
cial exchanges. This direct link will take full advantage
of the total spectrum of European investment opportunities
for Arab money.
The sound infrastructure that has developed between the
Arab countries and Greece can provide a vital link between
the industrialized giants of the West and the wealthy emerging
countries of the Middle East and North Africa once Greece
has become a full partner in the European Community. This
position can only benefit Greece as the middle man and

































































































Note: Imports are to Greece, exports from Greece.
Sources: a) Greece Economic Activity and Development
,
p. 11.
b ) Statistical Yearbook of Greece




Foreign exchange receipts from tourism in Greece for
many years have offset a significant portion of the balance
of payments deficit. More than that, Greeks have always
taken naturally to the tourist trade. They are proud of
their heritage and make an effort to present it in ways
which are truly Greek. As early as the 1950 's Mr. Karamanlis
established firm long-range plans for development of this
sector and managed to lay a strong foundation before the
political turmoil of the late 1960's began.
The leaders of the military Junta, although continuing
to produce substantial growth in tourist traffic, modified
the perspective on its cultivation. Mr. George Daskalakis
,
19 75 President of the Greek National Tourist Organization
(NTO) stated the military leaders were "trying to treat
this sector as an industry, overlooking the personal
43
aspects — that of offering services to human beings.""
The military leaders did conduct extensive research
which led them to develop the most advantageous areas, i.e.,
Crete, Corfu, Rhodes, Argolis in the Peloponnesus and the
Chalcidice peninsula south-east of Thessalonike. However,
they were so anxious to exploit the perceived commercial
value of the areas that they provided unrealistically large,
low-interest loans to virtually any company that offered
to construct hotels or tourist centers. Many profit hungry
businessmen could not resist the lure and hired fly-by-night
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firms which constructed inferior facilities at poor loca-
tions. Most of these endeavors ultimately ended in non-
44
completions or bankruptcies. Officials also neglected to
arrange for concurrent infrastructure development projects
such as airports, water systems, sewage systems and traffic
controls which limited the use of the new accommodations.
With the return of democracy in 1974, the new leaders
faced the mistrust of the Greek population over the merits
of tourism and the credibility of public officials and
businessmen. Potential visitors, equally wary after the
political upheavals in July, also needed to have their confi-
dence restored.
The newly organized NTO approached the 1975 season by
freezing hotel and recreation prices at 1974 levels and
by coining the slogan: "Spend a holiday in Greece this year
on last year's budget." NTO staffers offered further incen-
tives by waiving landing fees for private aircraft, issuing
gas coupons allowing the purchase of petroleum products at
one-third the market value and contracting for distinguished
programs of music and theater including Rudolf Nureyev and
the Royal Ballet, the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, the
Prague National Opera and the Orchestre de Paris . They also
encouraged Greeks supplying tourist services to remember
the disastrous 1974 season (tourist arrivals dropped one
million and the sector sustained a 14 percent loss in revenue)
45
and to be appreciative in their reception of 1975 guests.
137

The Greeks required little prompting, and 1975 ended with
substantial gains, although overall performance remained
well below the 1973 record level.
One deficiency continued to plague NTO officials through-
out 1975: the inadequate training of workers in tourist
services. The Junta had recruited young people from the
villages, skilled only in goat herding or olive picking,
and sent them to the major urban centers for crash courses
in cooking and table waiting. The results were rough at
best, and many guests left Greek hotels frustrated by the
inefficiency and ineptitude of the staff. The new NTO
increased the number and duration of specialty training pro-
grams within Greece and currently sends thousands of young
46Greeks to hotel training institutions in Europe and America.
After recovery and reestablishment of the sector during
the 1975 season, the NTO paused and attempted to establish
long-range goals. Steadily increasing world prices in 1976
forced officials to allow Greek tourist charges to rise
from the artificially held 1974 levels. Most hotel operators
claimed that their real costs increased 4 5 percent over the
two-season period. In January 1976, the NTO authorized
an 18 to 22 percent increase in hotel rates. This raised
the price of accommodations in Athens to London levels . The
new rates ranged from $20 to $40 per night for a single room
47including breakfast. Even with this hike in accommodation
rates, the US Department of State Cost of Living Indexes,
released in April 1976, showed Athens still undercutting
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Source: Foreign Assistance and Related Programs
Appropriations FY 1977
, p. 1102.
The NTO of course realized that most tourists travel lengthy
distances to visit Greece which adds to total per person
costs and requires low in-country expenses for the total
package to remain competitive.
Mr. T. Tzannetakis, the Secretary General of NTO in
July 1977, outlined long-range goals and stressed the major
objective for Greek tourism to be: "Cautious development
in order to safeguard the precious masterpieces that exist
in (Greece)." He stated:
We chose to plan for a kind of tourism
that would insure a steady long-term
growth, and not the one that promises
direct, but short-term profits. Tourism
must become beneficial to Greece; to
139

help develop our country, to make
accessible the places of interest of
our country not just to foreigners,
but to our own people as well, to
establish a cosmopolitan environment
combined with folk traditions, to
safeguard the evidence of our ancient
glory and civilization . . . Tourism
necessarily demands and draws a lot
out of the environment. Should we
not slow it down then? Should we not
try to limit, to the least extent
possible, the things that it takes?
For our country we must secure a future
for its past. "48
The Junta projected an eventual yearly goal of twelve
49
million tourists and $4 billion in income. The new
regime, applying the philosophy expressed by Mr. Tzannetakis,
set an absolute ceiling of 6.5 million annual visitors by
1980, and the stabilization of that number through control
of accommodations and facilities. Six and one-half million
visitors in itself remains a terrifically large number of
guests to serve in a year's time (with the current population,
a 1.4/1 resident-to-visitor ratio), but the NTO hopes to
meet the requirement by spreading the tourist season over
a longer period, perhaps the entire year.
This reorientation required development of winter sports.
Greece has at least four mountains (the highest nearly
10,000 feet) which are snow covered during the colder months.
A ski resort on Mt. Parnassus (8060 feet) about twenty-one
miles from Athens, opened for the 1977-78 winter season.
Accomodations included two hotels, a casino, restaurants and
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ski-lifts. The NTO's 1978-79 plans include the establish-
ment of a large tourist center at Mt. Ziria in the northern
Peloponnesus. It will be another major ski center but
will also have the expansion potential for year-round tourism
since it is close to the sea." Also for the first time
this season, twenty-five German tourist agencies have
included Greek villages and cities in their winter schedules.
Year-round tourist trade requires appealing to the "jet-
set" and the more wealthy travelers looking for new and
unique experiences. The NTO has encouraged this type of
development with some success. The international PLM
company which controls casinos, railroads, restaurants,
travel agencies and hotels around the 'world, opened a
luxurious resort complex in Hermione on the Peloponnesus
during the 19 76 season. Baron de Rothschild, the French
head of the consortium, marked the opening of Porto Heli
with three days of personal promotion aimed at attracting
54higher income Western European clientele. Also in 1976,
Mr. J.C. Carras, a major Greek shipping personality, opened
Porto Carras, an exclusive and complete resort town, on
the Chalcidice peninsula. This 4,500 acre conglomeration
of hotels, villas, restaurants, shops, swimming pools, golf
courses, bathing beaches and yachting marinas has 3335 beds,
six miles of coast, presents all forms of entertainment,
is dotted with vineyards, olive groves, and cattle farms,
produces excellent wines and is reputed to be the largest
55
complex of its kind in the world.
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The NTO also focused its efforts on expanding existing
facilities and capabilities which included the restoration
and preservation of prominent landmarks (towers, windmills
and old homes) to help retain the true spirit of Greece in
the tourist areas. The 1978 improvement plans include fifty
campsites, two marinas and three golf courses, while several
private firms have already begun upgrading inter-island
cruise service. A one day trip from Piraeus to three Aegean
islands now costs only $24 and includes lunch, while the
Epirctiki fleet's three day cruise to the very popular
Mykonos, Rhodes, Santarini and Crete islands is only $20 5.
The Ceres Company even introduced Russian-built hydrofoils
which can carry 116 passengers and travel at thirty-two
knots making it possible to visit several widely separated
islands in one day.
Since early 1976, NTO officials have meticulously pur-
sued a major expansion project: the return of the summer
Olympic games to Greece. Mr. Karamanlis recently addressed
a letter to Lord Killanin, President of the International
Olympic Committee, proposing that Greece become the permanent
site (perhaps at Olympia or Delphi) for future games, and
that the Olympiads be financed from a permanent contribu-
tory international fund. Several well known sports personali-
ties voiced the same opinion in the international press and
Mr. Andrew Paulen, the Dutch President of the International
Athletes Federation, summed up these views:
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It is a matter of necessity that the
Olympic Games should be held permanently
in the same place. This is because
of the enormous expenditures needed
for the necessary installations, most
of which remain unutilized afterwards.
The permanent site for the Olympics ought
to be Greece, where the games were born
and the Olympic spirit was nourished.
Greek officials will need to resolve a myriad of details,
and coordinate a lengthy transition period for site prepara-
tion, but international opinion seems to favor the permanent
location solution and Greece is a likely choice.
Effect of Accession
The overall importance of tourism to the Greek economy
is critical. In 1976, tourism accounted for 27 percent of
the invisible foreign exchange earnings which in turn
59
covered 67 percent of the year's trade deficit. Visitors
from the EC countries contributed a major portion of that
income. Of the seven largest groups visiting Greece in 1976,
four came from the Community (Germans, Britons, French and
Italians) sending a total of 1.4 million tourists.
With Greece's accession to full membership, the physical
contacts with the Community will increase, exposing a greater
number of EC residents to the tourist opportunities avail-
able in Greece. The required standardization of rules,
regulations and procedures will remove many of the unknown
characteristics of the Greek environment and the concrete
bond of Greece with the EC will suggest an aura of political
stability which will reduce the fears of prospective
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travelers. The harmonization of Greek methods with Euro-
pean standards of hotel classification, recreation schedules
and travel patterns will also present a more understandable
picture for North and South American travelers accustomed
to Western Europe's procedures.
In the NTO's quest for returning the Olympics to Greece,
alliance with the EC nations should increase those in sym-
pathy with the cause and enlarge the pool of influence
available to Greek officials . The initial steps to estab-
lish the permanent international support fund should also
be more easily taken through EC channels.
On the other hand, certain costs will accrue to the
tourist sector once Greece acceeds to the Community.
Rates for accommodations and services, currently some of
the lowest in Europe, will rise to parity with ether
Community states as demands begin to exceed supply. The
goals preventing the conversion of tourism to a commercial
industry and of "attracting the foreign tourist who respects
(Greece's) natural and cultural heritage" will have to be
jealously guarded. Already the monks at the sacred Mt.
Athos orthodox monastery have placed restrictions on tourist
admissions because of overwhelming numbers and the irrever-






1972 % 1973 % 1974 % 1975 %
Tourism 393 24 515 23 448 18 644 23




35 735 33 674 28 783 28








Total 1614 2203 2399 2726 3024
* Projection
Sources: a) QECD Survey Greece 1977
, p. 17.
b) Mellas, Christian Science Monitor
,
Mar 13, 1978, p. 32.
TABLE 3-15
TOURISTS FROM EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
COUNTRIES (thousands)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Belg-Lux 28.9 30.6 26.8 38.4
France 158.7 177.2 128.2 223.7 303.4
Germany 247.8 321.3 234.3 397.4 508.5
Denmark 55.1 67.5 36.5 50.1
UK 310.0 335.8 244.6 319.5 423.0
Ireland 8.9 11.1 6.2 6.8
Italy 115.2 125.2 64.3 137.8 136.0
Netherlands 56.4 66.9 40.2 59.3
Total EEC 981.0 1135.6 781.1 1233.0
US 548.1 615.6 371.8 458.5 464.0
Total Tour. 2731.5 3177.6 2188.3 3172.9 4243.5
Sources
:
a) Statistical Yearbook of Greece, p.
b) Greece: A Mcmthly Record Jan 77, p.
c) Greece: A Monthly Record Feb 77, p.





Mar 13, 197! 82.

TABLE 3-16
INCREASES IN TOTAL TOURISTS AND
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
(percent over previous year)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Total Tourists 16 - 32 44 33 10
Foreign Exchange
receipts (tourism) 31 - 14 43 27 27
Source: Tables 3-14 and 3-15.
REGIONALISM
Greece has faced acutely unbalanced regional problems
since the beginning of industrialization in Europe. The
problem surfaced as workers began to perceive distinct
location differences in the advantages of Greek life. These
perceptions spawned internal migration to urban centers such
as Athens — Piraeus and Thessalonike and to more fertile plains
areas located in Macedonia, Thessaly and southern Epirus.
Most of the outflow came from the poorer, overpopulated
island environments and the Peloponnesus area. Those who
moved sought better employment conditions and higher wages
,
access to better food and clothing, improved educational
facilities, more health and social welfare services, better
quality housing and in general a new way of life.
Pavlopoulos, in his 1975 review of Greek manufacturing
wage level differences, suggests that pay often determines
labor mobility and that wage differences in different regions,
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even for similar jobs, are a function of cost of living
differences, the number of employers controlling the labor
force and disparities in the natural labor market (size,
number, skill, diversity, etc.). Greek workers gravitated
toward areas of more lucrative employment and to regions
which provided opportunity for advancement and growth.
Most Greeks have strong ties with the traditions and
customs of their villages, but they feel greater urgency
to provide substantial opportunities for their children.
The advantages of a more prosperous area, often the urban
complex, appealed to this instinct and caused many Greeks
to leave the places of their birth.
The migration syndrome soon became self-perpetuating.
The less developed areas continued to lose manpower, skills,
talent, youth and financial resources while the expanding
major centers gathered these assets and increased their
appeal and offerings. As a result, greater and greater
regional disparities occurred in per capita income, stan-
dard of living, industrialization and services provided.
For many years, the government did little to control this
widening gap until, by the mid 1960's, officials could no
longer ignore the visible repercussions of the migration.
The 196 8 to 19 7 2 Economic Development Plan outlined by
the military Junta heavily stressed regional development
aims. It decreed that each region develop according to
its unique advantages and then sustain its own growth; that
individual regional centers provide all required social
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services and facilities; and that officials take measures
to resolve disparities between regions, particularly incomes
and standards of living and between Athens and the rest
of the country.
The plan established seven Regional Development Ser-
vices (RDS) under the Ministry of Coordination which charged
them to adopt government development policies to the specific
needs of the regions, thereby decentralizing the administra-
tive machinery and promoting use of resources within each
area. Primarily because of bureaucratic inertia, this
aspect of the design attained marginal success, being
limited mostly to agricultural reorganization.
In 1973, the government estimated that by 1987, the
Greek urban population would reach two million people and
that employment in agriculture would decrease by 600,000.
Since the RDS plan had not succeeded, the Junta placed its
new regional emphasis on developing urban-industrial "poles"
or centers capable of absorbing surplus workers from the
agricultural areas, thereby reducing disparities and halting
emigration from those with potential. Officials forecasted
that under this project, by the year 2000, the Athens/
Thessalonike axis would have 6.5 million people; Volos/
Larissa 300,000; Herakiion/Conea (Crete) 220,000; Ioannina
and Kavalla in Thrace with their poles 60,000 to 100,000
each; and Kalamai in the Peloponnesus with its pole also
60,000 to 100, 000. 64
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Through the Hellenic Industrial Bank (ETBA) , the govern-
ment provided generous incentives, including exemption from
taxes, easy credit and government management assistance, to
accelerate the decentralization plan. The Ministry of
Coordination also appropriated large parcels of land on
which to establish the industrial complexes. In Thessalonike
alone, officials proposed to expand the central area from
315 to 980 hectares (778 to 2,420 acres). 65
Change came slowly, however, and by 1974 the now dras-
tically lopsided regional condition reached a critical level.
Vatikiotis in his 1974 essay on Greece asserts:
The concentration of political, adminis-
trative, commercial, and industrial
activity in (Athens) promotes over-
centralization and paralyzes the rest
of the country. 6 6
He bases this assertion on some staggering statistics. The
Athens/Piraeus complex encompasses:
35 percent of the nation's civil servants
85 percent of its physicians
70 percent of its students of higher education
50 percent of its industry
39 percent of its electric energy consumption
The European Community Commissioners in thier January 1976
opinion on Greek accession state:
Industrial growth has tended to concen-
trate geographically, the bulk of
investments centering on the Athens/
Piraeus conurbation to the detriment
of most of the islands and the
peripheral mainland areas, thus
aggravating the regional problems
faced by Greece. '
The Karamanlis administration addressed the regional
disparity problem shortly after it consolidated its power,

but parliament did not enact a regional development law
(No. 289) until 1976. As outlined previously, this statute
provided generous stimuli for industrial business concerns
to locate in relatively remote areas and not select sites
in urban complexes. Investors responded favorably to the
incentives, and by the end of 1976 the Ministry of Coordina-
tion received applications under the new law for projects
totaling $115 million. Also in 1976, the Athens regime
established the National Council for Physical and Environ-
mental Planning, whose thirteen ministers assumed the responsi-
bility to develop a new system of land planning aimed at
69balancing the concentration of industry around the country.
Progress remains slow in solving this basic structural
dilemma, however. As rapidly as the government locates new
industry away from the major hubs, the older firms entrenched
in these areas expand or diversify and attract more workers
and resources. The Athens government, partially at least,
will have to resolve this perplexing matter before they
can expect significant alterations in the economic structure
of the country.
Effect of Accession
Greece's regional problems specifically qualify the
country for the use of EEC aid funds which will directly
help to relieve the internal migration and industrial
centralization dilemma. The social fund will provide money
to retrain and resettle Greece's rural poor while the gui-
dance section of the EACCF will help to modernize Greek
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farming techniques and raise living standards in the
agricultural regions. Special aid is available from this
section of the fund to help the farmers on the land in
particularly poor areas, thus protecting the countryside
from abandonment and misuse. This consideration has become
a chief concern of the Athens government as pollution and
the effects of tourism come to bear.
Programs developed around the assistance from these
two funds will attack the major regional problem: internal
migration. The EC Regional Development Fund will devote
resources from the more prosperous members of the Community
to modify and support the decentralization plans of the
Karamanlis government.
The major concern of EC member countries is the cost
of accession through these funds. Although not debilitating
(hypothetically only 5 percent of the 1976 EC budget) , a
measurable cost will accrue to the Nine and could continue
for several years if Greece responds slowly to fund guidance.
Greek planners are concerned about the overall negative
effects of diversifying the industrial infrastructure from
two major centers to eight or more. Concentrations of
factories and production plants will scar the countryside
and the environment, two of Greece's most valuable resources.
Government officials must also cope with management control
problems which come from spreading out. The Greek ministries
directly run many of the commercial enterprises in their
areas, and diversifying these will only increase the burden
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on an overtaxed and inefficient bureaucracy. How far the
industrialization should be carried and the extent of diver-
sity are critical questions over which government officials
feel they must retain control. Use of Community money will
require progress and carry restrictions that may not be
totally palatable.








































































































Source: Opinion on Greek Application for
Membership/ p. 27.
TABLE 3-21
PER CAPITA GDP BY REGION
($ US)
Greece Total
Attica and Aegean Islands
including Athens
Central & Western Macedonia
including Salonika













Source: Opinion on Greek Application for
Membership, p. 30.
INDUSTRY
To develop as a modern European nation, Greece naturally
focused its expansion efforts on the industrial sector.

Growth occurred very slowly, however, because of internal
resistance to change and the thoroughly entrenched and
antiquated industrial infrastructure. Most Greek entre-
preneurs lacked both the managerial skill and the ambitious,
modernizing drive necessary to take the risks and bear the
uncertainties required for real structural modifications.
They avoided industrial investments in favor of more tra-
71ditional and secure importing and real estate endeavors.
Those that did become involved, gravitated toward the lighter,
more predictable, consumer-goods fields, primarily food,
beverages, tobacco and textiles. These branches are still
the largest, but they currently comprise somewhat less of
the total manufacturing production than ten years ago. This
trend indicates that the structural problems remain but
that redirection efforts are slowly developing intermediate
and capital goods industries.
Government effort in the past to expand the heavier branches
of industry utilized protectionist devices including tariffs,
import licensing, import payment controls and quotas. The
weaker industries became dependent upon these supports and
found it unnecessary to create efficient competitive com-
panies. Monopolies flourished. The progressive schedules
of tariff reductions included in the EC Association Agree-
ment have helped to eliminate some of these problems but
have not created an independent industrial sector.
In May 19 74, Mr. John M. Mitsos, at that time the Presi-
dent of the Federation of Greek Industries, predicted that

the most dynamic branches of industry with good future
opportunity would be processed farm products, textiles,
wood products, heavy chemicals, basic metals, petroleum
refining, non-metallic mineral products (cement, tiles,
clay), fabricated transport equipment (trucks, autos, buses),
72
engineering equipment, and telecommunications equipment.
His forecast discriminated little between light, heavy and
intermediate branches of industry, but production statistics
at the end of 197 6 showed once again that light industry




INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX INCREASE
(1970 = 100)
1973 1976 Percent Increase
Textiles 147 200 36
Non-metallic minerals 137 168 22
Chemicals 148 177 19
Tobacco 117 141 20
Food 114 130 14
Basic Metals 161 169 4
Consumer Goods 139 168 20
Capital Goods 150 161 7







Textiles, clothing, footwear 12
Chemicals 6.2
Food, beverages, tobacco 4.8
Heavy industry
(base metals, metal products
machinery, transportation) 2.8
Source: OECD Economic Survey Greece 1977, p. 6
Despite these symptoms, the total industrial production
index increases 10.6 percent in 1976 compared to 4.4 percent
73in 1975 and -1.6 percent in 1974. This overall success
encouraged government officials to pursue their development
plans but place more emphasis on boosting demand for indus-
trial expansion goods. Such tactics required more active
encouragement of foreign demand for the sluggish industrial
products
.
Mr. Karamanlis currently faces two financial problems
74
spawned in the post-war period. First, to establish the
desired growth pattern, the manufacturing industries require
considerable investment from the private sector. Since the
early 1950 's, however, Greek investors have placed nearly
twice as much capital into housing construction as manufac-
turing. This tendency stems from Greek pride in home owner-
ship and from a dwelling's acceptability as a suitable dowry
Real estate ownership also has provided an excellent hedge
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against inflation in times of past political and economic
instability. These traditional concepts are difficult to
overcome and the government, even in this time of a stable
democracy, faces a formidable task when trying to convince
people to buy shares in a new automobile plant as opposed
to making a down payment on a house. Mr. Zolotas underlined
his concern in this area during a speech to the economic
editors of the Athens press in February 1977. He stated
that although the 1976 Greek increase in investments led
all the OECD countries, it was primarily attributable to
construction of homes and other expensive buildings. He
further warned that "private initiatives should be motivated
because unfortunately they do not show the initiative
75
required by a free economy."
Second, most manufacturing firms rely on borrowed
money, rather than invested capital or retained profits to
finance their operations and the loans are usually short-
term at high interest. This increases cost and lowers
efficiency. The Hellenic Industrial Development Bank (ETVA)
,
a corporation formed in 1964 and wholly owned by the state,
does help to finance new industrial enterprises (currently
its emphasis is on new plants for asbestos, aluminum, sili-
cone, ferrochrome and petrochemicals) and provides market
information to investors to keep them appraised of the current
7 6
environment. Interest rates and loan terms offered by
the EVTA are usually more attractive than those of other
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commercial lending institutions. An EVTA subsidiary,
Hellenic Exports S.A., began functioning in 1971 to help
promote exports of industrial products and thus build up
that sector through demand channels. It currently provides
marketing, sales promotion, technical and research services
to its clients, thus encouraging more stability and an
environment where the heavy reliance on borrowed funds can
77begin to dissipate. Mr. Karamanlis based his correctional
plans for these and other industrial issues on Greece's
need to prepare quickly for EEC accession.
The condition of several specific industries should be
briefly mentioned. The Greek mineral, mining and processing
corporations are becoming more stabilized. As previously
cited, officials established the Institute for Mineral and
Geological Research (IGME) in early 1976 to ascertain just
7 8
what types of minerals exists throughout the country. Of
the minable metals, aluminum is by far the most important
and since 1969 the industry continuously produced the largest
79
amount of metal ore mined in the crude state m Greece.
By 1976, aluminum products accounted for 12 percent of all
exported manufactures, exceeded only in the metals category
by iron and steel products which depend on imported inter-
8
mediate materials. The industry began its real growth
in 1966 when Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann of France opened the
Aluminum de Grece industrial complex in BoStia province.
Until 1977, the French company represented the largest
single industrial investment in Greece ($300 million) and

it contributed its own processes and management staff to
operate the alumina reduction plant and aluminum smelter.
By 1970 the complex became the largest exporter of manu-
factured products from Greece.
The leading producer of bauxite in Greece is Bauxites
Parnasse Mining Company which early in 1976 completed plans
for a new alumina manufacturing plant near Parnasse on the
Gulf of Corinth. Of the $200 million investment and $60
million equity capital, two US companies, the National Steel
Corporation and the Southwire Corporation hold 49 percent
interest. The ETVA and Paranasse will share the 51 percent
8
1
controlling balance, split 21/30 respectively. From the
580 million ton assessed Greek bauxite reserve, the new
plant will have the capability to produce 600,000 tons of
alumina annually and the opportunity to double production
82
when adquate electric power becomes available. . The complex
is scheduled for completion in 1980, and officials already
have discussed plans for expansion into full aluminum
smelting.
The most rapidly expanding industry in Greece is textiles
(1976 production up 16.8 percent) and its associated activi-
8 3
ties such as clothing, yarns and threads. Clothing exports
alone have increased over 300 percent in value since 1973,
accounting for 66 percent of the miscellaneous manufactures
leaving Greece in 1976. For the first time this product
exceeded tobacco and became the largest single export item.
Greece is rapidly becoming competitive with the EC in the
i fin

textile industry, partly because it is the only European
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country to grow its own cotton (over 360,000 tons in 1975).
Over 90 percent of the crop remains in the country, and
various textile based manufacturing companies use it to
produce exportable goods which earn considerable foreign
8 5
exchange (over S289 million in 1975) . Mr. Konofagos,
then Minister for Industry, announced in May 1977 the move-
ment of textile branch industries to the border areas in
support of the industrial development plan. He specifically
cited the Samos Weaving and Textiles Company, a joint Greek/
German enterprise, which when completed will manufacture
2,500 tons of yarn annually for export to West Germany,
8 fi
alone earning over $6 million at 1975 export prices.
Recent developments in some of the smaller industries
have been significant as well. Officials have recently
attempted to attract successful foreign companies to the
food processing field which is traditionally inefficient
and of low standards. Nestle and Del Monte already run
profitable branches in Greece, but the sector needs a real
87boost to bring it up to EC competition levels. Food and
live animals accounted for 22 percent of Greece's total
exports in 1976. With improved efficiency they could pro-
vide considerably greater values at lower cost.
In 1974, Greece took first place in Europe in overseas
8 8
cement exports with nearly 2.1 million tons. Demand
increased in the next two years stimulating new plants,
attracting foreign investment and pushing 1976 production up
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by 12.5 percent. Several plants are now capable of an
output exeeding 500,000 to one million tons annually, and
total Greek capacity is approaching thirteen million tons.
With the continuing probability of major oil finds in
the Thasos island area off the coast of Macedonia, foreign
interest in petrochemical manufacturing has significantly
increased. In early 1977, government officials approved a
$641 million investment (the largest ever) in a new manu-
facturing complex to be located near Kavalla, one of the key
industrial decentralization sites and close to the Thasos
area. If the Prinos fields yield as predicted, the new
consortium will utilize large quantities of the oil as raw
material for petrochemical products. Market value of the
enterprises' goods should exceed $300 million annually and
89provide nearly $150 million in foreign exchange.
With the advent of these very large industrial endeavors,
the owners of Greece's smaller handicraft industrial units
have become concerned. Mr. Papaligouras , then Minister of
Coordination, assured them that they too would benefit from
the industrial boom through expanded subcontracting work or
as finishers of the big industry products. He pointed out
that in several traditional fields, mass production facilities
could never replace the handicraft enterprises.
Effect of Accession
With full membership in the EEC, Greek officials face
confrontation once again with industrial infrastructure
problems. As previously discussed, most Greek industry

remains small in scale and family owned. In 1977 less than
100 firms employed more than 200 people. Consequently,
productivity (GDP per employee) remains low and ineffi-
90
ciency abounds. Many firms are protected by government
supports which the accession agreement will abolish, and
policy officials will have to decide which sections of the
industrial structure can survive on their own in the com-
petitive EC environment. Pesmazoglu suggests that reorgani-
zation and modernization of the small and medium size firms
may be less difficult than supposed and that many will
91
readily adapt to modern management and marketing techniques.
He asserts that real market competition will provide a
valuable pool of manpower, competitive drive and management
initiative if officials execute practical reforms and help
the hardier firms to make the transition while selecting
other industrial areas to develop.
This approach means increasing emphasis on drawing
foreign capital into Greece. With the formation of ELEVME
in 1976, Mr. Karamanlis warned that upon Greece's accession
to the EEC, private enterprise would find that survival
92depended on large-scale investment. He also pointed out
however, that with this investment would come advanced
technology, a large volume of jobs and the opportunity for
spillover of peripheral industries, plants and factories.
With the new competition and the restructuring needs
will come the expanded markets that the EEC and its associates
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can provide. Distinct possibilities of collaboration exist,
particularly in manufacturing and trade and, as already
discussed, Greece's geographical location will allow her
to serve as a bridge between the markets of Europe, the
Middle East and Africa, providing considerable expansion












increase in knits, yarns, synthetics
increased exports by large plants
increases in sugar and olive oil





















Durable Consumer goods - 11.3
Consumer goods + 8.3
Capital goods + 1.4
Total 1975 Industrial
production + 10.6
Sources: a) Greece Economic Activity and Development , p. 21






Iron and Steel 154 165
Textiles (total) 145 not available
Clothing 133 198
Cement 97 not available
Machinery, Transporta-





Sources: a) Statistical Yearbook of Greece
, p. 309, 310










Source: QECD Survey Greece
, p. 41.
AGRICULTURE
Throughout Greece's postwar economic growth period,
the agricultural sector developed at the slowest rate and
resisted change most tenaciously. Although three regimes
vigorously attacked the problem, the structure of Greek

agriculture in 1978 remains similar to that of 1953.
Government officials described the conditions in early
1977:
Agriculture has not yielded results
commensurate with its productivity
potential because of its inadequate
organization and outdated traditional
structure, and its orientation in
relation to the achievement of a
high standard of self-sufficiency
through the application of a strong
protectionist policy. 9 3
The same officials concluded that they needed to "rapidly
reform" agricultural institutions and standards at both the
production level (farm size and organization) and the trading
level (distribution and sales techniques)
.
In the 1960's, Greece reached self-sufficiency in bread
grains, fruits and vegetables, tobacco, cotton, olive oil and
dried fruit, but a considerably increased demand and heavy
importation of meat and dairy products coupled with small
domestic production placed a large drain on foreign exchange.
Ironically, Michael Wall had suggested a solution in July
1971 to these same problems:
To save foreign exchange, Greece must
concentrate on producing at home more
of the foodstuffs it now has to import
and to earn foreign exchange it must
grow the crops for which there are
ready export markets. 94
His suggestion was not a revelation, but it depicted the
heart of the matter: the need for structural reorganization.
Greek farmers have traditionally displayed major resis-
tance to reorganizational efforts, refusing to produce
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different crops, adopt more efficient dairying techniques
or switch to breeding and rearing animals. This attitude
keeps standards low and prevents consumer confidence from
developing in the weaker products. The fragmentation of
land holdings complicates the problem further, since most
farm plot owners are unwilling to consolidate their small,
separated holdings and in fact tend to sub-divide them
further through dowries and inheritances
.
Most farmers find it difficult to understand why offi-
cials want to make changes since the government historically
has supported existing commodity production structures with
heavy subsidies. In 1966, twenty different programs aided
the means of production (fertilizer and farm machinery)
,
twelve augmented minimum product prices, eleven increased
export prices to minimum levels and ten reimbursed market
95 . .
costs for specific goods. Agricultural officials m
several cases attempted to use these supports as incentives
for stimulating production of new, more desirable goods,
but they did net apply consistent methods and generally
tended to perpetuate the status quo . Until recently, the
government even purchased vast amounts of surplus crops,
particularly wheat and tobacco, which could not be sold by
producers. The overages created significant storage prob-
lems and large government budget drains when the products
later resold often for one-half the purchase price.
Since farmers still comprise 35 to 40 percent of the
working and thus voting population, possible election outcomes
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force government officials to consider the political rami-
fications of agricultural reform. Sudden removal of sub-
sidies or changes in price support levels could alienate
many voters. Since 1961, Greek farmers have enjoyed exten-
sive financial protection by the National Crop and Social
9 6Insurance Agency (OGA) . At no cost to the farmers,
coverage includes:
1) Old age pensions at 65,
2) Disability pensions for workers and their
children,
3) Complete medical insurance coverage for the
entire family,
4) Crop insurance against hail and frost,
5) Family cost of living allowances.
This generous plan, financed by direct and indirect taxes
on the entire Greek population, helps significantly to
offset lower agrarian incomes.
Although the government has directed most of its recent
effort toward harmonizing Greek agricultural policies with
the EEC's CAP, Greece's structural limitations have hindered
real progress. In 1976, the Community placed Greece in third
country status and applied countervailing charges on certain
produce items because the goods arrived in EC countries at
prices below reference levels. As a result, Greece destroyed
19,000 tons of peaches, reduced by 50 percent the output
of tomatoes headed for the EC concentrate processing indus-
tries and curtailed orange and cucumber shipments for certain
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9 7periods, thus increasing spoilage losses. The EC
Commission's Agriculture Committee in an official opinion
cited Greece's agricultural structure as the cause of the
incident.
In many respects Greek agriculture is
comparable to that of southern Italy
and of other Mediterranean countries,
being characterized by the frgamentation
of holdings and strong conditioning by
geographical circumstances, by the high
proportion of mountain areas, problems
of erosion, irrigation, etc., by its
output of Mediterranean products, by
low mechanization and by a shortage of
preserving and packing facilities. All
these factors combine to prevent Greek
agriculture from facing competition from
Community agriculture. ^
8
Since the other EC countries with Mediterranean climates
produce many of the same goods, the problem will not be
solved easily.
Over the years, Greek governments attempted many ways
to reorganize the agricultural structure. The military
Junta established increased productivity, improved farm
income and accelerated changes in production patterns as
main targets. They obtained some success by applying tech-
nological improvements to fertilizers, seeds and pesticides
and by convincing farmers that they could use tractors effec-
99tively even on small plots. They persuaded herders to
switch from sheep and goats to cattle, and introduced
artificial insemination methods to improve herd size and
quality. The Colonels even attempted complex land expansion
projects including clearage, drainage, irrigation, desalination
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and flood protection. Weintraub contends that the military
regime did meet some of their objectives and that:
The considerable advances in the
accelerated agricultural growth were
carried by the sinews of the 'reformed'
rural society . . . ^^
He may have been partially accurate in his assessment of the
Colonels accomplishments, but the "reformed rural society"
retained its basic structural problems.
The Karamanlis government took over the fight by shifting
resources and funds into more dynamic high-income commodities.
The state-owned Agricultural Bank became the vehicle for
these efforts and intensified its activities with increased
handling of technical services to farmers, expanded distribu-
tion of fertilizer, seeds and breeding stock and closer
supervision of agricultural cooperatives. The Bank is the
sole source of credit for most farmers. In 1975, it processed
101
over $1.5 million worth of long and short-term loans.
In November 19 76, after analyzing the sector, Mr. John
Boutos , Minister of Agriculture, announced the main features
102
of the 1977 Agricultural Plan. The document cites new
incentive policies to encourage increased production of
hard wheat, feed grains, cotton and potatoes while opening
new crop areas in horticulture, fruits and vegetables. The
plan provides for more farm machine credit and extends terms
on farm real estate investments through the Agricultural Bank.
Suggestions for major long-range institutional changes include
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land redistribution schemes to facilitate consolidation,
projects to double the farm land under irrigation by 1982,
methods to create direct local markets that will eliminate
unproductive middlemen and plans for reorganizing the
bureaucracy in the Ministry of Agriculture to improve
administrative and research operations. The instrument
proposes a public expenditure of over $25 million (a 20
percent increase over 19 76) and allocates 40 percent for
crop improvements and technical equipment. Nearly all of
the remainder is earmarked for improving livestock farming
'
with about $7 million set aside for development of fisheries."1"
The government realized the crucial importance of the
livestock question, and in the first months of 1977 began
utilizing the proposed funding by implementing new cattle
raising, breeding, feeding and slaughtering techniques while
at the same time reducing subsidies to the sector. Mr.
Boutos concurrently announced the application of steps to
increase wholesale and retail prices for veal, pork and
poultry and to improve domestic production of livestock feeds
to substitute for imports. These measures initially will
cost consumers and producers more, but in the long run they
should benefit all by reducing government spending, encouraging
efficient production, saving foreign exchange and redirecting
104
consumption toward more economical protein sources.
Effect of Accession
In February 1977, the EC Committee on External Economic
Relations filed a report adapted from recommendations made

by the Joint Greek-EEC Parliamentary Committee during its
1975-76 sessions. The agricultural evaluation concluded:
The committee noted with regret that
as far as agriculture is concerned, the
Association has failed to make any real
progress, especially over the past few
months . 1^5
The fifteen Greek deputies sitting on the Joint Committee
consequently confronted several problems.
1) Lower meat and dairy product prices from the northern
EC countries will severely affect Greek producers of these
goods
.
2) Under Greek law farmers who own small plots of land
are treated as employed workers and receive employee social
security and free movement benefits. Community criteria do




3) Greece will have to honor lower Community tariff
agreements with third countries , and since these are exten-
sive, major competitive forces will impinge on the Greek
agricultural market.
4) The French government has demanded revisions in the
CAP to include minimum prices on Mediterranean goods traded
among EEC members, minimum quality levels for fruit and
vegetables bought by one member from another, a ban on wine
107
mixing and more aid to Mediterranean farmers. As a
result Greek goods will have to bear higher prices and
stiffer standards, and since most Greek wine is shipped
1 7?

in bulk for mixing, Hellenic winemakers will have to com-
pletely restructure their industry if the Community approves
the demands
.
The deputies also considered some positive aspects of
accession. 1) The application of the CAP to the Greek farmer
means a higher real income, increased price stability and
a more reliable market. 2) Money from the Community
development funds will provide the means for a concentrated
application of structural reform measures. 3) Full member-
ship status will remove Greece from the "marginal supplier"
role to the EEC and eliminate any possibility of sporadic




Greece's accession to the Community should have no
appreciable effect on EC agricultural activities. Hellenic
product distribution is about the same as that of the Com-
munity and with the exception of super-sensitive items,
such as wine, peaches and tomato paste, Greece's input
should be easily absorbed. As previously discussed, most
EEC countries are concerned about the investments they will
have to make through development funds to restructure the
Hellenic agricultural system. The actual amounts involved
will depend on how fast Greece progresses on her own before






1958 1973 1974 1975
Percent of GDP
agricultural , ,
production 27.7 19.5 18.0 17.0
Percent work force
employed in
agriculture 54.0 35.7 34.0 C 36. a
Sources: a) Greece: Special Report, The Times
, p. V.
b) Statistical Yearbook of Greece / p. 445.
c) Zolotas, Greece in the European Community /
p. 53.
d) Greece Economic Activity and Development /
p. 19.
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Sources: a) Statistical Yearbook of Greece , p. 300
b) QECD Survey Greece - 1977, p. 48.





































Greece bases its foreign trade policy on efforts to
develop and maintain commercial ties with all countries;
West and East, industrialized and third world. At the same
time, officials must reduce the country's trade deficit and
protect domestic production in the context of her international
commitments. This means placing increased emphasis on the
substitution of domestic products for imports, increasing the
value added in Greek industry and expanding industrial exports.
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Traditionally Greece has depended upon imports of
machinery, industrial raw materials, transportation equip-
ment, chemicals, petroleum and coal, lumber, a variety of
manufactured goods, meat, fish and dairy products. In
recent years, officials have successfully encouraged varying
amounts of import substitution and the country now produces
significant amounts of fertilizer, chemicals, petroleum
products, textiles and light manufactured goods. However,
Greek production efforts toward items that predominate as
imports remain a top priority of the Karamanlis government
and the most critical part of a solution to reduce the trade
deficit.
As part of the adjustment plan, commerce officials con-
tinue to offer protection to Greek producers while imple-
menting methods to accomplish item output shifts. All imports




approval or the issuance of an import license:
Category I : Commodities free of import restrictions —
routinely issued approval.
Category II : List "A" commodities: Luxury and less
essential articles and products
adequately produced in Greece including
fine metals, textiles, furs, jewelry,
cosmetics, fire arms, automobiles
and certain foodstuffs — Require
special licenses issued by the
Ministry of Commerce.
Category III ; List "B" commodities: Types of
machinery adequately produced in
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Greece — Require special import
licenses issued by the Ministry of
Industry.
Category IV : Commodities which are state monopolized
and can be imported only by government
affiliated organizations: Petroleum
products, wheat and flour, medicines,
motion picture and TV film, ships,
and some minerals — Require adherence
to special import regulations.
Depending upon current conditions, the required approvals
or licenses may be issued with no restrictions, or cite
limited usage.
As a hedge against inflation, to discourage speculative
imports and to cover payment and tariff and duty charges,
all imports are included on pre-import cash deposit lists.
These schedules currently require deposits of payments
ranging from 70 to 100 percent of the c.i.f. invoice value
(cost, insurance, freight all included).
The Ministry of Trade partially reduced these restric-
tions on January 1, 1976 by eliminating 200 percent deposit
requirements on passenger cars, radio and TV receivers,
wines, liquors and soft drinks.
To combat certain detrimental trade practices by multi-
national corporations, the Greek parliament in July 1976
passed a new law specifying "equalizing and compensatory
tariff" procedures. The measure, essentially an anti-
dumping statute, provides protection for Greek producers of
goods which other exporters are selling below prevailing

international market prices. The Finance Ministry may
apply the measure for up to six months if it appears that
the governments of origin are subsidizing the goods in
question. The bill is in compliance with international
trade laws and specifically EEC and GATT provisions.
Greece is a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) , the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) , and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD). In her import/export transactions, she
applies the rules of these organizations, the tenets of the
EEC Association Agreement and several bi-lateral trade
instruments which include accords with the People's Republic
of China, Sudan, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria,
Romania, South Korea, India, Liberia, Syria, Egypt, Hungary,
112Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the USSR. The
bi-lateral agreements specify exportable items and annual
trade volume targets in both directions
.
The Greek export market has diversified considerably
since 1962. Agricultural products (all foodstuffs, beverages
and tobaccos) which at that time accounted for nearly two-
thirds of the goods leaving Greece now make up less than one-
third. Specific dominant items, such as tobacco, raisins
and furs have decreased in their proportion of volume and
value allowing a myriad of other goods to replace them,
particularly metals and metal products, chemicals, electrical
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equipment, mineral ores and cement. This broadened export
base has reduced the dependency of the economy on demand
levels for specific volatile items and increased the elas-
ticity and flexibility of exports.
In March of 1975, Greek officials disengaged the drachma
from the US dollar (established at DR 30 = $1 US since 1953)
and began floating it against the European currencies. This
de facto devaluation helped to expand exports and restrict
the volume of imports as well as to tie the country more
closely to her major trading partners. During that year,
the export structure shifted, reducing the share of tobacco,
raw materials, semi-finished products and petroleum products
while increasing the share of foodstuffs and minerals. How-
ever, the overall portion of industrial and handicraft pro-
ducts exported did not change, reflecting defeat of a major
113government effort to expand that sector.
By the end of 1976, the trade situation once again
changed. The latest results showed a substantial increase
in manufactures exported, particularly clothing and footwear,
but also reflected a substantial rise in the volume of
imports based on consumer demand rather than economic growth;
an inflationary trend. Thus the battle continues. The
government must diversify the production base and increase
exports while trying to protect the producer and convince





Economic officials face certain inflexibilities when
they try to balance the Greek trade sector. Because of
the uncertainties in the Aegean Sea and on Cyprus, Greek
military leaders continually demand equipment for moderniza-
tion. The military budget increased by 30 percent in 1976
to over $1,136 billion and 26 percent of government spending.
A considerable portion of this amount and future allocations
will buy expensive defense equipment such as attack heli-
copters, F-16A fighter aircraft, Model 209 submarines,
Combatant III guided missile boats and later model tanks,
which will increase import figures and continue the defense
drain on foreign exchange.
The January 1977 trade figures reflected some improve-
ment by registering a drop of $24 million in the deficit
and showing an increase in exports over imports of nearly
7:1. However, Greece still had to rely on substantial
invisible earnings to offset a $1,267 billion current account
deficit at year's end, up from $1,092 billion in 1976.
This reduces budgetary flexibility and ultimately puts the
burden right back on Greek planners to reduce the trade
deficit through structural reorganization.
Another of Greece's stated trade objectives is to estab-
lish commercial ties with as many countries as possible.
She has taken significant steps toward this end and has con-
cluded agreements with groups of nations not necessarily
aligned geographically or ideologically. On May 23, 1973,
l Rl

officials formalized trade relations with the People's
Republic of China. Since that time Greece has shipped
cotton, tobacco, olive oil and pharmaceuticals while the
PRC reciprocates with spices, tea, canned meat and light
industrial products. The value figures show that a credit
balance exists in favor of China and current negotiations




1973 1974 1975 1976
Imports to Greece 1,391 1,054 2,657 3,940
Exports to China 1,727 28 3,925 1,680
Source: Greece A Monthly Record, Jun 76, p. 6.
During August, a committee of Chinese experts visited the
tobacco fields near Dhrama to evaluate cultivation methods
at the Tobacco Institute there and decided on additional
117duvs .
Greece also maintains strong and improving trade relations
with the USSR which began in 1969. By 1976, trade levels
reached $174 million in imports to Greece (food products and
some raw materials, engineering equipment and machinery)
and $8 3 million in exports to the Soviet Union (tobacco,
raisins and citrus products). On April 19, 1977, the Deputy
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Ministers of Foreign Trade for the two countries signed a
new agreement in Athens which maintained the 1976 trade
levels for two more years and established a new system of
payments replacing the restrictive "clearing" method with
118free foreign exchange, a major step in the relationship.
Greek trade with Russia's East European allies totaled over
$117.9 million in exports and $124 million in imports in
1976 and economic officials consider these outlets essential
11 9to dispose of Greek agricultural surplus.
Greece's trade relations with her Balkan neighbors have
improved steadily in recent years and culminated in an
Inter-Balkan Conference held in Athens on January 26, 1976.
The meeting ultimately led to the signing of new expanded
bi-lateral agreements with the participants. On March 30,
«
1977, Albanian Trade Minister, Nedin Hoxha, finalized the
latest accord with Greece which provides for increased trade
levels totaling nearly $21 million. Albania will export
asphalt, electric energy, hides and chemical products while
Greece will ship cotton, cereals, metal products and
pharmaceuticals
.
Yugoslavia concluded a new agreement with Greece in
March of 19 7 7 and this time abolished the payment clearing
regulations (as the Russians did the following month) , thus
opening the system to free currency trading. The accord,
signed in Belgrad, includes a "most-favored-nation" clause
for tariff benefits, and paved the way for the conclusion
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of another instrument allowing Yugoslavian goods to transit
121the port of Thessalonike.
Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu visited Greece
in March of 1976 and concluded a long-term bilateral accord
which officials expect to double the volume of commerce
between the two countries in the next five years. Products
coming into Greece will include petroleum goods, timber,
vehicles (primarily jeeps for the Armed Forces) and tractors,
machines, metallurgical items, livestock and meat, and
122
chemicals. Relations with Bulgaria, although maintained
on a somewhat more formal level, are steadily improving as
evidenced by a 40 percent increase in total trade for 197 6
over 1975.
The countries of the European Economic Community trans
-
«
act the largest amount of trade with Greece, and the Federal
Republic of Germany heads the list world wide. The majority
of German exports to Greece are now capital goods including
defense items while Greece supplies mostly manufactured
items. The United States also places high on the list,
supplying primarily animal feed, foodstuffs, machinery, raw
materials and manufactured goods.
Effect of Accession
Although Greece in 19 77 largely moved out of the developing
nation category, many "developing" characteristics still
plague her trade growth. Since her domestic markets remain
unable to absorb much of the new industrial output, these
goods must be exported and thus are subject to the demand
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fluctuations of Greece's trading partners. Accession to
the EEC and the sealing of intra-community agreements should
dampen these fluctuations and provide increased stability
for export markets
.
On the other hand, the conditions of accession may
exacerbate the already increasing import demand base (com-
posed of raw materials and industrial products as well as
consumer items)
. Tariff abolition will make available
readily items which cannot be easily produced in Greece or
which can be imported at lower prices. This not only con-
flicts with the government's import substitution plan but
continues to drive the trade deficit higher.
As discussed in Chapter II, the largest single disadvan-
tage for Greece when she accedes to full membership in the
i
Community will be the requirement to apply all the rules of
EEC preferential access agreements with third countries.
TABLE 3-33
EEC PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
Agreement Tenets
European Free Trade Association Industrial free trade area
(Austria, Norway, Portugal, Sweden effective July 1, 1977
Switzerland, Ireland, Finland)
Lome Convention (February 28, 1975) Duty free entry into the Common
(46 African, Caribbean and Market of all ACP products
Pacific (ACP) nations) except certain agricultural
items
Generalized Scheme of Preferences Duty free entry into the Common
(1971) (112 developing countries Market of over 2000 manufactured
around the world) and semi-manufactured products
and over 250 processed agricul-
tural products. Quotas may be
applied to highly sensitive
products.
Sources: The European Community and Developing Countries ,
1977-1, p. 8-12.
The European Community's External Trade ,
1976-1, p. 4.

Greece's protectionist policies of import licensing,
pre-import cash deposits, and equalizing and compensatory
tariffs are in direct conflict with the Community's liberal
free trade agreements . The transition period required for
Greece to synchronize with EEC preferential access require-
ments remains a major hurdle in accession negotiations and
will play a large role in determining Greece's success as
a full member of the Community.
Greece does offer the Community a unique opportunity
to step across ideologcial boundaries and establish new
markets in countries not previously exploited. The strong
frameworks constructed by Greece through bilateral agree-
ments can shorten the time required for development of
trade systems and assist in smoothly initiating contact
between the Community and certain nations that otherwise
might be awkward or impossible.
TABLE 3-34
GREEK TRADE BALANCE
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Exports, fob
(percent increase) 65 41 13 10 13
Imports, cif







Sources: a) QECD Survey Greece 1977 , p. 47, 48.
b) International Financial Statistics , p. 156.
c) Zolotas , Summary of the Statement of the
Governor, 1978.
c
2021 2347 3027 3470 3885
37 16 28 14 11
-1185 -1241 - 999 -1084 -1267
193 04 20 08 16

TABLE 3-35
DIRECTION OF GREEK TRADE
($ million)
exports (fob) imports (cif)
1975 g."5 1976 % 1975 g."5 1976 g.o
World 2293 100 2544 100 5317 100 6013 100
EEC 9 1139 49 1271 49 2261 42 2318 39
of which:
Germany 482 21 542 21 842 16 872 14
OPEC 287 12.5 357 14 568 10 700 11.6
USSR 87 3.7 83 3. 2 102 1. 9 173 2.8
China 2 - 1.7 - 1. 5 - 4 -
EEUR* 100 4.3 117 4. 5 119 2. 2 123 2.0
Balkans** 148 6.4 133 5. 2 80 -L. 5 172 2.1
US 116 5.0 145 5. 6 392 7. 3 408 6.7
* Czeckoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland
** Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania












1970 50 52 641 48
1971 51 53 717 49
1972 55 52 830 56
1973 50 55 1050 52
1974 43 50 872 37
1975b 49 42 1122 37
1976b 49 39 1116 32
Scjurces: a)
b)
Op inion on Greek Application for Membership











1974 1975 1976 1974 1975 1976 1974 1975 1976
Food, Live
animals 19.3 22.3 22.4 10.5 8.9 7.5 -87 + 38 +115
Beverages
,
Tobacco 9.7 8.2 8.5 0.2 0.1 0.17 +188 +180 +205
Crude Materials 10.6 8.8 10.
C
9.5 7.8 6.9 -199 -214 -161
Mineral Fuels,
Lubs 9.0 11.0 5.8 22.2 22.2 20.4 -791 -833 -1079
Oils & Fats 1.5 1.8 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.2 + 15 + 23 + 07
Chemicals 5.0 5.8 4.0 8.9 8.7 8.2 -289 -327 -392
Manuf goods 34.6 28.7 31.6 17.8 13.8 12.4 - 77 - 79 + 58
Machinery,
Trspt. Eq. 2.7 3.9 4.9 28.1 35.7 41.4 -1179 -1814 -2366
Miscellaneous
Manuf 7.6 9.5 11.7 2.5 2.4 not + 45 + 96 not a
avail
Sources: a) (1974,1975), Statistical Yearbook of Greece
,
p. 302
b) (1976) QECD Survey Greece 1977, p. 47,48.
SHIPPING
To say that shipping is merely important to Greece is
ludicrous considering Hellenic maritime history, her 9,000
miles of coast and 1,300 islands. In fact, without the
shipping industry's financial contribution, the Greek economy
would be hard pressed to maintain status quo , much less expand,
In 1976, for the third consecutive year, foreign exchange




negative trade balance. The industry employs over 150,000
seamen on Greek owned ships (4 percent of the economically
active population) , and one source estimates that the over-
all sector provides jobs for nearly one-tenth of the total
population making it the largest single business activity
125in the country. Greek ship owners have made substantial
investments in other major domestic industries such as
refineries and shipyards which provide more jobs, help to
expand the capital assets of the country and increase the
industrial export base. The value of these investments today
is estimated at over $1 billion. By 1985 they should exceed
$3 billion. 126
The vital role that shipping currently plays is partially
a result of incentives which the military Junta adopted to
draw Greek owned ships and shipping activities back into
Greece. Even though many Greek ship owners disagreed with
the politics of the Colonels, business instincts prevailed
and by the end of 1973 the regime registered 3,000 vessels
under the Greek flag. London and New York based owners
shifted various parts of their operations to Piraeus, Greece's
major port area near Athens, and attracted the prominent
bankers, brokers, ship equipment suppliers and other entre-
preneurs necessary to support the new offices.
Under the Junta's incentive Laws 89 and 378, major
owners like Niarchos and Onassis set up new outlets without
paying any direct company or income taxes. Legislation
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established indirect tax rates at a ridiculously low $.10
per gross registered ton (grt) which at 1973* s 22 million grt
level would have provided only $2.2 million to the government
not counting exemptions. Actual tax income under these
127
rules in 1974 yielded only $1.25 million. Although these
measures put little cash into the treasury of the dictator-
ship they did succeed in returning Greek shipping to Greece,
and they established the base on which to build the industry.
When democracy returned, Mr. Karamanlis did not impose
direct forms of taxation on the shipowners, but in April
1975 he upgraded the tonnage tax to a range between $.40
and $1.20 per grt depending upon the craft's age, type and
date of registry. The new regulations scheduled 4 percent
annual increases until 1981, and in 1975 tax income under
the new system yielded approximately $40 million. The same
levies reached out to Greek owned tonnage registered under
foreign flags in the form of a "special contribution" to
the Seaman's Pension Fund which charged for the privilege
of hiring Arab crews and yielded an additional $19 million
12 8in 1975. Assets from the shipping industry today are
still treated like foreign capital and enjoy freedom from
direct taxation measures. This policy continues to limit
government receipts but provides a continuously attractive
incentive for the expansion of the industry and its invest-
ment in the economy.
The Greek fleet currently consists of an interesting
variety of owners including the giants (Niarchos, Goulandris
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Sons, Lemos Liranos and of course Onassis) but also claims
a group of smaller youthfully owned lines characterized by
the Thenamaris Group and the Bouboulina Company.
The Onassis fifty-ship fleet of supertankers, bulk
carriers and smaller vessels has been run for the past three
years by Christina, twenty-seven year old daughter of
Aristotle Onassis. The young owner has had some difficul-
ties, mostly as a result of the tanker surplus crisis which
developed in 1975, the same year her father died. In spite
of this, she has shown business brilliance on several occa-
sions and the empire still retains its position as one of
the biggest money makers in the field.
Christina's counterpart in the smaller lines is Mrs.
Jenny Pournaras-Bardavilias who in 1975 at the age of
thirty-two became the first Greek woman ship owner and
named her sixteen-ship fleet the Bouboulina line. She is
resourceful and has deftly established a prominent place
for herself in an extremely competitive, male-dominated
world. Her characteristics are those of many young Greeks
making their way in the shipping business.
Whether large companies or small, Greek ship owners
enjoy a reputation in financial circles as good credit
risks since most are able to show liquid assets which close
129
to equal the debts on their fleets. Although all owners
are currently absorbing the costs of idle or "laid up"
vessels (primarily tankers without oil hauling contracts)
191

most Greek lines are less affected because of their con-
servative approach to super-tanker purchases during the
pre-1973 boom times. This means that most Greek ships are
working and paying for themselves and reducing the amount
of profits eaten up by anchored vessels. Like most businesses
in Greece, the shipping lines are almost entirely family
owned and staffed, creating tight-lipped, closely run
organizations. In a field where competition is critical
this characteristic is enviable.
When Greek shipping magnates branched out into other
industrial endeavors during the Junta years, they under-
standably invested in shipbuilding and repair facilities.
These new yards provided services for the owner's ships
and their building capabilities filled a large void in
employment created by decreased repair contracts after the
Suez Canal closure in 1967. Niarchos concerns opened the
Hellenic Shipyard at Skaramanga, Andreadis enterprises
financed one at Eleuis and the Goulandris conglomerate
financed the Neorion facilities on the island of Syros.
Business has expanded despite the recent downturn in
the shipbuilding trade. In December 1975, the Philippou
Bros, shipyards near Piraeus signed a contract with the
Egyptian government to build four oil tankers for $7 million.
The Arab world has taken active steps since 1973 to estab-
lish its own merchant fleet and this order constituted a
market break-through for Greek shipbuilding. As of March 1,
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1311, the Greek industry totaled seventy-six ships under
131
contract in fourteen different yards. The reopening of
the Suez Canal in early June 1975 provided substantial
repair business for the Greek yards, and the increase in
floating and permanent docking capability since then has
turned the country into the largest ship repair center in
the Eastern Mediterranean.
In the middle of 1977, the Greek Merchant Marine listed
3,750 ships under home registry and 994 under flags of con-
132
venience totaling more than 48.4 million gross tons. Early
in 1978, sources increased the number of vessels of Greek
registry to approximately 3870 totaling some thirty-three
133
million grt. These statistics rank Greece first in
number of ships and third in gross registered tons, which
make the nation extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in
the world shipping market. By 1975, massive tanker over-
building forced ship prices to record lows and generated a
100 million ton excess capacity, about twice as much as
134
existing oil movement could fill. The surplus cancelled
tanker construction orders (forty to fifty million tons —
135Greece alone nearly eleven million) and rorced the laying
up of 10 percent of the world's fleet of oil haulers,
including about twelve Greek ultralarge crude carriers
137(compared to Norway's sixty).
For two reasons, this idle condition has not disabled
Greek shipping as much as that of other nations. First, by
.93

1975 a majority of Greek ships (57 percent over ten years)
had amortized their debt and subsequent idle time costs did
13 8
not include mortgage payments. Second, the conservative
approach of Greek ship owners toward investing in new
classes of vessels kept them away from massive supertanker
purchases. Nevertheless, with nearly one-half its tonnage
in tankers, accelerating costs and no real end to the oil
situation in sight, Greek owners must look toward diversi-
fication of their lines and hope that protectionist measures
139
of other nations do not hurt their profits too badly.
Effect of Accession
With the advent of accession, Greek shipping interests
will help to determine a common shipping policy not yet
concluded in the Community. Greek owners will be able to
represent their own needs and aid the establishment of a
policy to protect EEC shipping activities from undercutting
by rapidly expanding Soviet and Eastern European interests.
Common ties with the Community through a joint policy will
allow Greek owners to vie for an equal share of contracts
for oil hauling to Community nations and provide good oppor-
tunities for diversifying into other markets as nations
shift to alternate energy sources . The free movement of
labor will provide more opportunities for Greek seamen among
the fleets of the EEC countries and the generally higher




After Greece attains full membership status, the Community
will be able to count the powerful Hellenic shipping indus-
try as part of its own. The money and power backing Greek
shipping will accrue to the Community and provide a substan-
tial increase in bargaining leverage. This fact has
increased Greece's influence in current pre-accession nego-
tiations indicating how valuable these pending assets really
are to the existing Nine.
Of course, Greek interests will have to accept less
autonomy in their decisions and be willing to sacrifice some
company-oriented gains for the good of the Community. Group
decisions like that will not come easily for the traditionally
closeknit, independent Hellenes but the probability of bigger
long-term gains should persuade them.
TABLE 3-3 8
WORLD SHIPPING FLEETS RANKING
BY GROSS REGISTERED TONS
Rank 1974 1977 J 1978
1 Liberia Liberia Liberia
2 Japan Japan Japan
3 UK UK Greece
4 Norway Norway UK
5 Greece Greece
6 USSR Panama
7 United Sts . USSR
8 Panama France
9 Italy Italy
10 France United Sts.
Sources: a) Statistical Yearbook of Greece, p. 46
b) Dillin, Christian Science Monitor ,
Aug 24, 77, p. 5.
c) Aust, Christian Science Monitor ,
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Number thousand





Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, p. 353.
TABLE 3-40
GREEK MERCHANT SHIPS






Freighters 2320 58 2475 59
Tankers 479 38 498 37
Passenger 317 3 327 3
Misc 205 1 209 1
Total Greek Flag NO. grt* NO. grt* No. grt* No. grt*
3321 26623 3509 28573 3750 31361 3870 3300
Total Foreign
Flag 1070 17937 994 17070
Grand Total 4579 46510 4744 48431
* grt in thousands
Sources: a) Greece A Monthly Record , Jul 76, p. 3.
b) Greece A Monthly Record , Jan 77, p. 6.
c) Greece A Monthly Record , Jul/Aug 77, p. 2




GREEK AND EEC FLEETS








1970 30.9 13.6 57.3 25.2
1971 34.1 13.8 59.6 24.1
1972 39.0 14.6 - 63.1 23.5
1973 42.6 14.7 65.7 22.7
1974 45.3 14.6 69.1 22.2
1975 48.3 14.1 74.2 21.7
grt in millions
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ECONOMIC FACTOR ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION
To this point this work has investigated Greek economic
development since the beginning of the post-war period,
examined the Greek/EEC relationship and discussed key fac-
tors which bear directly on Greek economic stability. The
final section analyzes the specific factors in light of
Greek economic trends and Greek accession to the EEC. By
determining the degree of each component's movement toward
stability and the extent of accession impact, it predicts
the effect on the Hellenic economy.
To provide a more graphic picture of how these two
parameters — trend movement (t) and accession impact (i) —
bear on overall Greek economic stability, (t) and (i)
values are assigned for each factor. These values are sub-
jectively selected and based upon a summary and intuitive
interpretation of the material analyzed previously.
Both sets of ratings utilize a scale of (0) to (6) with
(3) representing neutral movement or impact. The values
(0) , (1), (2) signify negative effect and (4), (5), (6)
positive.
The author assumes that the events (t) and (i) are
independent, in that 1) current Greek economic trends and
2) Greece's accession to the EEC each constitute a unique
set of conditions. However, since both ultimately will
be occurring at the same time when Greece does become a full
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member of the Community they cannot be considered mutually
exclusive. These assumptions have simplified the subjective
analysis presented here and for the purpose of this study
are considered to be no more limiting on the predictions and
conclusions than any other circumstances governing the
interactions between Greece and the EEC today.
ECONOMIC FACTOR ANALYSIS
Factor I - Energy
Trend Movement
Although much of Greece's industrial and electrical
output currently depends on oil, prospects for the diversi-
fication of energy sources in the future are good. Indigenous
Greek resources soon should provide substantial portions of
the required amounts of lignite, peat, hydroelectric and
nuclear energy. The shift away from oil as an energy supply
will free what may develop into substantial domestic petro-
leum reserves for use in the expanding Greek petro-chemical
industry as well as reducing trade balances. The Public
Petroleum Corporation is coordinating effectively the diver-
sification of the energy base which must be well manned to
meet the demands of increased industrialization.
3ased upon these conditions , movement toward enhancing
Greek economic stability in the energy sector is assessed





Greece's accession to full membership status in the
Community will provide increased technical, managerial and
financial resources on which energy officials can rely to
further diversification and exploitation programs. The
assistance will speed Greece's move toward power self-
sufficiency and thus help to reduce more quickly import
quotas of energy materials.
At the same time, accession will increase industrial
development and correspondingly raise commercial power
requirements. These conditions produce a paradox for Greece
since economic growth depends on industrial expansion which
has greater energy requirements, increases fuel imports and
compounds the balance of payments problem.
Thus, accession should have a moderating effect
on energy development and is weighted: (i) = (3).
Factor II - Domestic and Migrant Labor
Trend Movement
Greece has long faced a shortage of skilled workers
and because of structural inadequacies officials can not
effectively resolve the problem. Labor managers speculated
in the past that migrant workers returning to Greece would
bring with them skills and practical vocational training
learned abroad. Since most secured only menial jobs over-
seas, this transfer of training did not occur. Now these
laborers have become a part of the unskilled workforce in
Greece and if returning numbers continue to increase, they
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could contribute substantially to unemployment problems.
Many emigrants also experienced the benefits of a highly
industrialized environment and could be prompted to agitate
for reforms that the structure is not ready to absorb.
Contrastingly, the government agreed to wage increases
over the past two years which improved the compensation
picture significantly but did not overburden the economy
with inflationary pressures. Social insurance benefits
increased and union organizations strengthened their posi-
tion providing more solid structure for government/employer/
employee agreements. High level professionals, particularly
industrial managers, agricultural scientists and techno-
logical engineers now tend to remain in Greece rather than
seeking better paying positions abroad.
Labor conditions in general have steadied but retain
structural flaws particularly in the measures developed to
train and utilize unskilled workers. Considering these
circumstancs , the movement of the labor environment toward
stability is weighted: (t) = (4)
.
Accession Impact
Accession to full membership will increase competi-
tion for many Greek companies because of lowered tariff
barriers. In some specific industries where rival goods
are too competitive, firms will be forced to close, increasing
unemployment. On the other hand, the competition will
directly confront rich monopolies and compel them to divest
their interests which will ultimately help to equalize wages

and salaries within the labor force. EEC membership will
bring better organized, more responsive union management
to Greece while improving migrant worker conditions abroad.
European Commission representatives agreed that host coun-
tries must provide foreign laborers with a better living and
working environment and more importantly with skill training.
Once the on-the-job training is implemented, migrants return-
ing to Greece will have a skill and only need to cress train
to Greek methods to become effective. Most migrants initially
tend to return to their home villages rather than the urban
complexes and with their new skills may remain there,
advancing the regionalization efforts of the government.
Considering these benefits, the impact of accession
on Greece's labor structure is positive and weighted:
(i) = (5)
.
Factor III - Relations with Arab Countries
Trend Movement
Greece's ties with the Arab world, traditionally
strong for twenty years, have continued to expand since the
oil crisis of 1973. Arab wealth opened trading doors for
Hellenic exports and the broadening of the industrial base
in the nations of the Middle East and North Africa provided
a market for Greek technology and management skills. The
two way flow of goods and services solidified the already




To encourage economic growth, Greece has always
needed foreign capital for investment in industrial expansion
projects. Substantial interest by Arab firms in these
enterprises should bring Greece into closer union with the
home countries, while the Greek/Arab bank and branches of
the National Bank of Greece now located in various Arab
nations provide the transfer channels.
The Athens government must closely consider two
implications of these relationships. Greece is still heavily
dependent upon foreign oil which places her at a disadvan-
tage in any association with supplier countries. Alterations
in international political patterns or major shifts in policy
by OPEC could restrict the latitude of decision making in
Athens and ultimtely destroy the carefully constructed
links with the Moslem world. In like manner, Greece's staunch
support of Arab foreign policy, particularly as it regards
Israel, may place considerable strain on portions of Greek/
Arab ties as the different countries shift positions and
split on ways to settle the Middle Eastern question.
The conclusion then follows that the relationship
of Greece with the Arab countries is strong and expanding
but that uncertain factors put future stability in doubt;
thus the assigned weight of: (t) = (3).
Accession Impact
For Greece to maintain solid ties with the Arab
countries is essential both for Greece and the European
Community. Greece provides the bridge between the

industrialized, energy hungry West and the developing oil-
rich/capital heavy Middle East. When Greece becomes a full
member of the Community, this bridge will essentially become
the property of the EC corporation. This condition can
only increase the need for a link between Europe and the
Middle East as contracts expand and Greece will inherently
benefit from her central position. As a result, Mr. Karamanlis 1
dream of a transportation Europort at Thessalonike appears
imminent. Greece's position as financial middleman also
requires that the established Hellen/Arab infrastructure
remain in tact and once again as full EC membership accrues
to Greece her functions in this area will expand and increase
that need.
With accession, Greece will naturally lose a certain
amount of autonomy in determining political foreign policy
which may cause her to modify her position of total Arab
support in lieu of a more moderate Community line. This
modification may strain Greek/Arab ties and weaken the
original link.
With these conditions in mind the effect of accession
on this factor is considered positive and assigned a
weight of: (i) = (4)
.
Factor IV - Tourism
Trend Movement
Long a pillar in Greece's financial structure,
tourism has changed steadily since the return of democracy
to Greece. Building on a solid foundation established by
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Mr. Karamanlis during, his first period as premier, and in
some ways by the military Junta's emphasis on advertising
the trade, the new government has developed long range
goals which are mature and far reaching. The new objectives
consider not only growth but also preservation of what is
uniquely attractive about Greece and set realistic limits on
the number of visitors the country can effectively serve in
any one season. Officials have developed new training pro-
grams to improve efficiency and tourism skills and have
diversified tourist attractions to appeal to the wealthy
weekender and winter traveler as well as the general vacationer
and summer visitor.
In recent months, the National Tourist Organization
(NTO) has placed considerable emphasis on returning the
Summer Olympic Games permanently to Greece. Although the
Olympiads can provide all the advantages of a major guar-
anteed attraction, initial costs will be high and compliance
with long range limit and structure goals questionable.
Greece still faces staff training problems and the constantly
rising costs of supporting tourist services raise real
questions about the benefits to be derived.
Projections for somewhat smaller increases in tourist
volume for 19 7 8 reflect an implementation of the NTO '
s
efforts to move more slowly in accordance with long range
goals. The decreased volume will also reduce foreign ex-
change intakes and impact on the current account deficit.
Although most prospective travelers to Greece are satisfied
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that the political situation, often so violent during the
years of the Junta, has steadied, Greece's proximity to the
Middle East and Eastern Europe always impose a slight ele-
ment of doubt on visitor confidence. The results of the
November 1977 election positioned Andreas Papandreou and
his radical left socialists as the major opposition party.
Their outspoken views against NATO and the EEC may raise
questions once again about the stability of Greece's politi-
cal atmosphere.
The structure of this factor and the application of
a new long-range attitude, project a favorable picture and
thus is assigned a weight of: (t) = (5)
.
Accession Impact
Greece stands to benefit from accession to the
Community primarily by the stronger formal ties that full
membership will generate. A greater amount of contact by
Europeans with Greek culture and thought will attract more
visitors to the Hellenic world. Standardization of tourist
service and pricing methods will remove inconveniences which
often deter prospective travelers and the final affirmative
resolution of the question: "Will Greece become a part of
the European Community?", will help to remove doubts about
Hellenic political stability.
Conversely, Greece will have to pay to upgrade
tourist facilities and methods to European standards and
in the process will sacrifice a certain amount of autonomy.
The new techniques may increase pressures toward giving

tourism the big business atmosphere and sacrificing the
traditional values so central to the goals of the NTO.
As a result, Greek tourism stands to benefit statis-
tically from accession to the Community, but imposed struc-
tural changes will alter some basic tourism goals. The
effect of accession is thus weighted: (i) = (3)
.
Factor V - Regionalism
Trend Movement
Greece's regional concentration of industry and
population into two major centers, Athens and Thessalonike,
began as soon as rural Greeks perceived that living condi-
tions could be better away from their villages. Since then
a steady stream of people have flowed toward the cities and
left many parts of the countryside in decline while saturating
the urban complexes, particularly Athens/Piraeus. Villagers
made their moves not only for material enrichment, but to
provide more opportunities for their children, a noble goal
which presented formidable resistance to officials who
would stop the migrations.
Perhaps because of this difficult opposition, the
government chose to ignore the growing problem for many
years until the heavily skewed population and industrial
distribution threatened the basic social structure of the
country. By the middle 1970 's the problem soared out of
control and even though the military regime and then the
Karamanlis government implemented stringent correctional
plans final solutions are not yet in sight.
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Some measures do appear finally to be taking hold.
The incentives for industrial relocation offered by the
current government received good response and new 1977
health care programs convinced many Greek workers that they
will receive at least medical support if they choose to
live away from the major urban centers. To achieve a real
reversal of the problem will require more extensive efforts,
such as full implementation of the urban/industrial pole
concept outlined earlier and total support commitments
toward village and island enterprises.
Government officials are not fully cognizant of the
need for regional restructuring but the complex nature of
the problem and the deeply rooted causes heavily reduce
the progressiveness of this factor and result in an assigned
weight of: (t) = (1)
.
Acession Impact
All new plans, particularly those requiring restruc-
turing of time-established networks take considerable amounts
of money to implement. Accession to full membership in the
EEC will provide Greece v/ith significant regional development
and social reorganization capital from Community funds. The
financing should allow officials to speed up implementation
plans offering greater incentives to industrial firms for
relocation, by retraining and reeducating workers to jobs




Of course the money will come with restrictions,
and proud, confident Greek officials will have to surrender
some of their autonomy to Community representatives. The
government will have to specifically define objectives and
produce results from restructuring programs
.
These restrictions should serve to improve the
likelihood of success and thus the impact of accession is
weighted: (i) = (5)
.
Factor VI - Industry
Trend Movement
As with the regional factor, Greek industry faces
deeply rooted structural problems ingrained over years of
inefficient government supported operations. All Greek
post-war governments realized that industrial development
required large amounts of capital investment, but they could
not attract enough to meet the need. The military oligarchy
succeeded in initiating several major investment programs
but they provided such high incentives that Greek industry
directly gained little. As small family owned firms began
to flounder, officials implemented support and protectionist
devices which prevented business failures but did not
address underlying structural weaknesses. Domestic firms
chose to borrow capital at expensive rates rather than
reinvest profits and Greek investors generally placed their
funds in housing construction, shying away from manufacturing
or other high-risk industries. When the governments did
succeed in attracting investment capital for other than

building propositions, investors selected light industry
or consumer goods manufacturing rather than capital production,
In the last three years, the Karamanlis regime has
reversed some of these tendencies. The Industrial Develop-
ment Bank loans funds and provides investment assistance on
a much larger scale. Major industries like aluminum and
textiles have stabilized their operations and continue to
attract new expansion capital while some of the relatively
smaller activities (cement, food processing, petro-chemical)
are diversifying rapidly.
Even though many reorganization requirements remain,
Greece's overall industrial production continues to expand
at a rate equal to or greater than most European countries.
Trend movement therefore is assessed as mixed for this factor
and assigned a weight of: (t) = (3).
Accession Impact
When Greece attains full membership in the Economic
Community most of the protectionist devices now sustaining
inefficient and non-competitive firms will cease according
to EC regulations. This requirement is a double edged sword
affecting both the long and short term outlooks. The weak,
parasitic companies will be forced out of the market making
room for new reoriented growth and freeing government funds
for other projects. Their departure however, will temporarily
decrease employment and cause disorientation within the sector
Officials will need to anticipate the specific effects and
plan appropriate adjustment measures.
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Community membership will provide Greek industry
with access to European technology and peripheral markets and
offer opportunities for joint enterprise ventures. All of
these advantages will help to tone and focus Greek indus-
trial operations as companies expand to avail themselves of
the new possibilities. The more stable environment and
closer physical ties with the EC countries will also provide
more open investment networks supplying Greek industry with
vital expansion capital.
Accession should significantly benefit Greece's
long term industrial development and is assigned a weight
of: (i) = (5)
.
Factor VII - Agriculture
Trend Movement
Greek resistance to agricultural reform stems from
many of the same reasons that suppressed industrial reorien-
tation. Traditional attitudes of farmers confronted offi-
cials with largely fragmented farm holdings and strong owner
unwillingness to consolidate their lands into more economical
divisions. Post-war reconstruction patterns established
subsidy and support systems which soon became accepted and
expected practice. Farmers did not consider growth or
diversification of the agricultural industry their responsi-
bility and although they accepted the government1 s financial
aid they openly resisted its attempts at management reform.
The large percentage of Greek adults involved in farming
pursuits represented a substantial voting block and forced
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elected officials to tread softly when making agricultural
policy. Although the proportion is smaller today, about
one-third of the working population still depends on farm
related enterprises for income and thus represents a large
lobby.
Despite the large proportion of workers employed in
agriculture, Greece is less than self-sufficient in several
farm products including important meat and dairy items and
as the domestic demand for these goods increases, import
volume and prices rise. At the same time the sector pro-
duces heavy overages in vegetables, citrus fruit and wine.
The Karamanlis regime attacked the diversification
problem by expanding the functions of the Agricultural Bank
to effectively meet the growth needs of the farmer. The
1977 agricultural plan applies research in new crop areas,
allocates increased credit for development efforts and places
heavy emphasis on improvement in the livestock/dairy area.
All these efforts are specifically directed at shifting
production to more saleable commodities and at reducing
agricultural imports
.
Farmer resistance to diversification remains and
average land holding size continues to increase sluggishly.
Some structural improvement can be seen but very difficult
adjustments remain resulting in an assigned weight of:




Although Greece has dropped most agricultural tariff
barriers with her major trading partners, accession to the
EEC will require that she implement all Community agreements
with third countries. These arrangements encompass trade
with many poorer nations which export agricultural goods
at low prices and could flood Greek markets with products
now blocked by high import duties. Within the Community,
French farmers are demanding that the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) change to include minimum prices on Mediterranean
produce and the imposition of higher standards, forcing up
Greek costs.
On the other hand, Greece's accession will help to
relieve some tough competition for her agricultural products
with the EC by employing CAP provisions and eliminating the
imposition of arbitrary countervailing charges. Current
negotiations indicate that the membership agreement will
allow transition periods for the harmonization of policies
on certain critical products (meat, dairy items and wine)
providing Greek producers with the time to adequately develop
their sectors. Community funds will provide financing for
these development efforts. Even more important, Community
programs should improve farm income and benefits,, and thus
help to breakdown resistance to diversification and land
consolidation.
After two years, accession negotiators have not yet
reached agreement on how to mesh current Greek agricultural
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conditions with Community requirements , indicating the
complexity of the problem and an assigned weight of:
(i) = (3) .
Factor VIII - Foreign Trade
Trend Movement
Greece's trade deficit continues to increase and
forces officials to rely more heavily each year on invisible
foreign exchange receipts to stabilize the current account
balance. Certain import conditions remain inflexible and
preclude any simple corrections to the inflow structure.
The continuing uncertainty with Turkey over Cyprus and the
Aegean requires Greek military leaders to demand heavy buys
of expensive capital defense goods. The cost of mineral
fuels, although not skyrocketing in the last twenty-four
months,- remains high and generally increasing. Real consumer
income has significantly improved since 1975 and provided
all Greeks with more buying power, thus more impact on
demand structure. Greek industry does not produce many items
desired by consumers who turn to the import markets to
utilize their enhanced purchasing power. Thus import figures
are climbing because of artificial demand pressures rather
than real economic growth.
As a result, officials face a dilemma. Import tariff
structures and protection schemes (categorizing, pre-import
cash deposits, licensing, etc.) take considerable amounts
of money and effort to operate but without them domestic
222

demand and readily available international imports would
force the trade deficit above the critical level. The
Karamanlis government has succeeded in partially adjusting
import lists by encouraging domestic industries to switch
to target demand goods and by a de facto devaluation of the
drachma in 1975.
From the export standpoint, recent months have shown
a broader diversity of items shipped from Greece and a
resulting decrease in dependency on the demand cycles of a
small group of goods. Within this broadened base, industrial
products increased significantly and provided the first
successful gains toward real expansion of the industrial
export market. At the same time new bilateral agreements
concluded with many of Greece's trading partners expanded
export possibilities and provided a strong market for her
agricultural surplus
.
Relating these conditions shows some movement toward
diversifying exports and curtailing imports through domestic
substitution, but also reveals a structurally handicapped
trade picture that does not promise to improve in the near
future resulting in an assigned weight of: (t) = (2).
Accession Impact
Greece should realize some major trade benefits
from full membership status. Application of Community trade
rules and closer coordination of trade policies will help
to dampen the effects of demand fluctuations so critical to
Greece's still underdeveloped export sector. Collaterally,
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markets not previously open to Greek goods will become
available. From a long range standpoint, as a full partner
in the European Community, eventual complete harmonization
of trading policies on all goods will make normal market
stability a reality.
Conversely, current Community regulations will
require Greece to open several markets to free competition
when they may not be fully ready. The European Coal and
Steel Community agreements depict this problem. Greece
currently makes no special compensation for imported ECSC
goods and officials impose tariffs as they deem necessary.
With accession, tariff walls will drop and ECSC's lower prices
will shock the Greek steel industry, ultimately affecting
its exports. At the same time, accession will make cheaper
Community exports more appealing to Greek consumers and
encourage demand buying. The cheaper imports in areas where
Greek production is weak will curtail development because
of investor reluctance to support highly competitive ventures.
In the long run, accession will benefit Greek trade
stability, but in the months immediately following membership
the impact of dissolved tariff walls and severe competition
will take its toll; thus the assigned weight: (i) = (4)
.
Factor IX - Shipping
Trend Movement
Since the military oligarchy offered major incentives
for Greek shipowners to return their operations to Greece,
the Hellenic shipping industry has grown and become a real
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pillar of the economic structure. Foreign exchange earnings
have offset over one-third of the trade deficit since 1974,
crews and associated activities have provided employment for
as much as one-tenth of the population and spin-off indus-
tries from shipping investments have made Greece the largest
ship repair center in the Eastern Mediterranean. The port
of Piraeus houses offices for all major legal, commercial
and financial shipping support corporations in the world
and even during the current slowdown in shipbuilding starts,
Greece adds an average of 200 ships to its registered inven-
tory every six months. Greek shipping firms enjoy some of
the strongest financial ratings in the industry and claim
less percentage of laid up tonnage than any other major
fleet. Rather than shying away from the critically competi-
tive conditions that exist in the environment today, young,
tenacious Greeks are buying into the industry and making it
vital and progressive. As a result of these strengths,
the existing crisis has not affected the Greek fleet as it
has so many others
.
A major criticism of Greek shipping companies is
that they do not pay direct taxes or income on profits.
Some officials feel the administration eventually will have
to eliminate this carryover from Junta incentives and the
industry will have a hard time adjusting. Most feel that
reasonable taxes will not reduce shipping effectiveness at
all. In the meantime, owners are trying to replace
surplus tankers with dry cargo and cruise ships to adapt
their fleets to the changing international market.

The structure of Greek shipping stands out as one
of the most stable in Greek industry with sound prospects
for the future. Thus factor movement is weighted: (t) = (5) ,
Accession Impact
The Community itself stands to benefit substantially
from the addition of Greek shipping strength and financial
power. For this reason Greek interests should play a large
part in developing a common shipping policy among the member
states. Since Soviet and East European fleets have begun
to acquire a considerably larger share of world contracts
(most by cost undercutting) , Community nations will have to
develop firm standards and strict resolutions to remain
competitive. Greek companies should benefit from this united
front and retain their portion of the market. Community
membership should also help to ensure a proportionate share
of the oil hauling market and the EEC's higher labor stan-
dards should help to increase the benefits to Greek seamen.
The price Greek shipping will have to pay for acces-
sion advantages is once again a certain amount of autonomy.
Greek concerns will have to make decisions for the good of
the Community, in many cases, rather than just Hellenic
interests. These sacrifices should have small impact,
however, and the overall benefits should be great, thus
the assigned weight of: (i) = (5).
PREDICTION
Trend movement (t) and accession impact (i) are not
mutually exclusive events since the influence of one on

Greek economic stability does not preclude the effect of
the other. Additionally, both are weighted parameters
rather than simple observations. For these two reasons,
the prediction quotient used here is derived from the
product (txi) rather than the sum (t + i) .
Assuming that a neutral trend movement of (t = 3) and
a neutral accession impact of (i = 3) would yield a neutral




suggests that Greece's accession to the European Economic
Community should have a stabilizing effect on the Hellenic
economy (see Figure 2) .
The degree of stability predicted becomes more apparent
when considering the extremes of possibility. If the trend
movement toward stability and the impact of accession for
each factor had received the maximum value (6), a prediction
quotient of (36) would have resulted. Considering the
nature of Greece's economy and conditions in the European
Community, this result is idealistic and a maximum quotient
of (25) (mean of t = 5, mean of i = 5) appears realistic.
The neutral-to-maximum realistic value range then lies
between (9) and (25) and the study's quotient, (13.44),
lies 27 percent above the neutral point, predicting a
moderately stabilizing effect (see Figure 3).

FIGURE 2






Impact (i) (t) x (i)
Energy 15
Labor and Migrant Labor 20











Average Trend Movement £t/N = 3.3 3
Average Accession Impact £i/N = 4.11
Prediction Quotient J(txi)/N = 13.44
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Considering the (t) and (i) values themselves, note
that average trend movement (£t/N) equaled 3.33, a near
neutral figure, while average accession impact (£i/N)
equalled 4.11, a relatively higher value, revealing that
the effect of Community membership played the dominant role
in arriving at the positive prediction.
Energy, Tourism and Shipping are the factors in the
economy advancing most rapidly toward stability while
Regionalism, Agriculture and Trade are the most sluggish.
Four factors should receive the most benefit from accession:
Domestic and Migrant Labor, Regionalism, Industry and
Shipping.
As previously stated, the values assigned are subjective
but were selected based upon quantified and statistically
sound facts concerning the Greek economy and EEC accession
as contained in the development chapters of this study. The
prediction that Greece's accession to the European Community
will have a stabilizing effect on the Hellenic economy remains
the subjective judgment of the author. However, membership
will not necessarily benefit all aspects of the economy and
officials must continue to strive for improvement in many
areas before Greece can attain her full economic potential,




This work offered the major hypothesis that political
stability in Greece is directly related to economic stability
and then set out to determine if Greece's accession to the
EEC would provide the conditions necessary for economic
equilibrium. Since this study has concluded that Greece's
membership in the Community will in fact have a stabilizing
influence on the Hellenic economy, it remains only to show
that accession will, as a result, contribute to political
calm and constancy.
Greece does not have a history of political stability.
The conservative Right and the Socialist/Communist Left
have reacted continuously in the past to perceived threats
from the environment and from each other. Mr. Karamanlis
lost his first premiership as a result of leftist reactions
to his conservative policies. The radical-right military
oligarchy ostensibly seized power because they perceived
a surge of left-wing influence and could not accept the
possibility that Greece might liberalize. Under the unique
political circumstance of 1974, Mr. Karamanlis returned to
power with overwhelming approval as a center-right leader
but in the most recent elections, the pendulum began to swing
again as 25 percent of the voters signaled their desire for
change and supported the radical left PASOK socialists.
Mr. Karamanlis now faces a difficult dilemma. The






















The stability of the prime minister's government depends
chiefly on developments in two areas: 1) regional confron-
tations with Turkey and 2) the economy. The former continue
to smolder on both the Cyprus front and over rights in the
Aegean Sea. After the death of President Makarios , many
hoped that a significant breakthrough might occur and that
Turkish troops would be withdrawn allowing Greek Cypriots
to return to their homes in the occupied north. To date
conditions on the island remain stagnant, just as negotia-
tions on the Aegean dispute over mineral and airspace
rights show little progress. Turkey currently faces severe
economic dislocation however, and has implied that she must
reduce the financial drain of her huge military structure
including the force on Cyprus. These domestic problems
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may portend a relaxation of tension and remove some of the
pressure on Mr. Karamanlis.
The Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) , now the
de facto representatives of the liberal left, agree with
the right that Greece must maintain a hard line toward
Turkey. PASOK representatives disagree however, that the
military should continue to strengthen and modernize to
its current extent, claiming that the increase in power only
heightens the possibility that conservative-right instincts
might drive the soldiers to entertain thoughts of another
government takeover
.
Finally, Mr. Karamanlis faces the economy. In the past,
if the Left received support because of economic unrest,
the Right, if strong enough, intervened to prevent the
shift. As this study shows, the Greek economy faces con-
siderable pressure from general development, industrializa-
tion and association with rapidly advancing economies in
the West. It needs a stabilizing force to assure the people
that it is progressing and expanding in the proper directions
Once the economy acquires this, the Left should then receive
little support for its claims of dissatisfaction and the
Right will have no stimulus for reaction. This study con-
cludes that the necessary stabilizing force is available to
the Greek economy through accession to the EEC and that
specific, critical economic areas will benefit from the
association. It then follows, based upon the paradigm
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presented here, that membership in the European Community
can be reasonably expected to enhance Greece's political
stability.
Viewed from the Community, Greece is the back door to
Europe and the front door to the Eastern Mediterranean,
the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East. Her position
is unique, her resources largely untapped. If economic,
and thus political, stability do in fact follow accession,
the Hellenic nation will be able to exploit her singular
opportunity to bridge the economic, political and social




ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN THE
GREEK ECONOMY
This appendix consolidates various Greek economic
growth indicators that are readily quantifiable. They
provide a picture of the internal structure of the Greek
economy and constitute the foundation supporting the factors
analyzed in the text. The body of the work addresses
several of the indicators in specific context, thus only
key elements and trend information are presented here.
For comparative purposes, a statement about the movement




Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is defined here as the
total value of final products produced within a country's
national boundaries; Gross National Income (GNI) is equal to
GDP plus the income of permanent Greek residents abroad
less the income of foreign nationals in Greece; Gross
National Product (GNP) is equal to GNI plus indirect taxes
less government subsidies.
With the exception of politically chaotic 1974, the Greek
economy has grown steadily since 1958, boasting average
yearly increases in GDP at constant market prices of 6
percent. Even during 1975, when most other nations suffered
economic slowdowns (GNP decreases in real terms) from the
international recession, Greece's GNP rose 5.6 percent. In
1976, the GNP again increased by nearly 6 percent and con-
tinued an accelerating trend primarily induced at that time
by public investments in industry. In 1977 the growth rate
slowed to 3.9 percent, largely due to a decline in agricul-
2tural output and sluggish manufacturing output.
Sector production breakdown shows that a substantial
portion of Greece's GDP is still derived from the primary
(agricultural) sector while industry's contribution has remained
virtually unchanged since 1966. From 1970 to 1976, GNP per
capita grew 113 percent at current prices and nearly 20 percent
in real terms at 1970 constant values. The Hellenic nation
ranked fourth among the EEC countries evaluated for rate of
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GDP growth between 1970 and 1974, exceeded only by Belgium,
the Netherlands and Germany.
In the EEC, the economic recovery which began in late
1975 continued through the early months of 1976 and then
began to slow. By mid-year, growth actually paused primarily
because of stock movements, slacker demand and decreased
investment tendencies. Final growth for 19 76 as measured
by GDP increase showed a rate of about 4.5 percent as against
3




1953a 1966 a 1975b
Greece EEC 9
<
Agriculture 32 22 16 5
Industry 20 30 30 44
Services 48 48 54 51
Sources: a) Herrick, Area Handbook for Greece
, p. 199.




(current prices - $ billion)
1970 1973 1976
GDP (factor cost) 9.96 16.13 21.78
GNP (market prices) 10.13 16.57 22.45
GNP/capita ($) 1153 1861 2467










































































Sources: (1970) Statistical Yearbook for Greece
, p. 471


























Source: Zolotas, Summary of the Statement of the





(average of monthly increases)
(percent)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 (Qtr I) 1911°
Greece 15.4 27.5 13.4 13.4 11.1 12.2
Belgium 7.0 12.5 12.8 9.2 7.7
Denmark 9.3 15.3 9.8 9.0 10.9
France 10.0 11.8 10.8 15.4 n.a.
Germany 5.6 5.9 14.1 10.4 7.5
Ireland 17.8 6.4 15.7 18.2 14.6
Italy 21.0 17.3 7.9 20.6 18.6
Luxembourg 6.1 9.5 10.8 9.8 8.1
Netherlands 7.8 3.3 18.7 12.2 7.0
UK 10.1 3.5 15.0 14.6 10.4
EEC Avg. 10.52 9.50 12.84 13.26 10.60 10.0
* average of (8) not including France
i
Sources: International Financial Statistics
, p. 29 (Aug 77)
a) International Financial Statistics
, p. 35 (Jul 77)











increase) 15.7 11.7 12.8
Wholesale Price Index
(Jan. to Dec.
increase) 10.1 15.8 10.8







Greece continues to battle inflationary trends begun
during the political turmoil of 1973 and 1974. The demo-
cratic government returned the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
to a reasonably acceptable level of increase by the end of
1974 but as much needed wage increases took effect and money
supply and credit expanded, demand and thus prices again
began rising in 1975.
Because of Greece's dependence on international trade,
domestic prices that creep above world prices have a critically
debilitating effect on the country's competitiveness and
thus economic growth. The government could have devalued
the currency to return Greek goods to competitive status but
realized that this would only increase domestic prices further
<
and accelerate the inflationary spiral. Officials elected
instead to limit wage, salary and profit increases to absolute
minimum levels, curtail the supply of money and stiffen
credit requirements. The administration has maintained this
approach since then and succeeded in holding the CPI increase
from the beginning to the end of the year within the 10-12
percent goal for 1976 at 11.7 percent. Primarily due to
increased unit labor cost and reduced agricultural output
the CPI increase from January to December 1977 rose to
412.8 percent.
Within the Economic Community, inflationary trends vary
widely from country to country. Generally, early and late
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1976 and 1977 showed accelerating trends due to higher
prices for agricultural produce, imported raw materials and
some currency depreciation. These effects dampened out in
the middle months of each year as wage costs slowed and
favorable summer season effects came into play.
TABLE A-
7
GREEK WAGE LEVEL/LABOR COST INCREASES
(percent from previous year)
1977
1976 (Jan - Sep)
Average Annual
Minimum Wage 22.0 17.0
Average Hourly
Wage - Manufacturing 30.4 22.0
Unit Labor Cost
Manufacturing 22.0 21.0
Source: Zolotas , Summary of the Statement of the




The unemployment picture in Greece is difficult to
display because of the techniques used to register the
large number of agricultural related workers, which may or
may not be employed, and the large number of self-employed.
The 1977 OECD Survey on Greece suggests that the 1976
1.5 percent reported rate of registered unemployment would
be closer to 4 percent if calculations considered young
persons seeking jobs for the first time and villagers who
return home when they lose seasonal jobs in the tourist,
agriculture and construction industries. This disguised
unemployment is particularly prevalent in the services
sector and with the expansion of the tourist trade may be
greater than perceived. Although many of the self-employed
are engaged in farming, nearly 40 percent are established
in non-agricultural pursuits, a figure which is substantially
higher than the OECD average for developing countries of
Greece's level.
Unemployment did increase from 3.6 percent in 1974 to
about 4.0 percent in 1975 and if the OECD estimates of
4 percent for 1976 and 1977 are accurate, Greece's position
compares favorably with the EEC Nine. The Community rate
stood at 4.8 percent in July 1976 and jumped to 5.4 percent
at the end of July 1977 primarily from new entries in the
market, school graduates and women seeking employment again









1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976b
6-0 4.5 2.5 1.5 3.0 3.0 1.5
Sources: a) Overseas Business Reports
, No. 76-17, p. 3
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Resolution of the negative balance of payments problem
remains critically important for Greece but is not unmanage-
able at this time. A substantial surplus of invisible foreign
exchange earnings from tourists, migrant laborers and the
shipping industry offsets approximately two-thirds of the
trade deficit and for the last three years has left a
relatively constant negative balance in the current account
of about $1 billion.
Greece also is fortunate that capital inflow required
to balance this deficit is nearly totally available from
deposits in foreign exchange accounts and from real estate
purchases, both made by Greeks living and working abroad.
The accounts are appealing because they bear high interest
and may be retained for five years after the owner returns
to Greece, while the foreign exchange real estate trans-
g
actions are conducted on privileged terms. Most of these
capital transfers are permanent since the majority of the
investors eventually return to Greece. It should be noted
that the net repatriation trend of migrant workers over the
last three years will begin to decrease this source of
capital inflow as well as diminish the amount of invisible
worker remittances, both directly affecting funds which help
to offset the negative trade balance.
The European Community in 1976 experienced a rapid rise
in the value of imports over exports due to stock replenish-
9
ments and the increase in world prices for essentials.
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The overall Community trade deficit was estimated at about
$18,000 million for 1976 up from $5100 million in 1975.
More striking was the Community's current account status
which stood at a $10,000 million deficit for 1976 against a
surplus of $500 million in 1975. Estimates for 1977 indi-
cate a reversal of these trends however.
TABLE A- 10
GREEK CURRENT ACCOUNT





($ million) -1605 -2816 -2888 -3050 -3328 -3887
Foreign Ex. Rets.
(Tourism, Shipping,
Worker Remittances) 1208 1628 1675 1961 2236 2620
Percent Offset 75 57 57 64 67 67
Current Act. Deficit
($ million) - 399 -1188 -1213 -1088 -1092 -1267
Net Capital Inflows 395 1045 1151 1219 1147 1330
Percent Coverage 98.0 87.0 94.0 112.0 105.0 105.0
Sources: a) QECD Survey Greece 1977
, p. 17
b) Greece Economic Activity and Development , p. 30
c) Statistical Yearbook of Greece , p. 450.
d) Zolotas, Summary of the Statement of the




BALANCE OF PAYMENTS GREECE AND EEC
($ million)


















Data for Belgium applies for Bel-Lux Econ Union
- 199 - 165 + 30 n.a.
-2048 -8581 -3676 -2551
-1188 -1213
+ 1153 + 911
- 472 - 987
- 691 -5942
+ 4301 +9590
- 234 - 687
-2510 -7818
EEC Total - 700 -13679 - 195 -8951
Three quarters only




Greece's 1977 taxation scheme provides three times as
much public revenue from indirect levies as from direct tax
income. This arrangement creates a lack of flexibility for
expansion since indirect revenues can be raised only to a
certain level. If the government hopes to implement signi-
ficant social reform measures and provide more social
insurance, officials will have to increase direct taxation
on profits and incomes including personal earnings. The
government made certain direct tax adjustments in 1975, but
since then, substantial wage and salary increases have taken
effect and once again direct revenues are proportionately low
Greece's total tax revenue as a percentage of GNP is
also low in comparison with other European nations. This
condition is not unusual for a developing country, but as
Greece continues to industrialize and improve her economic
capability, her government will need more funding to maintain
the higher standards. Most Community nations have tax sys-






1975 1976 1977* Percent change
Billion Percent Billion Percent Billion Percent previous
Dr total Dr total Dr total year
1976 1977
Direct
Taxes 29.6 21 47.9 27
Indirect
Taxes 91.1 66 113.2 65
Nontax





48.1 24 61.8 0.6














TAX STRUCTURE - GREECE AND EEC
(percent GNP - 1974)
Total tax Income and Other Personal





























The money supply is defined as notes, coins and
sight deposits.
The Greek government elected to limit the money supply
in late 1976 and 1977 to restrain rising prices. Seasonally
adjusted figures for this period show that the measures took
effect and the supply stabilized. However, to prevent further
inflationary tendencies, officials will have to continue to
maintain close control over money availability.
The EC faced similar inflationary possibilities coupled
with a sluggish economy in 1976 and the European Commission
in their annual report proposed monetary policy measures
which would "get the economy moving again while at the same
time strictly limiting the supply of money," a difficult
course to follow in all EC nations.
Since the end of 1976, for example, the Bank of England
has let the pound sterling float and by October 1977 Britains
*
foreign exchange reserves rose from $4.5 billion to over
$20 billion. This caused a 13 percent increase in the British
money supply with two months still remaining in the year and
could have touched off another round of ruinous inflation if
not checked. The rest of the Community faces money supply


















Source: Zolotas, Summary of the Statement of the
Governor, 1978, p. 18.
TABLE A-15
INCREASES IN MONEY SUPPLY
GREECE AND EEC
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